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Drawing on a variety of data sources—national surveys and censuses, probate and tax 
records, wage series and rich lists—I identify five period or regimes in US history 
with distinct wealth and income distributions. I argue that this periodization of 
inequality in the United States is a product of Arrighi’s systemic cycles of 
accumulation. Each cycle of accumulation is associated with a spatial configuration, a 
global pattern of interdependent technologies, infrastructure, institutions, networks 
and social relations, and ideologies, that structures the distribution and flow of  
wealth. Interdependence in the components of the spatial configuration means that 
there are periods of relative stability delineated by moments of cascading change 
when space is reconfigured; new patterns of wealth and income concentration emerge 
as a result. The principal contribution of this approach is to further our understanding 
  
of the impact of global processes on within-country wealth and income concentration; 
we cannot isolate domestic market institutions and technological change from global 
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On the eve of the Great Depression, incomes in the United States were highly 
concentrated; the richest 1% of Americans earned incomes 26 times greater, on 
average, than the other 99%. Eighty years later, and again on the eve of financial 
meltdown (2007), the richest 1% again enjoyed incomes 26 times greater than the 
rest. In the interim, the share of income going to the top percentile fell by 60% 
(Piketty and Saez 2003; author’s calculations). It is the goal of this dissertation to 
improve our understanding of wealth and income concentration through US history: 
income compression and re-concentration in the 20th century, the extraordinary 
wealth of a group of men born in the 1840s, the first American dollar millionaires in 
the decade before the War of 1812, and the concentration of wealth in Charleston, 
South Carolina before the American Revolution.  
It is the norm today to focus on a single historical moment in the study of within-
country economic inequality, but a more historical perspective is not without 
precedent. Sixty years ago Simon Kuznets (1955: 1) addressed “the character and 
causes of long term changes in the personal distribution of income” in his presidential 
address to the American Economic Association. A quarter century later, Jeffery 
Williamson and Peter Lindert (1980) produced a detailed macroeconomic history of 
American inequality. Income inequality in the United States from the end of World 
War II to the Reagan Administration was historically low. Robber baron-style 
inequality was a condition of the past for Kuznets, Williamson and Lindert.  
In the face of rising income inequality since the 1970s, researchers adopted a 





of the 20th century in the United States also encouraged researchers to focus on wage 
and income trends across those distributions over the last half century. That focus is 
again shifting. As income concentration in the United States approaches historical 
highs, there is a new appreciation for a more historical approach and a new emphasis 
on top income shares. This trend is highlighted in a May 2014 special issue of 
Science. The issue granted particular attention to Piketty’s (2014) Capital in the 
Twenty-First Century, a historical study of top incomes. In that issue, David Autor 
qualified his discussion of wage inequality in the United States by noting in the title 
that it applied to the “other 99 percent” and devoted significant time and attention to 
justifying research on inequalities towards the middle of the distribution.  
A more historical approach to within-country inequality offers us a different 
perspective on cause and effect. Technological change is the most popular 
explanation in the economics literature for rising wage and income inequality in the 
United States over the last four decades; other popular suspects are globalization, 
falling union membership and the rise of the service or knowledge economy, less 
progressive income taxes, changing family structure, and a declining minimum wage. 
I offer an explanation for rising income inequality over the last four decades and other 
long-term changes in the concentration of wealth and income that is unlike any other. 
I begin with a common premise, that economic inequality reflects exclusive, unequal 
access to wealth generating activities. Under this umbrella we could include racial 
discrimination (“irrational” exclusion) or higher returns to skill (“rational” exclusion). 
But instead of pursuing these well-worn paths, I point to a more esoteric variable: the 





A spatial configuration includes economic and political relations, labor market 
institutions, norms, ideologies, technologies and infrastructure. One could argue that I 
am merely co-opting most of the more popular explanations for long-term trends in 
within-country inequality and placing them under a single umbrella. Within the 
spatial configuration, though, these variables interact, are interrelated, in meaningful 
ways, and we can theorize change across the spatial configuration in ways that we 
cannot if we approach the various processes as unique, independent explanatory 
variables. In other words, we can treat (more) change endogenously. Similarly, 
because the spatial configuration spans the world-economy, this approach can 
progress our understanding of the relationship between global processes and within-
country inequality.  
Each configuration of the modern world-economy has two key characteristics (for 
our purposes): first, it structures access to wealth generating activities globally. 
Second, it matures with time, grows old, eventually dies (kicking and screaming), and 
is replaced by a new configuration (Arrighi 1994/2010). As a result, we see a 
periodization of wealth and income concentration (I call these inequality regimes) 
that correlates with the duration and transition between spatial configurations. In 
chapters 2 through 5, I track the structure and life cycle of the spatial configurations 
of the modern world-economy to explain long-term trends in wealth and income 
concentration in the United States.   
Figure 0.1 highlights some key processes (in cross-section) of the theoretical 
model I develop in chapter 1. At the intersection of space and institutions, the 





economic competition into political competition and institutional change. For 
example, war is often motivated by groups seeking to increase their access to 
resources in other spaces, and domestic market institutions are often reformed 
politically in reaction to evolving global economic competition. At the intersection of 
institutions and technology, institutions influence technological change by structuring 
innovation and diffusion; the most obvious examples are patent and copyright law 
and private ownership of the means of production. At the intersection of technology 
and space, sites of wealth generation are determined by the co-location in space of 
technologies, capital (human and physical), and natural resources. Wealth and income 
concentration, then, is determined by access to wealth generating activities (situated 
in space); access to these activities is structured by their distribution in geographical 
space, infrastructure, and social networks, transportation technologies, and 





Figure 0.1 Static Model of the Spatial Configuration 
 
The diagram above emphasizes processes of change, but it is actually a static 
model of wealth and income concentration. The various components of the spatial 
configuration reinforce one another; there is a tendency to reinvest in existing 
infrastructure, technologies, institutions, and structures of power. The diagram below 
(Figure 0.2) highlights the key processes of change in the spatial configuration, and 
thus change in wealth and income concentration. First, capitalists invest in existing 
technologies, markets, infrastructure, etc. to expand production along the existing 
spatial configuration; this is the phase of material expansion. In time, accumulation of 
capital drives down profits, and capitalists move their capital in search of new growth 
opportunities; this is the phase of financial expansion. Financial expansion allows for 





accumulation), and contradictions between the old and the new creates crisis, conflict 
and instability. For example, as I discuss in chapter 4, war and the Great Depression 
in the first half of the twentieth century were, in part, a product of a spatial 
configuration built around British hegemony that was unable to accommodate 
Germany and the United States as emerging superpowers. Crisis and conflict 
ultimately destroy the foundations of the dominant spatial configuration (e.g., weaken 
superpowers, destroy infrastructure, create demand for new technologies, 
delegitimize dominant ideologies, etc.) and create space for a reconfiguration. While I 
develop this model to suit my own purposes, I borrow heavily from Arrighi 
(1994/2010) and use his periodization of the cycles of accumulation (see Figure 0.3). 
Figure 0.2 Life Cycle of the Spatial Configuration of the World-Economy 
 
Spatial reconfiguration 
creates space for the new 
regime of accumulation
Material Expansion
Markets (as currently 
organized) are saturated -> 
Signaling crisis -> Capital 
goes in search of new 
investment opportunities
Financial Expansion
Search for new markets 
allows alternative regimes 
of accumulation to 
develop -> Contradictions 
in the spatial configuration
Terminal crisis (inter-state 






When we bring these two models together, the static model relating the spatial 
configuration to wealth and income concentration and the dynamic model of spatial 
configuration and reconfiguration, the net result is a thesis of inequality regimes, 
within which wealth and income concentrate in particular, predictable sites, 
delineated by moments of crisis and transformation.     
What truly differentiates my project from other studies of within-country 
concentration is the more complete use of space and time. Consistent with a world-
systems perspective, I define the unit of analysis to include all relevant processes. 
Most studies of within-country inequality focus on processes within the country—for 
example, domestic labor market institutions. Even when globalization is included as a 
variable researchers often stop at the border: e.g., immigration, imports/exports. But 
capital and labor in the United States are situated within a transnational division of 
labor, so the appropriate unit of analysis is not the domestic economy, but the world-
economy. A key point here is the “discontinuity between economic and political 
institutions” (Wallerstein 1979: 35); in other words, political borders and economic 
markets, and the rules by which they operate, do not perfectly overlap. As a result, 
‘economic’ competition across a transnational division of labor is also political, 
institutional, even ideological, and it can induce change that is economic, political, 
institutional, and ideological. 
In addition to a bigger space for analysis, I make better use of that space. Space is 
not just a container through which objects move; it is variegated (space as place), it 
has distance (space as scale), and interrelationships (space as network). The creation 





physical and institutional environments, and exchange networks and hierarchies. 
Demarcating space and managing movement over space are the most effective 
strategies for controlling access to resources today.  
A spatial configuration in cross-section it is not enough to understand changes in 
the long-term concentration of wealth and income, but few studies analyze a 
sufficiently long period of time (the temporal unit of analysis) to recognize transitions 
between spatial configurations. In other words, these analyses again fail to include all 
relevant processes to understanding inequality change. My analysis covers four 
centuries of US (and colonial) history, through which I identify four transitions in the 
character of wealth and income concentration and five distinct inequality regimes (see 
Figure 0.3). 
By defining the unit of analysis (spatially and temporally) to include the relevant 
processes for understanding income and wealth concentration and change, I show that 
change is systemic. The maturation and death of a spatial configuration are the 
product of processes internal to the spatial configuration. This is a major deviation 
from a literature that emphasizes competing bivariate relationships (i.e., the impact of 
globalization, technological change, taxes, the minimum wage, or unions on income 
inequality). Even within the world-systems community, it is common for researchers 
to regress a series of independent variables on the Gini coefficient across a set of 
purportedly independent and analytically comparable countries. I offer a more 
complete world-systems perspective. Instead of measuring the relative contribution of 
different independent variables, I emphasize the interrelationship of processes that 





series of countries, I locate the United States within a universe of interdependent 
political entities. 
That said, this project is complementary, not contradictory, to the 
establishmentarian approach to within-country inequality. A study with a narrow unit 
of analysis in space and time can perform the necessary function of identifying the 
proximate correlates of inequality change, but it will treat change in the independent 
variables as the product of exogenous events – it has limited scope for understanding 
the processes that drive change. For example, research in skill-biased technical 
change often evades the issue of why change is skill-biased. By extending the unit of 
analysis in space and time I model these changes endogenously.  
Of course, there is a cost to extending the unit of analysis in space and time. By 
way of a social Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, a broader unit of analysis in time 
and space allows us a greater sense of momentum in change, but less precision in 
cross-section. This limitation is exacerbated because as we move back in time we are 
forced to draw on less reliable data. I am forced at times to ignore nuance and 
construct a narrative with broad brushstrokes. That said, it is my goal to offer a 
framework for reinterpreting trends over time, and I believe this project satisfies that 
goal.  
This project hinges on the successful integration of three literatures that rarely 
interact, a theoretical Frankenstein’s monster. The first is the historical (period-
specific) study of economic inequality in the United States. This research is generally 
empirically rich and theoretically specific, noting particular relationships in time but 





macro operations of the world system, is built from the integration of world-systems 
theory, particularly Arrighi’s (1994/2010) systemic cycles of accumulation, and 
trade/development economics. Finally, I use US economic history as the sinew to 
bind the meat to the bones.  
This project represents a major deviation from most research on within-country 
income inequality, but I hope it is at the forefront of a shift in our understanding of 
that subject. I do not identify a likely causal mechanism (proximate determinant) and 
attempt to measure its contribution to inequality change relative to other, popular 
causal mechanisms. To identify proximate determinants is a worthwhile goal, but my 
goal is to place these proximate determinants in context. I consider the major 
transitions in the level of wealth and income inequality in the United States to be 
over-explained phenomenon in terms of the proximate determinants; it is the 
coincidence of so many variables that drive inequality in a coordinated direction that 
now warrants our attention. In other words, I do not believe that inequality change in 
the long-term can be calculated as the sum of a series of independent variables; the 
relevant variables are not independent.  
 I hope this project is at the forefront of a shift that emphasizes the dynamics of 
historical capitalism to our understanding of within-country economic inequality, a 
shift away from the narrow focus on bivariate relationships. The best evidence of this 
shift is the outrageous success of Piketty’s (2014) Capital in the Twenty-First 
Century. Instead of focusing on bivariate mechanisms, Piketty applies a logic of 
historical capitalism to explain long-term inequality trends. But Piketty approaches 





processes. I instead offer a discussion of global historical capitalism and its 
relationship to long-term trends in within-country inequality.  
The first substantive contribution of this project is a reinterpretation of long-term 
trends in within-country inequality that places global processes at the center. Global 
structures are large and rigid; in shorter moments of time they do not produce enough 
variation to establish causation. This problem is exacerbated because our discussion 
of within-country inequality is motivated by the available data. Often that data 
reflects shorter periods of time, and changes in the way we collect data are correlated 
with bigger shifts in the global structures. For example, data collection changed 
dramatically during the Great Depression and after World War II. These data are 
valuable for understanding inequality trends since, but are less useful for tracking 
inequality trends as global structures were collapsing.  
These challenges have led investigators to focus on domestic institutions and 
economic trends. This is a mistake. I highlight in this project that long-term inequality 
trends in the United States are better understood as a part of the global historical 
narrative. I highlight global economic forces, but also the diffusion of ideologies and 
institutional models internationally and the international character of war and 
economic crisis that drive institutional and economic change.  
The second substantive contribution of this project is to offer an approach that 
moves beyond bivariate relationships. Unfortunately, this effort is too often 
interpreted as a weakness of the project, that it cannot easily be distilled into a model 
that is conducive to regression analysis. Instead, given the complexity of the model, I 





models of within-country inequality, applicable only to a specific place at a specific 
time and with limited explanatory power. It would hardly be a valuable contribution 
to add another approach of this ilk. Instead, I offer a model that reflects the 
complexity of human social and economic interaction across a dynamic world-
economy. While it might initially appear more difficult to standardize the approach so 
that it can be applied in other places and other times, my framework is, in fact, 
infinitely more pliable than the standard approach that is obsessed with a single 
bivariate relationship. 
In short, within-country inequality change is a product of complex processes that 
play out across a dynamic world-economy. This project offers the first model of long-
term trends in within-country inequality that respects this complexity.  
To review, this is a study of long-term trends in wealth and income concentration 
in the United States. It is unique in that I adopt a broader unit of analysis in space and 
time and, from this, present a systemic model of inequality change. A motivating goal 
of this project is to identify mechanisms linking within-country inequality to global 
processes. To that end, I highlight the spatial configuration of the world-economy, a 
self-reinforcing pattern of economic and political relations, institutions, ideologies, 
technologies and infrastructure which structures the distribution of and access to 
wealth generating activities in space. Domestic political and market institutions are 
components of this spatial configuration, buffeted by world economic forces, so 
change in the former must be understood in the context of the latter. Finally, the 
spatial configuration has a natural rhythm, and changes in within-country wealth and 






The narrative I present on long-term changes in wealth and income concentration 
in the United States is, admittedly, a complex one. It is, therefore, appropriate to offer 
a brief roadmap before delving into the meat of the argument. I divided the project 
into five chapters. The first develops the theoretical model of spatial configurations 
and their relationship to wealth and income concentration within countries. The next 
four chapter deal with specific historical periods, applying the theoretical model to 
empirical evidence. Through the rest of this section, I offer a brief summary of the 
project as a whole.  
I propose that large economic inequalities are the manifestation of unequal access 
to innovative practices. Innovation is the creation or utilization of a better, more 
effective, more profitable resource, technology, product or market (Schumpeter 
1942/1950). Early adopters enjoy monopolistic or oligopolistic rents, returns above 
what would be realized in a perfectly competitive market (Sorenson 1996; 2000). In 
time, profitable innovations are copied (diffused), competition increases, and profits 
fall. A number of institutions exist to limit diffusion and protect extraordinary profits, 
for example, private ownership of physical and intellectual property, discrimination 
based on gender, race, and educational credentials, and professional associations. But 
the largest inequalities are spatial, and they trace the contours of space (distance, 
geography, infrastructure, political boundaries). 
Innovation and diffusion are not random processes. First, for an innovation to be 
broadly adopted (diffused) it must exploit relatively abundant productive inputs 





space and time, so innovation and diffusion are patterned by the spatial and historical 
contours of the world-economy. Second, diffusion often requires the adoption of new 
capital and skills, exchange relationships, and the adaption of technologies and 
techniques to local demands – in other words, diffusion often requires a significant 
investment of time and resources. Third, those profiting from a new innovation can 
impede its diffusion. Strategies for doing so include institutional regulations (e.g., 
patents), the monopolization of inputs, exclusive trade relationships, and preventing 
transmission through political boundaries. 
Self-reinforcing relationships emerge in the spatial distribution of innovation, 
wealth, production, and power, and patterns of diffusion and exchange are calcified 
by investment in physical infrastructure (Harvey’s spatial fix, 1982; 2003), 
institutions and networks. These spatial configurations consistently funnel excess 
profits to some sites and some people and away from others. By identifying sites of 
wealth creation globally and tracing paths of wealth diffusion, we can predict where, 
to whom, and to what extent wealth will accumulate. I refer to these patterns of 
advantage and disadvantage as inequality regimes. 
A spatial configuration represents the scaffolding on which the world-economy 
expands, but the same structures that supported growth in the past constrain it in the 
future. Productive capacity increases, driving up prices for inputs and saturating 
markets with goods and services. Capital seeks new spaces for growth, but these 
developments might not be consistent with the dominant spatial configuration – 
existing infrastructures and technologies, international and national institutions and 





configuration force a reconfiguration; because the components of the configuration 
are interdependent, change cascades through the system (Arrighi 1994/2010: 231). 
Global reconfigurations can be associated with a restructuring of the international 
hierarchy, the rise of new economic and political ideologies, new trade patterns, 
institutions and associations, and investment in new means of production—the typical 
variables used to explain rising and falling inequality. Features of the old regime will 
survive—e.g., institutional expectations, relations of power, economic organization 
and investment. But in other respects the new regime will represent an antithesis of 
the old regime: an intentional rejection of old philosophies, old institutions, old 
hierarchies. Consequently, the level of inequality will tend to fluctuate around an 
equilibrium over time (Korzeniewicz and Moran 2009). 
Drawing from such a perspective, I divide the history of inequality in the United 
States into five periods or inequality regimes (see Figure 0.3). The “colonial” regime, 
the first of the five, lasted from initial colonization to 1790. Wealth concentration was 
relatively low, but categorical inequalities (e.g., slavery, indentured servitude, 
coverture) were severe. High land to labor ratios encouraged an economic and 
political democratization for white men, and the functional distance from Europe 
made it difficult to tap that key site of wealth accumulation. There was significant 
variation across colonies, though; southern colonies that were better positioned to 
export to the West Indies and Europe recorded higher levels of wealth inequality 
across the non-slave population and larger slave populations. 
Two events in 1789 set the stage for a new, “commercial” inequality regime. The 





July. As war spread in Europe, American merchants exploited gaps in the frayed 
remnants of the mercantilist organization of the world-economy to enrich themselves 
and a few producers of uniquely American goods. In other words, the barriers that 
defined the colonial inequality regime began to break down. As profits fell, wealthy 
American merchants invested in a range of new businesses, including manufacturing 
built on borrowed British technology, and entrepreneurial merchants were able to 
push into new, western markets within the United States. The Civil War marked the 
end of the commercial inequality regime.  
 
Through the second half of the 19th century, new transportation technologies, the 
British emphasis on free exchange, and the growth of US domestic demand eroded 




Figure 0.3 Systemic Cycles of Accumulation, US Inequality Regimes, and Stylized 
Wealth and Income Concentration
(MC) (CM')(CM')(CM')(CM') (MC)(MC)
Notes: Dotted lines represent periods in which I emphasize wealth inequality, dashed line income inequality. 
CM' and MC are periods of financial and material expansion, respectively.  The timing of systemic cycles of 










arbitrage profits in cross-Atlantic trade. The combination of intensive (more 
productive) and extensive (more inputs, e.g., workers) growth of the US economy has 
few precedents in world history, and those in a position to take an early lead in key 
industries are among the wealthiest men in the history of the world. More precisely, 
new organizational forms (i.e., the modern corporation) exploited the more rapid 
movement of information, goods and capital in order to control markets, secure 
profits, and enrich their owners against "cut-throat" competition. I refer to this as the 
“corporate” inequality regime.  
In the first quarter of the 20th century, the Atlantic economy was torn apart by 
competition for scarce resources and access to new markets (both to be found, 
theoretically, in colonization), leading ultimately to armed competition and financial 
crisis. New national and global economic institutions reflected emergent economic 
and political ideologies that were reactions against the turbulence associated with the 
gold standard and British liberalism. Legislation turned against the monopolistic 
corporations of the last regime. Countries experimented with a variety of models, 
generally oriented towards managing market forces, but victory by the Allies and the 
rise of the United States as the new global hegemon pushed change in a direction 
suitable to a US-centric world-economy. Domestic markets and workers were 
protected incidentally by the centralization of global power, production and capital 
within the United States, and by Washington’s inordinate control over each. This 
Keynesian inequality regime lasted from the Great Depression to the 1970s. 
Domestic and international institutional arrangements that defined the Keynesian 





financial and military power, was challenged on all three fronts by the 1970s. 
Western European and Japanese firms began to compete with American firms, both 
internationally and in the United States itself; financial power shifted to New York, 
and the United States was not able to stay on the gold standard; the United States 
became embroiled in a war that it could not win in Vietnam. Rising inequality in the 
United States since reflects the transition to a new inequality regime, a period of 
financial expansion and a new economic logic of global competition. Capital from the 
core seeks out growth opportunities abroad, and is oriented towards reducing costs, 
not expanding production, when it stays home. Key financial and labor market 
institutions accommodated this new focus. Those in charge of managing financial 
flows, those in charge of managing production costs in the United States, and those in 
a position to profit from the international flow of goods and capital have fared well; 
others have not. This is the financial inequality regime. 
I am faced with three challenges in the defense of my thesis. The first is to define 
and empirically identify distinct inequality regimes through US history, the long-term 
changes in wealth and income concentration. The second is to correlate transitions 
between these regimes with changes in the spatial configuration of the world-
economy, the timing of which I borrow from Arrighi’s (1994/2010) systemic cycles 
of accumulation. The third is to identify the mechanisms that relate each spatial 
configuration with the corresponding inequality regime. In the Epilogue, I discuss the 





Chapter 1: A Model OF Within-Country Inequality  
A study of long-term trends in wealth and income concentration is ultimately 
motivated by a need to understand trends today. I begin this chapter with a brief look 
at the current inequality trend in the United States, a look at its historical relevance, 
and juxtapose my approach against the perspective offered by other studies of US 
inequality over historical time. I follow that with a discussion of the relationship 
between innovation, diffusion, institutions and inequality. Innovation provides a 
means to secure extraordinary profits, but diffusion introduces competition, reducing 
profits. Institutions can influence the rate of innovation and diffusion, and thus 
intervene in the relationship between innovation and inequality. Institutions can make 
inequalities durable by naturalizing categorical distinctions. These distinctions are 
easiest to maintain when people in different categories do not interact (i.e., do not 
compete), which is most easily accomplished if they inhabit different geographical 
spaces. Consequently, the largest categorical inequalities globally are spatial. In fact, 
‘unequal exchange’ (e.g., the exploitation of labor) always involves a manipulation of 
space.  
Space can be manipulated because it has structure. Innovation and diffusion are 
constrained by physical and constructed geographies, institutional environments, the 
distribution of wealth, and distance. The configuration of space is durable. Resources 
(economic, social, political) yield greater returns when they are invested to exploit, 
not replace, the existing structures, and those who control the most resources are 
particularly invested in supporting existing structures. Within a spatial configuration, 




opportunities for growth within the spatial configuration are exhausted. Tighter 
competition for falling profits forces capitalists to seek out new markets, which 
allows for developments that contradict the existing spatial configuration. 
Contradiction leads to crisis, conflict and, eventually, a reconfiguration. I use this 
model to link Arrighi’s (1994/2010) systemic cycles of accumulation with periodized 
changes in income and wealth concentration in the United States. 
The Current State of US Income Inequality in Historical Context 
There is nothing wrong with people succeeding and making money. But there is 
something wrong when the opportunity for all Americans to get ahead, to enter 
the middle class, and to create a better life for their children becomes more and 
more elusive. That is what has been happening: The ladder into the middle class 
and beyond has become harder and harder to climb. The American dream has 
slowly slipped beyond the grasp of millions (OMB 2009: 9). 
 
In its spending request for fiscal year 2010, A New Era of Responsibility, the 
Obama administration documented growing inequality by charting top income share 
estimates from economists Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez (2003). The 
President’s chart shows the share of total income going to the top 1% of earners 
doubling since 1980 (see Figure 1.1a). Of this chart, Daniel Henninger (2009) of the 
Wall Street Journal said that “Messrs. Piketty and Saez have produced the most 





The real value of the Piketty and Saez income share estimates is not what they tell 
us about the distribution of income in the United States since 1980. Several surveys 
offer reliable estimates and broader coverage of the distribution of income for this 
period.  
Piketty and Saez draw on tax return data to provide consistent top income share 
estimates back to 1913.1 From this perspective, we see that income inequality in the 
United States today, though high, is not unprecedented (see Figure 1.1b). This is 
recognized widely in the literature. For example, Goldin and Margo (1992: 3) find 
“remarkable similarities . . . between the narrowing wage structure of the 1940s and 
the widening wage structure after 1970.” Harrison and Bluestone (1990: viii) prefaced 
their work on “the Great U-Turn” by noting “the decade of the 1980s bore a credible 
resemblance to the 1920s. Underneath a small sliver of society with an almost 
                                                          
1 The federal income tax was made constitutional with the ratification of the Sixteenth 
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unfathomable wealth lay a precarious economy and an increasingly uneasy struggling 
middle class.”  
 
In Figure 1.2 we can see just how remarkable these similarities are. According to 
the U.S. Census Bureau, income inequality in the United States hit a high point in 
2006 when the Gini coefficient reached .470 (Census 2011a: Table A-2). The income 
shares accruing the top 10%, 5%, 1%, .5%, .1% and .01% of earners in 1928, when 
income concentration last peaked, are almost identical to those in 2006 despite a large 
drop in top income shares in the intervening years. 
Looking back further, Williamson and Lindert (1980:5) wrote that “inequality 
among free Americans before the Revolution was not too different from that which 
we experience today [1980]. Yet, inequality was hardly stable for the long period in 
between.” Taken together, these observations suggest a cycle of rising and falling 
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colonial-era levels through the post-war era, and then retracing those steps since the 
1980s.  
 
Despite the empirical similarities in wealth and income inequality in different 
historical periods, the literature favors period-specific explanations. For example, 
Goldin and Margo (1992) argued that the empirical similarities between the 1940s 
and 1970s were largely superficial, and the politico-economic forces driving those 
trends were fundamentally different; “For the 1940s . . . unique historical events [and] 
institutional changes . . . might explain much of the narrowing” (1992: 4, italics 
added). Even Simon Kuznets’ (1955) explanation for long-term changes in the 
distribution of income emphasizes economic modernization, a one-off process. 
It is my position that the changes in the proximate determinants of economic 
inequality—e.g., new technologies and institutions—are primarily the result of actors 
reacting to the evolving structure of the world-economy, and deploying a range of 
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words, historical events and institutional changes are unique in time, in that the 
strategies they adopt are influenced by local conditions. But the goals are the same. I 
use the rest of this chapter to discuss how strategies to control access to resources 
become manifest in the spatial configuration. 
Smith and Schumpeter on Inequality 
Economic inequality reflects the unequal distribution of profits. When few people 
are engaged in producing a good or service that is in high demand, those few can 
enjoy large profits. People tend to adopt those strategies—activities, techniques, 
locations—that generate greater profits. As they do so, existing producers are forced 
to compete on price to purchase inputs and attract customers, and profits fall. 
Eventually, the profit per person from that activity above that generated from other 
activities approaches zero . . . in theory, at least. 
According to Adam Smith, 
The whole of the advantages and disadvantages of the different employments of 
labour and stock must, in the same neighbourhood, be either perfectly equal or 
continually tending to equality. If in the same neighbourhood, there was any 
employment evidently either more or less advantageous than the rest, so many 
people would crowd into it in the one case, and so many would desert it in the 
other, that its advantages would soon return to the level of other employments. 
(Smith 1776/2004: 85) 
 
Smith added one condition: 
This at least would be the case in a society where things were left to follow their 
natural course, where there was perfect liberty, and where every man was 
perfectly free both to chuse what occupation he thought proper, and to change it 
as often as he thought proper. (Smith 1776/2004: 85) 
 
Unfortunately, as Adam Smith highlighted, this “perfect liberty” does not exist. 
There is a cost to acquiring the necessary tools, skills, networks, etc., to engage in a 




constraints allow those already enjoying extraordinary profits to continue to do so, 
creating durable inequalities. 
Durable inequalities, though, may be less durable than their beneficiaries may 
hope. Even if the diffusion of profitable activities is perfectly constrained, excess 
profits are vulnerable to innovation—the creation of new, better, more profitable 
techniques in their place. Along these lines, Joseph Schumpeter argues that the 
traditional economic focus on price competition and advantages at the margins is 
myopic. 
In capitalist reality as distinguished from its textbook picture, it is not that kind 
of competition2 which counts but the competition from the new commodity, the 
new technology, the new source of supply, the new type of organization (the 
largest-scale unit of control for instance)–competition which commands a 
decisive cost or quality advantage and which strikes not at the margins of the 
profits and the outputs of the existing firms but at their foundations and their 
very lives. This kind of competition is as much more effective than the other as 
a bombardment is in comparison with forcing a door, and so much more 
important that it becomes a matter of comparative indifference whether 
competition in the ordinary sense functions more or less promptly; the powerful 
lever that in the long run expands output and brings down prices is in any case 
made of other stuff. (Schumpeter 1942/1950: 84-85) 
 
While potentially disruptive to old inequalities, creative destruction entails the 
constant generation of new winners and losers, and can itself be the source of a 
“constant drive towards inequality” (Korzeniewicz and Moran 2005). Those who are 
on the leading edge of a successful innovation reap “spectacular rewards”, while 
others see their products / technologies / markets / organizations replaced and 
destroyed as they become less profitable 
                                                          
2 “competition within a rigid pattern of invariant conditions, methods of production 





The most popular explanations of wage inequality today point to differential 
returns to skill and skill-biased technological change (SBTC; Autor, Katz and 
Kearney 2008). Some individuals are richer, the argument goes, because they have 
abilities that make them more efficient and their work more profitable. New 
technologies and the death of old technologies can stretch that gap if the new 
technologies increase the demand for skilled labor. This model can then be combined 
with changes in household composition to explain trends in income inequality. Rarely 
explicated in these models are 1) the reasons technological change might be skill-
biased and 2) the factors that lead to imperfect competition—that is, what prevents 
innovation from benefitting lower-income workers and what prevents lower-income 
workers from adopting higher-income strategies? 
One aspect that prevents the immediate redistribution of workers from less 
profitable to more profitable economic activities is that with each new technology 
there is a learning phase, a period of time during which more workers (typically 
designated less-skilled) master the skills necessary to manage the new technology. 
More often than not, the effects of technological change are unequalizing at first 
but not in the long run. For example, after the learning phase is over and 
workers become fully efficient in using the new technology, firms substitute 
relatively expensive skilled labor with more economical unskilled labor. . . . 
Even if the demand for skilled labor did not decline, wage inequality would fall 
if the supply of skilled workers caught up with demand. (López-Calva and 
Lustig 2010: 13-5). 
 
Goldin and Katz (2010) describe a race between technological change and 
education (or innovation and diffusion) in the United States during the 20th century—





But these approaches are, again, insufficient. First, having been derived from the 
human capital model of inequality they ignore the complexity of diffusion. Access to 
new economic activities may require a new set of skills, but it may also require access 
to new markets, capital and technologies. In other words, we lose sight of inequalities 
between workers and capitalists by focusing instead on differentiating workers. The 
income gap between workers and capitalists (and managers) far exceeds income gaps 
between skilled and less-skilled workers. This stylized fact is highlighted by rising 
income inequality in the United States in recent decades: a growing gap between 
skilled and less-skilled workers in the middle of the income distribution is dwarfed by 
the gap between the richest 1% of adults and everyone else (see chapter 5).  
Second, they ignore the multiple dimensions of diffusion. Innovation and 
diffusion are social processes that are embedded in time and space (Arrighi and 
Drangel 1986: 20; Arrighi, Silver and Brewster 2003: 17). They respond to the spatial 
distribution of supply and demand as well as the social relations that constrain the 
movement of capital, goods, ideas, and people through time and across space. 
Therefore, if one is able to manipulate social institutions and relations that shape 
innovation and diffusion—influence the pace and location of innovation, gain access 
to sites of innovation, and constrain or channel its diffusion—that person or group can 
consistently earn profits beyond what is possible through price competition alone.  
Institutions and Inequality 
Speaking of the disruptive nature of capitalism, Polanyi (1944/2001) notes that 
“the rate of change is often no less important than the direction of the change itself; 




which we allow change to take place which well may depend upon us” (1944/2001: 
39). To Polanyi, the role of government and legislation “consists often in altering the 
rate of change, speeding it up or slowing it down as the case may be” (1944/2001: 39; 
quoted in Korzeniewicz and Moran 2009: 35). “Historically, the institutional 
arrangements shaping inequality have combined both sets of strategies, . . . 
accelerating the introduction of some innovations . . . , while simultaneously slowing 
down and restricting the rate at which [other] innovations . . . are introduced” 
(Korzeniewicz and Moran 2009: 35).   
For this discussion, institutions encompass everything from physical and 
intellectual property rights (which constrain/protect access to capital, resources and 
profitable ideas), labor organizations, professional associations and anti-trust 
legislation (which constrain/protect access to employment and productive activities 
generally), schooling (access to skills and credentials), trade and migration 
regulations (access to resources and markets), financial regulations (access to capital), 
and institutions of political governance (which influence everything else). Polanyi 
argues that the market system is “an institutional structure itself [that], as we all too 
easily forget, has been present at no time except our own” (Polanyi 1944/2001: 40).3 
In each case, the diffusion of a productive innovation (or access to the capital 
necessary to exploit that innovation), is sped up or slowed down by institutions—“the 
rules of the game” (North 1990: 3). They operate by preventing access to a market 
                                                          
3 A classic historical example is the English “market overt”. Only in a market, in a 





(goods or labor), preventing access to capital (human or physical), or preventing the 
intellectual or practical diffusion of the innovation. 
That institutions shape economic development and the distribution of its benefits 
is not a new idea. New institutional economics, which seeks to explain economic 
growth by focusing on the institutions that mitigate transportation and information 
costs, redistribute risk, etc., traces its roots back to 1937 (see Coase 1937).4 Douglas 
North linked American economic growth to institutions and institutional change 
(North 1981; 1990). Recently, Sokoloff and Engerman (2000; Engerman and 
Sokoloff 1997; 2002) and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001; Acemoglu and 
Robinson 2001) have looked at initial conditions in the New World (factor 
endowments, population density and geography) to explain the development of 
“extractive institutions” (with high inequality) in some places and “property rights 
institutions” (with low inequality) in others. These institutional environments are 
associated with different long run growth rates, linking inequality within regions to 
inequality between regions5 (see also North 2005; De Ferranti et al. 2003; Ravallion 
1997). 
Institutional environments that offer narrow access produce a distribution of 
power and resources in which the beneficiaries have both the incentive and capacity 
to reinforce that institutional environment (Glaeser, Scheinkman, and Schleifer 2003). 
Initial conditions favor/allow accumulation of wealth and power at the top, which is 
                                                          
4 Going back much further, even Adam Smith was concerned about unequal influence 
(Rothschild 2002) 
5 Korzeniewicz and Moran (2009) critique this link by showing that the relationship 




then reproduced by limiting political voice and mass education (in favor of higher 
education), hijacking systems for [re]distributing land, curtailing the capacity of 
workers to negotiate contracts collectively and to migrate, and legislating regressive 
taxes and public spending (Sokoloff and Engerman 2000). These can limit one’s 
ability to develop skills, to deploy skills, and receive a fair return for skills. These 
inequalities can influence the distribution of wealth and income within a population 
and create a group-based system of stratification. 
This approach is represented empirically in work by Hernando de Soto (2002). De 
Soto argues that huge numbers of potential entrepreneurs (in Peru specifically) are 
excluded from the formal economy by bureaucratic regulations that make gaining 
formal property rights and licensing a business a long and expensive process. The 
result is a system of dysfunctional property rights that deters investment by the poor 
and allows the rich exclusive access to formal markets. The poor are forced to 
compete in the riskier informal economy.  
The institutional environment also plays an important role in mediating risk. 
Individuals cannot control or predict economic outcomes because 1) they cannot 
control or predict the economic, social and political decisions of others and 2) they 
cannot control or predict the consequences of creative destruction (though some are 
more effective than others). Greater risk, by definition, produces greater inequality; 
the gap between winners and losers is larger. The relationship between risk and 
inequality is reinforced because those with fewer resources have less margin for error, 
so access to risky, and potentially very rewarding, ventures are open 




less consequential when 1) the rules of the game are clearly explicated and executed 
consistently (there is less uncertainty in the institutional environment itself), 2) the 
process of creative destruction (whereby innovation makes older technologies, goods, 
markets, etc. redundant) is constrained to reduce uncertainty in the speed and 
direction of economic change and 3) risk is pooled across many individuals.  
Relational Inequality 
In a review of Williamson and Lindert’s (1980) seminal study of historical 
inequality in the United States, Turner (1982) differentiates their model, which 
focuses on uneven capitalization and technological change, from more sociological 
models that focus on the role of power.  
For most sociologists, existing inequalities create differences in power that are 
used to influence economic and political decisions that increase inequalities. 
Unless this cycle is broken by mitigating conditions, such as democratization, 
unionization, ideological persuasion, consolidation of power by the 
disadvantaged, etc., inequality tends to increase. Thus sociologists focus on 
those conditions that retard or accelerate capacities of various economic and 
political sectors to consolidate power, control key economic and political 
decisions, and extract economic surplus. (Turner 1982: 530) 
 
Inequality is relational. This is obviously true in the sense that an individual 
cannot be unequal unto herself. Wealth and poverty do not make inequality, but their 
coexistence. But we can also argue that inequality is relational in the sense that “there 
is a causal connection between the advantage and the disadvantage of two classes” 
(Sorenson 2000). 
We can conceptualize this “causal connection” as adopting three forms. At one 
extreme is market competition, the rich are rich and the poor are poor because the rich 
are more efficient producers. Most economists tell us that we should celebrate this 




extreme, the rich are rich and the poor are poor because the rich exploit the poor. I’d 
like to highlight a third “causal connection” which combines aspects of the two: the 
rich are rich and the poor are poor because the “rules of the game” favor some and 
disfavor others. Institutions naturalize inequalities for those that want to emphasize 
market competition, while critical thinkers note that the rules of the game are biased. 
The privileged adopt strategies to monitor and protect their advantage while 
minimizing the costs of doing so. 
Durable inequality among categories arises because people who control access 
to value producing resources solve organizational problems by means of 
categorical distinctions. Inadvertently or otherwise, those people set up systems 
of social closure, exclusion and control. Multiple parties — not all of them 
powerful, some of them even victims of exploitation — then acquire stakes in 
these solutions. (Tilly 1999: 8)  
 
Categories are used to justify the existing inequalities when they were themselves 
created to justify and protect restricted access to economic opportunities.  
If we ignore the relational character of inequality, we are left to focus on the 
unique characteristics of groups—this approach often reduces to a project of 
measuring skill. Skill is, generally, an ability that has been acquired by training or 
experience. It is economically significant because it increases the productivity of 
labor. But productivity is not synonymous with price or profit. For a skill to produce 
surplus (i.e., profits that exceed the cost of developing the skill), something must be 
preventing its diffusion. These barriers to diffusion are not always intentional. For 
example, a skill may require immense natural capacity (e.g. physical size or 
intelligence). But in some cases, capacities that are labeled skill are just undiffused 




their advantage (Arrighi 2007: 46). In other words, skill is not the source of inequality 
but an organizational mechanism used to justify and protect an advantage. 
Adam Smith highlighted this point by comparing the work performed in the town 
and country.  
No apprenticeship has ever been thought necessary to qualify for husbandry, the 
great trade of the country. After what are called the fine arts, and the liberal 
professions, however, there is perhaps no trade which requires so great a variety 
of knowledge and experience. The innumerable volumes which have been 
written upon it in all languages, may satisfy us, that among the wisest and most 
learned nations, it has never been regarded as a matter very easily understood. 
(Smith 1776/2006: 107) 
 
But town workers were able to protect their relatively high wages by “restraining that 
free competition which would most certainly occasion” a “reduction of price” through 
corporations and apprenticeships (Smith 1776/2006: 107). 
A new technique which has not yet diffused (or, if diffused, its practice is in some 
other way constrained6), is more profitable, and that reward is often interpreted as a 
return to skill and a prime mover of rising inequality. As in Smith’s example, when a 
group is able to slow or control diffusion, they can hoard opportunity and retain 
excess profits in the name of skill. The concept of human capital conceptualizes skill 
as a property that can be rented for a wage, but we can also consider the privilege to 
acquire or deploy a skill to be a property.   
Historically, those activities in which children could not or were not usefully 
employed held a natural advantage in slowing diffusion. With Adam Smith’s 
husbandry, for example, the employment of children not only increased the labor 
                                                          
6 To produce for the market, producers need access to any material inputs, tools, labor 
(skill and time), and access to the market. Producers can control competition by 




supply, tightening competition, but through their employment the required skills were 
diffused broadly and cheaply. But for the first European migrants to what is now the 
United States, the knowledge and capacity to produce food was the most valuable 
skill and one that was too often in short supply. 
Over the last century, formal education, especially public education, and the 
demands of industrial employment revolutionized the dynamics of skill diffusion. In 
the United States, the high school movement between 1910 and 1940 and the GI Bill 
in 1944 allowed populations to access training (and credentials) that they could not 
receive at home and from which they would have otherwise been excluded (Goldin 
and Margo 1992; Goldin and Katz 2010). One result is that education is increasingly 
used as a proxy for skill or human capital more generally (historically, occupation and 
literacy have been the dominant proxies).  
In the last two decades of the 20th century, inequality within groups with similar 
educational experiences (residual inequality) began to increase in the United States 
(Lemieux 2004). Formal education is becoming relatively less important in managing 
the diffusion and deployment of skill and is, therefore, a less efficient measure of 
skill. As the demands on the labor force evolve or groups struggle to control 
diffusion, institutions that channel diffusion are created, recreated and destroyed, but 
within the context of the existing institutional environment. Guilds are replaced by 
professional associations and trade unions, and formal institutions of public education 
replace home and religious training. 
In short, economic inequality reflects the operation of social relations in time and 




arrangements and categories. These arrangements can be sustained over time, despite 
the constant turbulence of creative destruction because the benefactors reinvest profits 
in new profit-generating activities. These relations, though, would be impossible to 
maintain over time without the role space plays in locating innovation and channeling 
diffusion. 
To review, inequality is the product of unequal access to wealth-generating 
activities. First, innovation creates new wealth-generating activities (and destroys old 
ones). Second, the diffusion of that innovation is constrained in some way. All 
diffusion is constrained in time, but institutions also affect the rate and direction of 
diffusion. Inequalities, are structured by socially-constructed institutions, but the role 
of institutions is hidden, and inequalities naturalized, by categorical distinctions. In 
the next section I introduce the role of space. Space exacerbates each of these 
processes. Natural, built and institutional environments interact in space to structure 
innovation and diffusion. 
Modeling Spatial Inequality 
Distance can separate workers from work and producers from markets. Barriers 
between places—e.g., political borders, linguistic/cultural differences—further 
exclude workers from capital, more productive technologies and more profitable 
markets. On the other hand, workers in the right place at the right time benefit from 
limited competition. Today, the location of workers has more to say about their 
income than their education, occupation, experience, gender, age, effort and capacity 




It is difficult to empirically measure the impact of differential market access 
across space on inequality. If we assume that the primary principle separating 
workers from markets is national borders and the physical distance between countries, 
the impact of space is titanic. The single most important variable influencing an 
individual’s income in the world today is country of residence. The inequality 
between nations explains about ¾ of total global inequality (i.e. the unequal 
distribution of income across all individuals worldwide; Korzeniewicz and Moran 
1997; Milanovic 2005; Firebaugh 2003). These gaps have proven durable over the 
last century (Milanovic 2005; Bourguignon and Morrisson 2002). 
Admittedly, these inequalities reflect more than differences in market access. One 
alternative explanation for international inequalities are differences in human capital 
accumulation between countries and regions. But differential market access is, in part, 
responsible for human capital inequalities. Workers in poorer regions are less 
productive in part because they are excluded from working with the most productive 
technologies and in the most profitable fields, and therefore have less incentive and 
fewer surplus resources to invest in training and education. They might also be 
spatially excluded from training and educational opportunities (which are made 
available through markets as well) even if they wished to pursue them.  
The second problem with the human capital explanation is that even after 
controlling for the education, occupation and experience of workers, the gaps are still 
massive (Lucas 1990; Krueger 1968). For example, the economic gains of becoming 




becoming an engineer in Mumbai versus a building laborer in that same city 
(Korzeniewicz and Albrecht 2012). 
Measures of between-country inequality ignore the contribution of spatial 
exclusion within nations. Intra-national inequalities are relatively small compared to 
the international gaps, but we are missing an important piece of the story if we ignore 
intra-national spatial lumpiness. These range from North/South regional inequalities 
(Williamson 1965) to more granular systems of racial segregation (e.g. South African 
apartheid or urban residential segregation). In the United States, Massey (2007; 
Massey and Denton 1993) and others have noted the impact of residential 
segregation. “Spatial segregation renders stratification easy, convenient, and efficient 
because simply by investing or disinvesting in a place, one can invest or disinvest in a 
whole set of people” (Massey 2007: 19; see also Massey and Denton 1993). If our 
scope is sufficiently granulated, there is little empirical difference between within and 
between-space inequality; just the mechanisms that spatially separate workers from 
work are different at dissimilar spatial scales. In other words, there is not one 
appropriate unit of analysis in the study of inequality, and our interpretation of 
inequalities should vary with the unit of analysis.  
The impact of differential market access across space is not limited to what we 
typically think of as between-space (e.g., international) inequality. Korzeniewicz and 
Moran (2009) point to the spatial character of exclusion for differentiating between 
high and low inequality institutional arrangements. High inequality is the product of 
exclusion within a region. Low inequality also depends on exclusion, but the 




country [low inequality] do restrict access to opportunity for large sectors of the 
population, except that excluded populations now are located primarily outside 
national borders” (78). The total distribution of resources is similar, but one region 
enjoys low inequality by creating a more unequal distribution between regions. For 
example, southern and eastern European immigration at the end of the 19th century 
undoubtedly increased inequality in the United States during that period but helped 
these poorer regions close the gap with the richer United States.  
Researchers adopting a narrow unit of analysis (processes within a rich country 
over a short period of time) conclude that domestic labor market institutions are 
important and international competition less so in driving international inequalities. 
That is only true because domestic labor market institutions limit competition from 
abroad. Capital and labor in rich countries are cognizant of the costs and benefits of 
those mechanisms (e.g., citizenship requirements, tariffs, price floors and other 
subsidies), and that calculus plays a role in domestic institutional and political 
negotiations. For example, there are many examples of workers seeking protection 
from competition from immigrants, but we should also recognize that employers seek 
compensation if immigration restrictions limit their pool of employable workers. 
Changes in global labor market conditions reverberate through domestic labor market 
institutions. 
In short, international inequalities are larger than within country inequalities, in 
part because rich countries protect workers against international competition and 
hoard access to scarce resources. These mechanisms do not undermine the concept of 




political institutions” (Williamson 1979:35).  Markets are socially constructed 
institutions, so those who do not benefit from naked economic competition often seek 
to reconstruct them. Labor and capital renegotiate their relationship with an 
awareness of the potential impact on international competition.  
Confined Space and Unfree Labor 
The unfettered operation of supply and demand for allocating labor is 
undervalued as an equalizing force. Obviously, certain individuals are more 
productive than others, by innate capacity, training or choice, and therefore garner 
more from market exchange. And the creative destruction of economic progress 
displaces some workers while rewarding others. But wage labor, in which workers are 
able to negotiate the price of their labor with potential employers without constraint, 
has a better track record of fairly compensating workers than other historical 
alternatives. Unconstrained wage labor is not equality, but the invisible hand can be 
more progressive than visible ones. 
Wallerstein (1974) went so far as to say, “When labor is everywhere free, we shall 
have socialism” (pg. 127). On the other hand, it is “the combination of free and 
‘unfree’ labor and land that in fact characterizes the capitalist world-economy” (pg. 
149). Through slavery, tenancy, sharecropping and other coerced forms of non-wage 
labor, capitalists extract profits. “Somewhere in a remote village at this moment a 
non-wage worker is producing a surplus in which, via multiple intermediaries, each 
one of us is partaking, if to different degrees” (pg. 127).  
Free labor is mobile, and because no labor is perfectly mobile no labor is perfectly 




labor—i.e., when they are constrained to a single work site and ‘employer’. Slaves 
are forced to ‘sell’ their labor in a specific work site. Workers have a stronger 
negotiating position, and thus receive higher wages, as they gain access (including 
spatial access) to new potential work sites, just as a merchant that has access to more 
markets will tend to find a higher price for her wares. There are many barriers that 
can separate workers from work, but none is more important than physically/spatially 
preventing movement between work sites.  
The same is true of the sale of goods; goods are ultimately consumed in space, 
and physically limiting access to those sites of consumption reduces the sale value of 
those goods. Buts goods are fundamentally more mobile than labor, so those who 
profit from their exchange have an inherent economic advantage over those who 
depend on selling their labor. Financial capital is even more mobile, and today the 
flow of financial capital is limited only by its liquidity.  
For Wallerstein (1979), a necessary characteristic of the capitalist world-economy 
is the multiplicity of states in a single economy. Within this setting, actors must 
pursue profits. “The attempts of these actors to use non-market devices to ensure 
short-run profits makes them turn to the political entities which have in fact power to 
affect the market – the nation-states” (1979: 17). More powerful states impose 
themselves on weaker territories, and capitalists in core regions reap the benefits of 
‘unequal exchange’. “If states did not exist, in short, capitalism would have had to 
invent them” (Harvey 2006: 105). 
Ignoring “non-market devices”, we can apply the Heckscher-Ohlin model to 




regions will export those local resources that are relatively underutilized. Demand for 
labor will increase relative to capital where demand for labor was low, and vice versa, 
so that inequality will fall where demand for labor was relatively low (and inequality 
high) and will rise where demand for labor was relatively high (and inequality low), 
so that international inequalities will converge. But we cannot ignore non-market 
devices; considering that humans have bought and sold other humans in the market, 
the very concept of non-market devices as a distinct category is a farce. 
 ‘Unequal exchange’ (e.g., the exploitation of labor) always involves the 
manipulation of space. Even the most coercive and violent systems for organizing 
labor have to account for space in their operations; for example, it is not slavery if 
slaves can easily leave one place and access markets in another (and, thus, the 
importance of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 in the run up to the American Civil 
War). But when spatial control over slave labor is imposed, slave owners are able to 
convert their spatial dominance of slaves into a price advantage over competing 
producers. Some of those profits are then reinvested to bolster their spatial power. 
Power over space can be used in other ways to restrict market access and create 
opportunities for excessive profits. Market exclusion creates opportunities for 
arbitrage. The ‘law of one price’ suggests that the same good in different markets, 
after accounting for transportation costs, should have the same price. If not, actors can 
purchase goods at the cheaper market and sell them at the more expensive market to 
earn a risk-free profit. If only one actor is able to move goods between markets, that 




Control over market access also allows insiders to hoard opportunities (Tilly 
1999). Returning to The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith notes that higher wages in 
towns should attract workers from the country. 
In every country of Europe we find, at least, a hundred people who have 
acquired great fortunes from small beginnings by trade and manufacturing, the 
industry which properly belongs to towns, for one who has done so by that 
which properly belongs to the country . . . [S]tock and labor naturally seek the 
most advantageous employment. They naturally, therefore, resort as much as 
they can to the town, and desert the country. (Smith 1776/2004: 109) 
 
Towns developed a system of “voluntary associations and agreements, to prevent 
that free competition which they cannot prohibit by bye-laws” (Smith 1776/2004: 
109). In other words, town residents hoarded the more profitable employment by 
restricting access to it (Tilly 1999; Korzeniewicz and Moran 2009). Going further, 
town employment is also more profitable in part because country employment is not 
hoarded. Because labor in the country is cheaper than labor in towns, town workers 
are able to import cheap foodstuffs and other raw materials through which they are 
able to add value and maintain their higher wages—again emphasizing the relational 
character of inequality. Smith did note that, in time, even if labor was not free to find 
employment in the towns, opportunities for growth in towns would become scarce 
and investment would flow to the country, reducing wage gaps. 
Conceptualizing Space 
The manipulation of space (e.g., barriers to migration) is critical to our 
understanding of economic inequalities between and within countries. But I have 
focused to this point on the political manipulation of space. A better understanding of 
the interaction between space and inequality requires a richer conceptualization of 




which social processes occur” (Harvey 2006: 77). Social processes occur through 
space and time, and the operation of these processes is influenced by the distribution 
of power. 
The ability to control the timing and spacing of human activities . . . reflects the 
distribution of power and the control of resources. Relations of power, 
structures of inequality, and practices of domination and subordination are 
embedded in spatial design and relations. Thus spatial arrangements are both 
products and sources of other forms of inequality. (Tickamyer 2000: 806) 
 
To understand the relationship between space and diffusion, and, therefore, 
between space and inequality, we need to draw on all three components of space: as 
place, as scale and as network (Tickamyer 2000; Lobao 1996). Unequal exchange 
occurs at the intersection of all three. 
Space as Place. In the sociology of spatial inequality, place is “the particular locale or 
setting” (Tickamyer 2000: 806). It includes the “production of nature” through the 
interaction of productive technologies and the local environment (Smith 1990). 
“Regional consciousness and identities, and even affective loyalties” may build 
within a region from shared consumption patterns and culture that can cut across class 
lines (Harvey 2006: 102). In short, a place is both a location with certain material 
characteristics, but also a geographic region with an organizing principle and 
institutional environment—e.g. the sovereign state or municipality. 
Place finds expression in economic models that include local ecological or 
institutional characteristics as variables (see Sachs and Gallup 1998). Adam Smith 
pointed to differences in place to explain the advantage of town over country: “The 




The inhabitants of the country, dispersed in distant places, cannot easily combine 
together” (Smith 1776/2004: 109). 
Too often, explanations of inequality within and between places reduce to 
detailing characteristics of place. For example, Firebaugh (2003) links recent 
developments in global inequality to the “deepening industrialization of poor nations” 
(Firebaugh 2003: 23)7. Industrialization of poor nations, it is argued, has produced 
international convergence but new intra-national inequalities.  
Any approach that focuses primarily on developments within countries is 
incomplete because of Wallerstein’s discontinuity between political and economic 
institutions. The global economy is charged by a single division of labor—the 
temptation to treat some sovereign states as isolated economic systems is only further 
evidence of the impact of exclusion (see space as network) on the practical 
functioning of the world-economy. The state is the focal point of power when the 
place is a country, but power is also organized and barriers erected at other scales. 
Space as Scale. Scale is the most underappreciated component of space in the study 
of inequality. Scale has been invoked by the inherently more spatial subdisciplines in 
the social sciences (Tickamyer 2000), often for its role in impeding diffusion. For 
example, John Snow mapped cholera outbreak clusters in London in 1854. 
Princeton’s European Fertility Project in the 1970s found evidence of diffusion in 
demographic transitions (Coale and Watkins 1986). Sociologists have also used scale 
                                                          
7 He additionally notes economic integration, technological change, demographic 




to map residential segregation and the geographic distribution of poverty, and how 
the two may be related (Massey 2007; Iceland, Weinburg and Steinmetz 2002). 
In economics, scale has two theoretical manifestations: economies of scale and 
transportation costs. Early growth models assumed constant returns to scale; 
productivity was independent of the spatial proximity of other productive activities. 
Constant economies of scale made growth models insensitive to space (Pritchett 
2006). Paul Krugman and other trade economists in the 1980s began to emphasize 
agglomeration as an outcome of economies of scale, factor price differences, and 
transportation costs (Krugman 1991; Helpman and Krugman 1985; Fujita, Krugman 
and Venables 2000). In short, this means that “new production tends to be drawn to 
existing production locations” (Harvey 2006: 98). 
Space as Network. Inequality is relational—one cannot be unequal in isolation. For 
example, to Marx, the condition, or even the existence, of the proletariat does not 
make sense in isolation, but only in relation to the bourgeoisie, and vice versa. Tilly 
(1999) bridged Marx’s exploitation and Weber’s social closure to develop a model of 
durable inequalities. “I claim that an account of how transactions clump into social 
ties, social ties concatenate into networks, and existing networks constrain solutions 
of organizational problems clarifies the creation, maintenance, and change of 
categorical inequality” (1999: 21). 
These unequal relations are embedded in and across space. Relations between 
places can facilitate or hamper interactions between segments of populations in each 
place differently, and are therefore an important source of inequality within and 




relational character of inequality to theorize the impact of unequal relations between 
larger social units (Wallerstein 1979; Rubinson 1976; Cardoso and Faletto 1979). 
“The strength of the state machinery in core states is a function of the weakness of 
other state machineries” (Wallerstein 1979: 21).  
Embedded spatial relations operate within and between regions. For example, in 
the world-economy today weaker states tend to be associated with higher levels of 
inequality because they lack the capacity and incentive to respond to the poor 
(Rubinson 1976). On the other hand, stronger states are built on broader 
compromises, so advantages won by the state are more broadly enjoyed within the 
country (Phillips 1993; Arrighi 1994/2010: 325).  
Alternatively, we can conceptualize actors within regions as members with 
limited participation rights in the world-economy. Actors with greater participation 
rights (more extensive market access both within and between regions) are in a 
stronger position, and therefore will tend to see higher profits. Within a region, these 
advantaged actors can reinvest excessive profits to reinforce their advantaged 
position—e.g., slave owners pushing pro-slavery legislation. In the modern world-
economy, elites within a country can manage exports and imports to a country, and 
therefore monopolize on the profits from the local comparative advantage. The sites 
of production, exchange, and consumption, and power, are distributed unevenly 
across the spatial plane, and an individual’s economic opportunities are dependent on 
their position relative to the sites of profit and the barriers erected to restrict 




Innovation and Diffusion in the World-economy 
At face value, this next section is a review of literature on international 
inequalities, but the goal is not to explain international inequalities. Instead, a 
discussion of durable international inequalities highlights the scaffolding of the 
world-economy that structures the production and accumulation of wealth in space. 
The configuration of space and the inequalities that configuration produces are 
intimately linked; the configuration consistently funnels wealth to some and away 
from others, and the beneficiaries of the configuration are, in turn, literally invested in 
sustaining the status quo. In other words, I show how a contoured space (composed of 
place, scale and networks) allows for spatial structures that constrain innovation and 
diffusion. Drawing on trade economics and development literatures, I argue that these 
spatial structures are self-reinforcing and form durable configurations that constrain 
innovation and diffusion. 
Adam Smith sought to explain “the wealth of nations,” and countless social 
scientists have investigated uneven national economic development since. I next 
explore a portion of this literature that deals specifically with “spatial inertia”, or why 
the rich tend to stay rich and the poor tend to stay poor. This spatial inertia is a 
symptom of structured distributions of innovation, production, exchange, migration, 
and wealth, in other words, a spatial configuration of the world-economy. An analysis 
of the formation (and collapse) of spatial configurations is important for our purposes 





David Harvey (2006) organizes arguments of uneven geographic development in 
four categories: environmentalist, constructivist, geopolitical, and 
historical/diffusionist. First, environmentalist arguments look at “the ways in which 
human adaptations to variegated environmental possibilities underlie territorial 
specializations, divisions of labor, and the creation of distinctive regional ways of 
life” (Harvey 2006: 73). For example, Diamond (1997) has argued that Eurasian 
dominance is a product of ecological advantages, including climate, high-yield grains 
and domesticable animals.  
Ecological models can also be relational. Pomeranz (2000) argues that ecological, 
cultural and political differences between pre-industrial England and China have been 
overstated. The real advantage that led to England’s industrialization was a 
coincidental co-location of coal and population centers in England and the country’s 
access to the natural resources of the New World. New World resources allowed 
England to break from a cycle of adopting more intensive agricultural techniques to 
feed a growing population on a constrained supply of arable land. 
Environmental approaches are incomplete if they do not consider the interaction 
between natural endowments, productive technologies, labor, competition, and 
consumption. For example, the profitability of mineral deposits depends on the 
demand for that resource in other economic activities and the technology for 
economical extraction [profitability is dependent on our capacity for material 
appropriation]. When we make this model dynamic by adding technological change 
and local resource depletion, unequal development is not static, but fluctuates with 




Harvey’s next two sets of arguments on uneven development are geopolitical and 
constructivist (Harvey 2006). Both point to the role of state capacity, but the two 
approaches differ on the important mechanisms that link state capacity to 
development. Geopolitical arguments point to an institutional survival of the fittest; 
certain arrangements—state structures, political blocs—privilege some populations 
over others (for example, see Birdsall 2002; Sachs 2005; North 1990). Constructivist 
arguments emphasize the effect of stronger states on weaker states (see Arrighi 1991; 
Wallerstein 1983/1996). 
Harvey’s final set of arguments to explain uneven development are 
historicist/diffusionist. These arguments generally adopt models that focus on 
technological innovation and adaption; as it pertains to industrialization, the West 
developed a new set of technologies that allowed it to produce more efficiently. 
Those regions that adopt this new set of technologies share in these advantages. Other 
regions fail to jump on board and remain backwards. 
Alone, historicist/diffusionist models predict a temporary spike in interregional 
inequality followed by convergence through diffusion. Firebaugh (2003), for 
example, expects convergence to come through the diffusion of industrial 
technologies and techniques. But models that focus on diffusion in time only fail to 
account for an interdependent global economy populated by variegated natural, built 
and institutional environments, and distances that unevenly distribute comparative 
advantage across space. 
It is important to recognize that the global economy evolves with time. “The 




the new consumers’ goods, the new methods of productions or transportation, the new 
markets, the new forms of industrial organization that capitalist enterprise creates” 
(Schumpeter 1942/1950: 83), so developmental models that were successful in the 
past are unlikely to be successful in the future, in part because they were already 
exploited successfully. Arrighi, Silver and Brewster (2003), for example, argue that 
industrialization is no longer the path to convergence between countries. Industrial 
capacities have diffused, so the profit margins enjoyed by the early industrialists have 
shrunk. American producers have shifted away from manufacturing (employment in 
manufacturing has dropped to levels last seen in the 1940s despite heavy growth in 
the size of the labor force (BLS 2010)), not because it is less productive, but because 
it is less profitable and, as a result, market share has shifted elsewhere. 
Second, successful innovations—those innovations that generate profits and are 
diffused—exploit a resource base, an institutional environment, a labor supply, and 
profitable markets. In other words, innovations are located in space, and its diffusion 
requires adapting that innovation to a new environment. One implication of spatially 
embedded innovation is that creative destruction also adopts a spatial component: 
innovation in one place, suited only to that place, can make previously profitable 
activities particularly suited to another place redundant. More frequently, innovation 
accumulates; it exploits economies of scale and wealth generated by prior innovation. 
Before Schumpeter, Marx pointed to processes of creative destruction in 
capitalism. Capitalism is inherently vulnerable to overaccumulation crises; productive 
capacity exceeds demand, prices fall, and profits are erased. “And how does the 




of productive forces; on the other, by the conquest of new markets, and by the more 
thorough exploitation of old ones” (Marx and Engels 1848). 
This concept was extended by Arrighi (1994/2010) who noted cycles of material 
and financial expansion, with each cycle ending in interstate chaos and the emergence 
of a new hegemon—Holland from Genoa, to Britain, to the United States. Brenner 
(2006:4, 8) argues that we are now in the midst of “a long-term and system-wide 
economic downturn” from “the over-capacity and over-production that result from 
intensified horizontal, intercapitalist competition.” Larry Summers (2013) borrowed a 
term from the 1930s, secular stagnation, to describe a situation of savings exceeding 
investment, and investment rates already too low to further induce borrowing.   
Harvey (1982) argued that uneven development means that overaccumulation crises 
are not always synchronized across the system, but can be regionally specific. “The 
timing of upturns and downturns in the accumulation cycle can then vary from one 
region to another . . . . different regional rhythms . . . can just as easily compensate 
each other as build into some vast global crash” (Harvey 1982: 427-28).  
Innovation creates opportunities for profit and therefore attracts capital. In time, 
though, that innovation becomes old, diffused, and supplanted by something newer 
and better. But the capital invested in the worn-out innovation is already sunk 
(Brenner 2006), and a system of institutions and networks are structured around it. In 
other words, the “destruction” of creative destruction lags behind and fails to create 
space locally for more creation. Profits dry up, and capitalists adopt one of Marx’s 
solutions—the destruction of productive forces (war, economic depression) and/or the 




industry is supplanted or relocated in a place, it will also affect neighboring industries 
that in some way profited from their co-location (Pritchett 1997), and when the push 
for change gains enough momentum, the system organizing production and exchange, 
the spatial configuration, undergoes a revolution. 
In practice, inequalities between some regions are deeper, and inequalities across 
other regions flatter, and these patterns are more stable than we might expect from the 
processes of creative destruction described above. This spatial inertia is the product of 
place-independent production, economies of scale and other institutional and non-
institutional constraints on innovation and diffusion that often overpower those forces 
that encourage convergence between regions. 
A key principle of developmental spatial inertia is that some production is not 
strictly rooted in space. “A merchant . . . is not necessarily the citizen of any 
particular country. It is in a great measure indifferent to him from what place he 
carries on his trade; and a very trifling disgust will make him remove his capital, and 
together with it all the industry which it supports, from one country to another” 
(Smith 1776/2006: 394; quoted in Arrighi 2007: 63). In other words, some producers 
are (somewhat) free to move production to that location which offers them the 
greatest profits. 
The meaning of place-independent production has changed since Adam Smith. At 
the time of the first national census of 1790, when 90% of the US population worked 
in agriculture, work sites were deeply rooted in space; farmland cannot be shifted to 
another location to take advantage of cheaper labor or higher prices. Early 




mineral deposits. Space was revolutionized in the 19th century, largely by the steam 
engine. Not only did the steam engine dramatically reduce transportation costs (on 
land and water), but it also offered a source of power that was more reliable and 
powerful than animal power and more mobile than water power. Production is never 
completely place-independent (a lesson which has been reinforced as world cities 
have survived the theorized onslaught of the cyber age), but through time, people 
have shifted to work that is more dependent on the institutional and built 
environments and labor supply than the natural environment and resource base.  
The dominant convergent force between regions is that capital can find greater 
profits in less developed regions precisely because they are less developed. In 
economics, this is known as the catch-up effect: 
Consider two countries producing the same good with the same constant returns 
to scale production function, relating output to homogeneous capital and labor 
inputs. If production per worker differs between these two countries, it must be 
because they have different levels of capital per worker: I have just ruled 
everything else out! Then the Law of Diminishing Returns implies that the 
marginal product of capital is higher in the less productive (i.e., in the poorer) 
economy. If so, then if trade in capital good is free and competitive, new 
investment will occur only in the poorer economy, and this will continue to be 
true until capital-labor ratios, and hence wages and capital returns, are 
equalized. (Lucas 1990: 92) 
 
Returning once more to Smith’s discussion of town and country, he noted that in time 
profits in the town would be reduced enough by competition that town residents 
would find it necessary to invest in the country, and the two would converge. 
The Marxian version also emphasizes diminishing returns. Competition for profits 
between capitalists drives down the returns on capital to zero. Like Smith, Marx 
noted that the law of falling profits “is only a tendency” and “it is only under certain 




pronounced” (Marx Capital, Vol. 3: 237-239; quoted in Harvey 1982: 415). The 
overaccumulation crisis can be delayed by extending the borders of capitalism and 
investing in new markets (Harvey 1982, 2003). 
But it is more than the will of the rich that prevents capital from pursuing cheap 
labor. Looking back at Lucas’ description of the catch-up effect, the logic appears 
sound, but the assumptions are not robust. Lucas (1990) notes that three assumptions 
behind his quote above are violated: that labor across countries is homogenous, that 
capital markets are perfect, and that there are no external benefits of human capital. 
Lucas’ first violated assumption—that labor supplies are homogenous—has some 
effect on aggregate income levels, but wage gaps between similarly skilled 
individuals across countries are still huge (Krueger 1968; Korzeniewicz and Albrecht 
2012). In other words, regions do not fail to converge because of differences in the 
base levels of human capital. 
Second, because of poor institutional development or active intervention, capital 
fails to move efficiently. Poor institutions are costly, and can create inequalities, 
because they prevent the efficient allocation of resources. An individual or group can 
be excluded from an opportunity because they are not able to access the investment 
capital necessary to purchase the raw materials, tools, training or transportation to 
produce and distribute a finished product, even when the investment would be 
profitable. They are not directly excluded from competing economically by market 
failure. 
More important is Lucas’ third violated assumption, that there are no external 




of reasons, there are benefits to setting up shop closer to other shops, none more 
important than the co-location of experienced labor. As a result, productive activities 
tend to cluster; the role of agglomeration economies has received increasing attention, 
especially in trade economics (Krugman 1991). 
Harvey (1982, 2003) discusses agglomeration as the outcome of a ‘spatial fix’. 
Faced with an accumulation crisis, capitalists invest in construction and 
infrastructure, which can absorb capital in the moment and make a region more 
productive and efficient in the future. Larry Summers recommends that the 
government begin a large investment in infrastructure to overcome secular stagnation. 
The fix (solution) is temporary, but the fix (spatially immobile) has a longer 
timeframe. Large scale construction projects root production in place. “The vast 
quantities of capital fixed in place act as a drag upon the capacity to realize a spatial 
fix elsewhere” (Harvey 2003: 116).  
Capitalists and workers resist capital’s spatial relocation—a `switching crisis’. 
“Territorial alliances, which often became increasingly powerful and more deeply 
entrenched, arise to protect and enhance the value of capital already committed within 
the region” (Harvey 1982: 428). Capitalists are locked into these alliances to protect 
spatially fixed investments and because they are dependent on the extra-market 
interventions of the state, which require cross-class compromise. 
Once fixed physically and institutionally, producers in these locations have both 
the incentive (to reduce costs) and resources to drive innovation (Arrighi, Silver and 
Brewster 2003), and their innovations tend to reflect the needs of that place. 




consciousness” (e.g. within a country, though some regional gaps can be still be 
surprisingly durable (Williamson 1965)), while divergent forces tend to dominate 
elsewhere. The result is the formation of relatively stable zones of predominating 
prosperity and zones of predominating depression (Arrighi and Drangel 1986; 
Arrighi, Silver and Brewster 2003: 17). 
Part of “conserving privileges already won” is restricting access to these fixed 
productive technologies.  
[A] social relationship may provide the parties to it with opportunities for the 
satisfaction of spiritual or material interests. If the participants expect that the 
admission of others will lead to an improvement of their situation, an 
improvement in degree, in kind, in the security or the value of the satisfaction, 
their interest will be in keeping the relationship open. If, on the other hand, their 
expectations are of improving their position by monopolistic tactics, their 
interest is in a closed relationship. (Weber 1968: 1:43; quoted in Tilly 1999: 7) 
 
A territorial alliance, especially one built on notions of nationhood, will often seek to 
limit immigration. On the other hand, if they truly have captured a valuable 
advantage, outsiders will be looking to gain spatial access. 
One result that may arise from such a scenario is the contemporary condition of 
‘everything but labor globalization’—a world-economy organized around mobile 
capital and spatially excluded labor. With the tendency for production to be 
centralized, labor mobility is the most powerful force towards convergence. 
Convergence is not about the relative productive capacity of a region, but the relative 
productive capacity per worker. Workers want to maximize wages which, in the right 
circumstances, translates to migration. In fact, given the tendencies towards perverse 




Immigrants from poor countries who find work in rich countries might earn as much 
as ten times more than they did before migration (Word Bank 2002) 
That migration can positively affect the migrating individual is straightforward, 
but the economic theory of interregional migration and interregional convergence is 
complex and inconclusive (Lucas 2003), but a growing body of empirical work 
supports the connection. Puga (1998) links greater levels of regional inequality in 
Europe compared to the United States to lower mobility between regions (nations in 
Europe and states in the United States) despite greater centralization of productive 
activities in the United States. Pritchett (2006) provides evidence of a similar 
phenomenon when comparing the United States and the Atlantic economy historically 
with less-developed countries today. Other researchers have demonstrated wage 
convergences that coincide with variable population growth rates (Blanchard and 
Katz 1992; Glaeser and Gyourko 2003). 
In short, if the sites of productive innovation are less geographically rooted than 
in the past, but have become physically rooted, territorial alliances and economies of 
scale will encourage the agglomeration of production. Labor mobility becomes the 
primary vehicle for regional convergence (short of a spatially reorienting 
overaccumulation crisis as noted by Smith and Marx). Labor mobility, in this context, 
is diffusion by infusion; the most profitable techniques or capital do not diffuse 
spatially to workers, so workers move to the most profitable sites.  
In summary, durable regional inequalities are a product of innovation (creation) 
across an ecologically, infrastructurally, demographically, and institutionally 




Innovations are localized in space to exploit unique environments. The concentration 
of wealth, infrastructure, complementary industries, exclusive institutions and 
knowledge mean that profits tend to be reinvested locally. Space becomes configured 
as the incentives to invest and trade are structured by the distribution of infrastructure, 
labor, capital, institutions and technologies. As wealth accumulates in some regions, 
costs rise. Productive capacity exceeds local demand (overaccumulation) in wealthy 
regions, and financial capital from those regions finds higher returns in non-
traditional markets.  
Over time, many of the pillars that supported the existing spatial configuration are 
weakened. Physical capital in the core becomes less profitable, but also makes it more 
difficult to adopt newer, potentially more profitable technologies. Institutions that 
structured relations domestically and internationally are undermined by changing 
economic demands. Capitalists turn to the state to protect their interests in markets 
around the world, and emerging markets, bolstered by capital investments from rich 
countries, look to bring their international status in line with their growing economic 
clout. These contradictions lead to interstate chaos, or a reshuffling of the global 
hierarchy. War, civil and international, can destroy physical infrastructure, and paves 
the way for a new spatial configuration (although many of the pieces end up falling 
close to where they had been laid previously). 
Arrighi (1994/2010) describes this process as systemic cycles of accumulation. 
Each cycle has two phases, material expansion and financial expansion. Material 
expansion (a rapid investment in productive capacity) leads to overaccumulation. The 




increasingly shifted out of production and trade and into finance. This transition only 
forestalls the eventual terminal crisis, a series of events that marks the end of the 
“dominant regime of accumulation.” 
The spatial configuration consistently funnels wealth to certain activities and 
places and away from others, creating stable patterns or regimes of inequality. 
Therefore, it follows that a change in the configuration of space should introduce a 
new pattern or inequality regime. In other words, we should expect a synchronization 
between spatial reconfigurations and inequality regime changes, or in the context of 
Arrighi’s systemic cycles of accumulation, the synchronization of crises (be they 
signal or terminal) and inequality regime change.  
From the Global to the Local 
Direction of Change. Spatial reconfigurations provide the conditions for change, but 
say nothing about the nature of that change. Crisis creates a state of disequilibrium, a 
period during which social action has greater leverage than when the system is in a 
stable equilibrium. But pre-existing power structures, while vulnerable, continue to 
exist. Institutions continue to define the “rules of the game” even if those rules are 
more likely to be broken. Existing infrastructure, natural and constructed 
environments, and agglomeration points of economic activity are more likely to recur 
in the new configuration, but some are made redundant and others are physically 
destroyed in the transition. In short, the new configuration and new regime will 
reflect a transformation of the old, not the creation of a new. Change is path-




On the other hand, the emergent system will reflect a conscious reaction against 
the old system precisely because the old institutions and hierarchies will define the 
points around which action will be organized. Social action will focus on key pivot 
points of the old system, but the balance of power shifts because the crisis reflects a 
failing of the old arrangements. Those parties advantaged by the old arrangements 
will be weakened because 1) the configuration that structured their advantage is 
weakened and 2) the logic or ideology that justified the old arrangement will lose 
authority. As a result, change in the institutions governing a particular set of 
arrangements, e.g., the relationship between workers and managers, will tend to 
fluctuate cyclically. The net result is that, if inequality rose with the last transition, 
there is a greater than random chance that inequality will fall with the next regime 
change. 
Finally, transition generates room for political, institutional, and technological 
innovation. These innovations diffuse globally, so that institutional, political and 
technological forms can spread rapidly around the world. The emerging global 
hegemon emphasizes innovation (and change in general) that is conducive to a new 
spatial configuration centered on it – e.g., the United States quickly took up the 
mantle from the United Kingdom as World War II was coming to a close to cajole 
other states and the international system to adopt institutional and political forms that 
were consistent with its vision of the emerging spatial configuration.  
The result is that the new regime will tend to adopt three characteristics: 1) it will 




“solutions” to the crisis of the world-economy will tend to diffuse through the world-
economy, often disseminating from the inside out (or core to periphery). 
I propose the following hypotheses: 1) We can predict points of wealth 
accumulation (the character of an inequality regime) from the configuration of the 
world economy. 2) Inequality regime change will be synchronized with spatial 
reconfigurations. 3) The new regime will share many features with the old regime, 
but will tend to produce a reversal in the degree of wealth and income concentration, 
and some characteristics of the new regime will have been disseminated from the 
most powerful state(s) at the time. 
Systemic Causality and the Counterfactual Fallacy 
In this project I employ a world-systems perspective. This means that I accept as a 
matter of principle that the key processes driving income inequality in the United 
States are not all contained within its political boundaries: e.g., global flows of goods, 
capital, and labor/technology, ideologies, and policies; unequal relations and access to 
markets; global economic dynamics (systemic cycles of accumulation); domestic 
investment patterns (economic specialization and access to capital). The historical 
example of slavery is particularly useful. Slavery was the principle source of 
inequality in the colonies, both in the unequal relations between slaves and slave 
owners and in the unequal relations between slave owners and free households 
without slaves. The institution of slavery was adapted from slave models in colonies 
to the south. The supply of slaves was made possible by unequal relations between 




were exported to Europe and the Caribbean. Slavery, and its impact on inequality, 
within the United States makes no sense without a global perspective. 
This perspective has a few important methodological implications. First, it is not 
appropriate to treat countries as equal and independent observations. They are not 
independent. Country-level outcomes in the United States depend on processes within 
countries around the world and the networks between these countries. And they are 
not equal. Concepts of Westphalian sovereignty aside, Luxembourg and China are not 
analytically comparable. They should not be treated as standardized units of 
observation. 
Second (and building on the first), generalization, and therefore significance 
testing, is devoid of meaning because there is only one world system. A study of 
income inequality in the United States can apply theory to define mechanisms, 
develop hypotheses, and identify correlations. But that single observation, with a 
sample size of one, represents the entire universe of the study.  
A popular approach to the study of within-country inequality is to look at 
inequality change within a country over time and test for significant covariance with 
explanatory variables. The potential for omitted variable bias using this approach is 
overwhelming. Not only do we need to recognize the potential impact of reflexivity 
(past outcomes can influence future outcomes), but the entire global-historical context 
changes with time. These limitations ultimately mean that it is impossible to establish 
an appropriate counterfactual. Any quantitative measure of a variable’s impact 
requires a control – a situation in which the variable is not allowed to vary. But in the 




States of the past nor Germany in the present is an appropriate control for the United 
States in the present.  
For example, what would income inequality in the United States look like today if 
the minimum wage had kept pace with inflation? Many researchers have approached 
this problem with some form of multivariate analysis, comparing observations across 
countries or over time. These all assume some scenario of ceteris paribus – what 
would inequality look like if all else was equal. But all else cannot be equal; in fact, 
all else must be different; it is a fundamentally different world in which the minimum 
wage in the United States keeps pace with inflation. Minimum wage does not change 
(or not not change) in a vacuum, and it defies rationality to propose a scenario in 
which it does. Therefore, it is fundamentally impossible to uniquely measure the 
impact of the minimum wage (or any other explanatory variable) on inequality in the 
United States.  
The emphasis on measuring the relative contribution of a host of potential 
explanatory variables on inequality is motivated by a search for policy implications. 
If we could isolate the impact of the minimum wage on income inequality, for 
example, minimum wage policy would be better informed. This is a valid goal. But 
this project has a different goal. I seek to explain the long-term changes in wealth and 
income concentration. Projects that adopt a narrower unit of analysis seek to explain 
fluctuations in the size distribution of income (i.e., inequality) over a short period of 
time. By contrast, I seek to explain the larger historical transitions. The difference 




1920 and 1940, and again after 1970, not the substantial but impermanent fluctuations 
we see at shorter time scales.  
In this sense, this project is not meant to challenge the traditional literature on 
within-country inequality, and in fact I draw heavily on that research to identify the 
key mechanisms linking spatial configurations to the concentration of wealth and 
income in the United States. The difference is the interpretation of causality. Change 
is not the cumulative outcome of a host of independent variables; it is systemic. I do 
not treat minimum wage policy as an independent variable, but as an institutional 
solution, one of many, designed to achieve a particular outcome. My goal, then, is to 
identify and explain a constellation of changes (economic, institutional, 
technological) that, in turn, create a new economic elite and increase or decrease the 
concentration of wealth and income. 
The Dependent Variable. Throughout the project I refer to within-country inequality 
as the phenomenon I am explaining, but I do so only as a form of shorthand. My real 
focus is wealth and income concentration, or the share of wealth or income that is 
controlled by those at the top of the distribution. In other words, I limit my attention 
to one point in the distribution instead of the entire distribution. I do so for four 
reasons. First, changes in the distribution of income or wealth across the entire 
distribution is excessively complex; a mechanism that impacts the distribution of 
income at the top of the distribution may not impact those at the bottom of the 
distribution, and vice versa. 
Second, the distribution of incomes across the entire distribution is often driven 




richest tend to control such a large share of total wealth and income. This can be 
demonstrated geometrically using the Gini coefficient, the most popular point 
estimate of inequality in a population. The Gini coefficient is equal to twice the area 
between the Lorentz curve (which traces cumulative income or wealth by cumulative 
population) and the 45 degree line. In the chart below (Figure 1.3), the Gini 
coefficient would be equal to twice the entire shaded area (light and dark). 
Using this metric, if we are given a top income share—for example, the top 10% 
of earners receive 33% of total income—the geometry of the Gini coefficient gives us 
an upper and lower bound of possible values, a maximum and minimum Gini 
coefficient for the entire population.  On the chart above, the lightly shaded area 
would be the minimum Gini—if income were to be distributed as evenly as possible 
across the population given that the top 10% of earners receive 33% of total income, 
this would be our income distribution. This area is equal to (y-x)/2, where y is the 
income share and x is the proportion of the total population, and the minimum Gini is 
equal to y-x, or .230. We can also calculate the maximum Gini as 1-x/y, or .700. In 
this case, the true Gini is .451. The minimum Gini is equal to 51.4% of the true Gini. 
Assuming a log normal distribution of income (and large population distributions 
rarely deviate enough from a log normal distribution to invalidate this assumption), 
the minimum Gini based on the income share of the top 10% of earners generally 
represents about 50% of the true Gini, the top 5% about 33% of the true Gini, and the 




               Figure 1.3 The Lorentz Curve, Gini Coefficient, and Minimum Gini 
 
Empirically, the importance of the top shares may be greater than this abstract 
discussion suggests. For example, according to the Census Bureau (2014), the US 
Gini for household income inequality increased from .403 to .468 between 1980 and 
2009. During that time, the income share of the top 5% of households increased from 
16.5% to 21.7%, lifting the minimum Gini during that period from .115 to .167. This 
rise in minimum Gini (of .052) is equal to 80% of the total rise in the true Gini over 
that period (and 94% of the rise between 1980 and 2000). 
In addition to its direct impact on inequality, top income shares can inform us 
about the distribution of incomes below. Income shares at other levels are correlated 
because income and wealth distributions tend to follow predictable patterns. Gains by 
the top 10% of earners are usually mirrored by smaller gains for the next 10% and 
losses for the bottom 40%. For example, Piketty and Saez’s (2003) top income shares 




they only provide data for the top 10% of earners (see chapter 4 for a more detailed 
discussion). 
Third, the abstract and empirical importance of top income shares is also 
theoretically important because it forces us to emphasize explanations for rising or 
falling inequality that focus on the richest members of a society. I would argue that it 
is more sociologically relevant if the top 1% of earners capture an additional 5% of 
total income than if the top 40% of earners capture an additional 10%. Most research 
on rising income inequality in the United States, though, has focused on the latter.  
Finally, historical data is often collected and/or reported only for the richest 
individuals or households, e.g., the percent of total wealth or income controlled by the 
richest 1% or 10% of households. Additionally, before 1913 there is little reliable 
information on the distribution of incomes, particularly at the top of the distribution. 
Therefore, from 1600 to 1913, I focus primarily on trends in the concentration of 
wealth; after 1913 I look also at the concentration of income. 
Summary 
In this project I offer an explanation for the long-term changes in the 
concentration of wealth and income in the United States. Against a literature that 
emphasizes multivariate models of change, with researchers promoting competing 
explanatory variables, I offer a systemic model. Specifically, the spatial distribution 
and flow of wealth globally is structured by an integrated configuration of 
international and domestic institutions, physical infrastructure, economic and political 
ideologies, and informal networks.  These conditions determine to whom and to what 




Change is the result of contradictions within these spatial configurations. As the 
configuration ages, profits fall in older economic activities and new competitors—
new technologies, new markets, rising national powers—are constrained by the 
institutional arrangements, relations and infrastructure of the spatial configuration. 
These contradictions lead ultimately to crisis, chaos and a reconfiguration. The 
character of wealth and income concentration change as a result. 
Each of the following chapters deal with a specific historical period: the colonial 
inequality regime from 1600 to 1790, the commercial regime from 1790 to 1860, the 
corporate regime from 1865 to 1929, the Keynesian regime from 1929 to 1973, and 
the financial regime from 1973 to the present. I also use chapter 5 to speculate on the 
next inequality regime. Each chapter describes the crisis that drove inequality regime 
change, the global context of crisis, and situates the emergent inequality regime 




Chapter 2: The Colonial Inequality Regime(s) 
The story of wealth and income concentration in the United States is composed 
principally of two narratives. The first tracks the systemic cycles of accumulation of 
the world-economy. Early colonization correlated with the financial expansion near 
the end of the Genoese cycle. The end of the colonial inequality regime (and the end 
of British control of the territory) can be causally linked to conflict at the end of the 
Dutch cycle (see chapter 3). As such, wealth concentration in the colonial inequality 
regime reflects the configuration of space during the Dutch cycle (see Figure 0.3).  
The second narrative is the secular convergence of the United States with the 
centers of wealth and power in the world-economy. In the early colonial period, the 
territory that would become the United States was a second-class colony. By the mid-
20th century, the United States was the center of economic, financial, and military 
power in the world-economy. Economic inequality is ultimately a product of the 
exclusive access to wealth generating activities situated in space, the intersection of 
functional distance and institutional constraints on access. The colonial inequality 
regime is a useful foil for understanding the effect of convergence on wealth and 
income concentration in the 19th and 20th centuries.  
In this chapter I discuss the spatial configuration of the Dutch cycle, the 
peripheral position of the colonies in that configuration, and the resulting degree and 
character of wealth concentration in the colonies. Our interpretation of economic 
inequality in the territory that would become the original United States during the 
colonial period depends on where we choose to look. The experience of puritanical 




Carolina was high if we consider only free households, and it defies modern 
comparison if we include that half of the population living in bondage (Jones 1977; 
1980). Relatively egalitarian Pennsylvania was more dependent on indentured 
servitude than any other colony (Herrick 1969). Inequality rises if we count British 
proprietors and married women whose legal rights, including ownership, passed to 
their husbands (Shanahan and Correll 1997). In other words, our interpretation of 
colonial economic inequality will vary depending on geography and the unit of 
observation.  
That being said, wealth concentration across free, resident colonial households 
was lower than in contemporary England, and lower than in the United States towards 
the end of the 19th century. Wealth and status were principally defined by land 
ownership, and colonial administrators were giving land away. With land in 
abundance, labor was scarce and relatively pricey. Because land was relatively cheap 
(Christensen 1981), the very wealthiest often distinguished themselves by 
accumulating other, more portable assets; slaves and ships were particularly 
important.  
Early colonial wealth accumulation was limited by market size and reach. In 
1700, the purchasing power of Europe (gross domestic product adjusted for the 
relative cost of goods locally) was 20 times that of what would become the United 
States, and England’s purchasing power was more than 7.5 times greater than that in 
the colonies (Maddison 2008; author’s calculations). The ability to accumulate wealth 
in the colonies was tied to one’s capacity to exploit American resources and export 




and too dependent on subsistence farming, to produce huge profits for a large-scale 
producer. But the North American colonies in the early colonial period were 
relatively devoid of high-demand exports (i.e., goods that Europeans were willing to 
pay a high premium to obtain) and profits were constrained by high transportation 
costs and mercantilist trade policies.  
In short, the principle source of wealth (i.e., land), was broadly distributed and 
wages were relatively high; the American economy was too small to support a local, 
large-scale producer, so little wealth could be accumulated by producing for the 
domestic market; Americans struggled to find exports (like sugar and silver) that were 
valuable enough in Europe to overcome the political, technological and 
organizational constraints to penetrating European markets. As a result, wealth 
inequality across free households during this period was relatively low and 
fluctuating with the price of exports.  
I begin this chapter with a brief discussion of contemporary perspectives and 
interpretations of inequality in the colonies and early United States before turning to 
the empirical evidence on wealth inequality in the colonies. I then discuss the 
transformative effect of the unique physical environment of the Americas on 
imported European institutions and traditions; because the functional distance from 
Europe created a sense of isolation, the process of institutional adaptation is often 
treated locally, but I emphasize that functional distance is a component of the spatial 
configuration. Institutional change occurred at the intersection of space, broadly 
conceived, and the existing institutional arrangements. I then consider the impact of 




imported institutions, the frontier, mercantilism, and the intersection of technology, 
natural resources and the functional distance to markets. Ultimately, the inequality 
experience of the colonies, from trade to slavery, even their relative isolation, was a 
global phenomenon. 
The Mythos of Colonial Inequality 
Economic inequality in the region was a matter of great philosophical, moral, and 
political consequence in the decades after the Revolution. Political and economic 
democratization were theoretically linked. For example, James Madison in a letter to 
Thomas Jefferson drew a causal arrow from political freedom to economic 
egalitarianism, “I have no doubt but that the misery of the lower classes will be found 
to abate wherever the Government assumes a freer aspect, & the laws favor a 
subdivision of property” (1787, quoted in Soltow 1989: 12). 
In that same year, John Adams also linked democratization with lower levels of 
inequality, but detailed a more pernicious mechanism: 
Perhaps, at first, prejudice, habit, shame or fear, principle or religion, would 
restrain the poor from attacking the rich, and the idle from usurping on the 
industrious, but the time would not be long before courage and enterprise would 
come, and pretexts be invented by degrees, to countenance the majority in 
dividing all the property among them, or at least, in sharing it equally with its 
present possessors. Debts would be abolished first; taxes laid heavy on the rich, 
and not at all on the others; and at last a downright equal division of every thing 
be demanded, and voted. (John Adams 1787, quoted in Soltow 1989: 19). 
 
Like Adams, and now writing after the French Revolution, Alexis de Tocqueville 
feared ‘equality in servitude’: "But one also finds in the human heart a depraved taste 
for equality, which impels the weak to want to bring the strong down to their level, 




(Tocqueville 1835: ch. 3). But he also saw the arrow of causation running in the other 
direction, 
Among the new objects that attracted my attention during my stay in the United 
States, none struck my eye more vividly than the equality of conditions. I 
discovered without difficulty the enormous influence that this primary fact 
exerts on the course of society; it gives a certain direction to public spirit, a 
certain turn to the laws, new maxims to those who govern, and particular habits 
to the governed. (Tocqueville 1835: preface). 
 
In the Federalist Papers, James Madison emphasized the risk presented by class 
conflict to political stability. 
The most common and durable source of factions has been the various and 
unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without 
property have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors, 
and those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a 
manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many 
lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into 
different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The regulation of 
these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern 
legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and 
ordinary operations of the government. (Madison 1787: No. 10). 
 
This was not an abstract interest in economic inequality for its own sake. The 
American Revolution was a project in bringing political governance in line with the 
existing material conditions of social life. Before the political revolution there was an 
economic revolution that transformed economic institutions and social relations and 
would eventually make British rule untenable. In this sense, inherently at issue was a 
comparison of economic inequality in the colonies to that in Europe, as it was 
intimately linked to independence and a new model of governance. Contemporary 
observers, both American and European, often noted greater equality among the 




Lord Adam Gordon, 1764: The levelling principle here, everywhere operates 
strongly and takes the lead, and everybody has property here, and everybody 
knows it (quoted in Mereness 1916: 449, Williamson and Lindert 1980: 9). 
 
Benjamin Franklin, 1772: I have lately made a Tour thro’ Ireland and Scotland. 
In those Countries a small Part of Society are Landlords, great Noblemen, and 
Gentlemen, extreamly opulent, living in the highest Affluence and 
Magnificence: The Bulk of the People Tenants, extreamly poor, living in the 
most sordid Wretchedness, in dirty Hovels of Mud and Straw, and cloathed only 
in rags. I thought often of the Happiness of New England, where every Man is 
Freeholder, has a Vote in publick Affairs, lives in a tidy, warm House (quoted in 
Soltow 1989: 10). 
 
While not fundamentally disagreeing with the observation of general equality, the 
reaction of La Rochefoucauld to his trip in 1797 is far less romantic, “The inhabitant 
here is proprietor and cultivator; that he lives as he pleases, must be admitted; but in 
the most remote and uninhabited parts of America that I have visited, I have never 
seen a greater proportion of wretched habitations” (quoted in Soltow 1989: 13).  
The early United States had a high rate of landownership, but land did not 
correlate with wealth as it did in Europe. For example, it required about 1/50th as 
much labor time to buy a parcel of land in America as it would to buy that same land 
in England in 1790 (Christensen 1981). Land was cheap on the frontier but it was also 
unimproved and distant from markets, so it did not generate the same revenues as 
land in Europe. As a result, despite high rates of landownership, life on the frontier, 
was decidedly nasty, brutish and short. “Travelers into the frontier regions were often 
appalled at the meager diet, squalid housing, and near-absence of creature comforts to 
which homesteaders subjected themselves while they sank most of their time and 
resources . . . in to the business of farm development” (Vickers 1996: 218). 
Conditions were less stark in older settlements, but the North American colonies were 




Observers of American wealth and poverty were also selective (Soltow 1989). 
Jefferson admitted that beggars do present themselves in larger towns, but “these are 
usually foreigners” (Jefferson 1787: Query 14). Property was held widely among free 
men, but 17% of the US population was enslaved in 1800. More than 25% of South 
Carolina, Virginia, Georgia, Maryland and North Carolina (representing four of the 
country’s seven most populous states) were enslaved in that year (1800 Census, 
Historical Census Browser 2004). British coverture meant that married women’s legal 
rights (including property rights) were subsumed under those of her husband. In light 
of these categorical inequalities, to claim that “everybody has property here, and 
everybody knows it” reflects a myopic perspective on US wealth inequality. 
At the time, the leading thesis for American exceptionalism was the 
transformative effect of the American frontier. Land was relatively cheap, as noted 
above, and many colonies employed headright grants to attract settlers, whereby land 
was given to those willing to cross the Atlantic. James Madison (1786) admitted that 
superior governance might not be the only factor in the abatement of the misery of the 
lower classes: 
Our limited population has probably as large a share in producing this effect 
[comparative comfort of the mass of people in the United States] as the political 
advantages which distinguish us. A certain degree of misery seems inseparable 
from a high degree of populousness. If the lands in Europe which are now 
dedicated to the amusement of the idle rich, were parceled out among the idle 
poor, I readily conceive the happy revolution which would be experienced by a 
certain proportion of the latter. But still would there not remain a great 
proportion unrelieved? (Madison 1786) 
 
A century later, Frederick Jackson Turner (1893/1996) formalized and extended 
the logic relating the American frontier to the ‘American character’ – democratic, 




explore new social forms and practices. To quote Turner’s own gratuitously romantic 
language: 
In the settlement of America we have to observe how European life entered the 
continent, and how America modified and developed that life and reacted on 
Europe. . . The wilderness masters the colonist. It finds him a European in dress, 
industries, tools, modes of travel, and thought. It takes him from the railroad car 
and puts him in the birch canoe. It strips off the garments of civilization and 
arrays him in the hunting shirt and the moccasin. It puts him in the log cabin of 
the Cherokee and Iroquois and runs an Indian palisade around him. Before long 
he has gone to planting Indian corn and plowing with a sharp stick, he shouts 
the war cry and takes the scalp in orthodox Indian fashion. In short, at the 
frontier the environment is at first too strong for the man. He must accept the 
conditions which it furnishes, or perish, and so he fits himself into the Indian 
clearings and follows the Indian trails. Little by little he transforms the 
wilderness, but the outcome is not the old Europe . . . . The fact is, that here is a 
new product that is American. (Turner 1893/1996: ch. 1). 
 
Drawing on the economic theories of Malthus and Ricardo, Kearl, Pope and 
Wimmer (1980) extend the Turner thesis to hypothesize that inequality was lower on 
the frontier, and that inequality increased with population density.  
In this line of thought, the colonial historian Jackson T. Main (1976) argues that 
European class structure, with highly concentrated levels of wealth, was exported to 
the colonies, but these institutions proved impossible to maintain in the colonies. 
Likewise, institutional economists Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James 
Robinson (2001; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012) differentiate the institutional models 
of the North American colonies from those in South America, and associate these 
differences with native population density and political structure and sources of 
exportable wealth (see also Engerman and Sokoloff 1997; 2002; Sokoloff and 
Engerman 2000).  
Williamson and Lindert (1980) began their discussion of colonial wealth by 




seriously debated” (p. 10). But Lee Soltow’s (1989) study of the First Direct Tax of 
1798 suggested that wealth inequality at the turn of the 19th century was as high as it 
was on the eve of the Civil War. As Peter Lindert (2000) notes, this would suggest 
that early American wealth inequality was also as high as in England at the same 
time. Others have noted that estimates of colonial wealth inequality, particularly from 
Jones (1977; 1980), severely underestimate experienced inequality by ignoring 
coverture, indentured servitude and slavery, and large estates owned by British 
nonresidents (Shammas 1993; Shanahan and Corell 1997).  
The reality is that there was no single inequality regime through the colonial and 
Revolutionary periods. Inequality is best understood at the intersection of 
discontinuous political and economic institutions; as such, a study of economic 
inequality across the North American British colonies and United States under the 
Articles of Confederation should focus on the intersection of regional variations (e.g. 
diverse geographies) and shared experiences (e.g., British institutional histories) as 
they interact over time (e.g., westward expansion). In other words, economic 
inequality in the colonial inequality regimes was low in some places and high in 
others, was steady and rose over time, was defined by slavery in some regions and by 
the absence of slavery in others. The aggregate is theoretically and experientially 
meaningless even if it was mythologically relevant. 
A Note on Data 
Wealth data for this chapter are drawn almost exclusively from probate records, 
inventories of the property of the recently deceased. Through the 1960s and 1970s, 




living population (the estate multiplier; Lampman 1962; Jones 1977) and adjusting 
for underrepresented populations (Smith 1975; G Main 1977; 1974; JT Main 1965; 
1976; Jones 1977). Audits of the estate multiplier method have “established 
unambiguously that adjusting for age distribution affects only the levels and not the 
trends in wealth inequality” (Williamson and Lindert 1980: 12). Comparisons of 
probates against local censuses have found that about 60% of potential wealth 
holders8 were probated, and coverage was positively correlated with age and higher 
for whites (G Main 1976; Smith 1975). But researchers have also found that both 
very rich and very poor populations are surprisingly well represented in probate 
(Williamson and Lindert 1980).  
Unfortunately, there is no equivalent source of data on incomes. Williamson and 
Lindert (1980) argue that income and wealth inequality will be monotonically related 
given a few “innocuous” assumptions. Soltow (1989) derives an estimate of income 
based on home prices. But divergent trends in wealth and income inequality in the 
United States since 1980 (with the former stable for several decades while the latter 
drove upwards) suggest a simplifying assumption about the relationship between 
wealth and income inequality may not be in order.  
The relationship between wealth and income inequality suffers two complications. 
The first is fairly straightforward: high incomes do not exclusively target the 
wealthiest. If we assume wealth reflects the distribution of past incomes (which 
                                                          
8 Children, married women, slaves and servants are generally treated as non-potential 
wealth holders. There are two methods for dealing with these populations. The first is 
to focus only on free adult men. The second is to assume zero wealth for non-wealth 




requires a constant savings rate and a very loose definition of income, see below), we 
may deduce that there is a lagged, linear relationship between wealth and income 
inequality. But those activities and actors generating high incomes change over time. 
Wealth and income inequality can move in diametrically opposite directions if non-
wealthy individuals begin to earn very high incomes.  
The second complication hinges on the definition of income. We can include up 
to four components in a definition of income: cash incomes (which may or may not 
include government transfers; e.g., wages, EITC), non-cash benefits (e.g., subsidized 
health insurance, WIC), more-liquid asset appreciation (e.g., rising stock prices), and 
less-liquid asset appreciation (e.g., rising home prices). The definition of income a 
researcher uses often depends on the source data. Research from surveys often define 
income in terms of cash income, those drawing on tax data can include capital gains. 
Only the more enterprising include the value of benefits or non-cash government 
transfers as these can be difficult to appraise (see CBO 2011).  
Typically, only ideologically motivated research includes all components. For 
example, Richard Burkhauser, Cornell economist and adjunct scholar of the 
neoconservative American Enterprise Institute, has challenged the measure of rising 
income inequality in recent decades in the United States from standard sources, and 
recently used the rising costs of homes and medical insurance to argue that 
“comprehensive” income inequality is not rising (Armour, Burkhauser and Larrimore 
2013). Including non-liquid asset appreciation as income is problematic because it 
does not track the capacity to consume. For example, a rising home price does not 




proportionately across the region, the residents cannot sell the home to convert that 
new wealth into consumption because they will need to reinvest those gains in a now 
more expensive new home. The same is true of medical insurance, the cost of which 
has grown faster than the marginal benefits of that insurance on health. To cash in on 
these new sources of “income,” and individual would need to sacrifice housing and 
health. Modern finance offers some options for leveraging non-liquid assets, but 
colonial households would have found it nearly impossible to convert non-liquid asset 
appreciation into consumption.  
So we are faced with two options. The first is to ignore convention and define 
income comprehensively. The second is to admit that we should not use wealth and 
wealth inequality as an indicator of incomes. Instead of depending on flimsy wage 
data and unreliable assumptions about the relationship between wealth and income, I 
choose instead to focus exclusively on wealth and wealth inequality through the 
colonial period. More wage data is available in the 19th century, and I will draw on 
that data in chapter 3, but the unfortunate reality is that quality income data is not 
available until 1913.  
Probate records allow for a relatively reliable measure of wealth inequality within 
a region over time, but complications arise in cross-colony comparisons. First, 
counties and colonies had different rules for which assets were inventoried, with more 
gaps in coverage as you move south (Williamson and Lindert 1980). Second, 
coverage by researchers, to extract and analyze probate archives, follows the same 




Against this provincial scattering of coverage, only Alice Hanson Jones (1977; 
1980) offers a cross-colony sample. This 1774 benchmark is critical for cross-colony 
comparison, but also for “national” comparisons to the censuses of the mid-19th 
century. On the other hand, we must recognize that we are dealing with a sample of 
919 individuals drawn from sources with inconsistent definitions of wealth, and we 
should not draw conclusions that extrapolate beyond the data. For the most part, even 
those critical of the 1774 benchmark do not attack Jones’ methodology, but how those 
results have been interpreted.  
Colonial Crisis, Adaptation and Institutional Path Dependency 
It is the general argument of this dissertation that interstate crisis associated with 
systemic cycles of accumulation creates space for spatial reconfiguration – economic 
and institutional change – with important consequences for within-country inequality. 
This leads to a periodization of inequality change. That being said, the initial regime 
change in the American colonies was not systemic but geographic.  Regime change 
was not the product of a global spatial reconfiguration, but an adaptation of European 
institutions to a very non-European environment.  
While the initial regime-defining crises of the colonial period were not 
synchronized with global systemic cycles of accumulation, global processes played a 
crucial role in defining trends through the 17th and 18th centuries. Most important was 
slavery, an essentially global institution. Slaves were kidnapped from one part of the 
world by men from another part of the world exercising superior technology and 
economic resources. They were transported to the North American colonies to 




The experience of each colony varied substantially by geography, the composition 
and intentions of the colonizers, and timing. But they also shared some key features – 
e.g., isolation from the principal sites of wealth generation and accumulation, 
European institutional and political traditions, and low population density. 
Divergence between colonies was relatively small compared to the divergence 
between the North American colonies and those further south. Those societies 
organized around sugar or the exploitation of native populations experienced higher 
levels of inequality (Engerman and Sokoloff 2002). 
Early colonial history is rife with examples of reformation in response to 
contradictions between the institutional models introduced in the colonies and the 
physical realities facing colonists. Economic struggles and political strife in response 
to weakly embedded institutions created space for change. The result was a new set of 
institutional arrangements that varied some from colony to colony and dramatically 
from what the original governing bodies had intended.  
Virginia. The Virginia Company of London established the Jamestown Settlement in 
1607. The early colonists were poorly prepared for the challenges they faced. The 
Jamestown site was selected because it was uninhabited; it was uninhabited because it 
was a malaria-ridden swamp. Despite that, natives attacked the company within two 
weeks of reaching Jamestown (then James Fort). They arrived too late in the season 
to plant. The first colonists lacked the skills to produce their own food. Instead, they 
depended on strong-arming nearby tribes. In John Smith’s famous ‘Rude Letter,’ he 
emphasized the need for appropriately skilled workers: 
When you send againe I intreat you rather send but thirty Carpenters, 




trees, roots, well provided; then a thousand of such as we have: for except wee 
be able both to lodge them, and feed them, the most will consume with want of 
necessaries before they can be made good for any thing. (Smith 1608). 
 
Investors had unreasonable expectations of economic returns in the colonies based 
on others’ experiences in South America: “There was not talke, no hope, no worke, 
but dig gold, refine gold, load gold” (Anas Todkill, quoted in Acemoglu and 
Robinson 2012: 22). With the second shipment of supplies, the Company demanded 
that the colonists send commodities sufficient to pay for the voyage, a lump of gold, 
and evidence of a route to the South Sea. The colonists failed to meet this “good 
faith” request.  
The functional and normative collapse of Jamestown came in the winter of 
1609/1610. Known as the Starving Time, 80% of the colonists perished. Historical 
accounts and recent archeological evidence suggest that some turned to cannibalism: 
. . . driven through unsufferable hunger unnaturallie to eat those thinges which 
nature most abhorred, the flesh and excrements of man, as well of our owne 
nation as of an Indian, digged by some out of his grave after he had laien buried 
three daies & wholly devoured him; others, envying the better state of bodie of 
any whome hunger had not yet so much wasted as there owne, lay waight and 
threatened to kill and eat them; one amonge the rest slue his wife as she slept in 
his bosome, cut her in peeces, powdered her & fedd uppon her till he had clean 
devoured all partes saveinge her heade . . . (Journals of the House of Burgesses 
of Virginia, Papers of the General Assembly 1623/24, McIlwain 1915: 29). 
 
In 1613, communal farming was abandoned and plots of land were granted to 
settlers. Economic circumstances immediately began to improve. In 1619 the first 
representative assembly met, forerunner to the Virginia General Assembly. But the 
most important development for the future of Virginia came in the form of a plant. 
John Rolfe and his family were heading to Jamestown aboard the Sea Venture, a 




in a hurricane and was deliberately driven into Bermuda. While in Bermuda, Rolfe 
collected seeds of Nicotiana tabacum. He began exporting tobacco in 1612, 
Jamestown’s first successful export. 
The introduction of tobacco as a cash crop in the region would dovetail with 
another development of the 1610s. The headright system, implemented to attract 
settlers to Virginia, granted a plot of land to anyone that paid their own way, or that 
of another, across the Atlantic. This encouraged well-to-do settlers to invest in 
indentured laborers, who would provide labor for a period of time and entitle the 
master to another plot of land. African workers were first imported as indentured 
labor in 1619. The legal rights of African indentured laborers were trimmed over the 
next decades; in 1661 slavery as a lifelong, hereditary legal status made its first 
appearance in Virginia statute (Hashaw 2007). Just under 40% of the residents of 
Virginia in 1790 were slaves (Historical Census Browser 2004). 
Maryland. Maryland likewise adopted headright and indenture servitude to attract 
new settlers, but Leonard and Cecil Calvert (Lord Baltimore) hoped to govern those 
new settlers under feudalistic precepts. In 1638, four years after landing in Maryland, 
and in response to popular discontent, Leonard Calvert was forced to abandon this 
experiment for British common law, and the republican Assembly took over the right 
to initiate legislation.  
Carolina. After an initial bid to establish a Carolina colony in the early 17th century 
failed, title was granted to eight Lords Proprietors in 1663. The most active of the 
eight, Anthony Ashley-Cooper (Lord Shaftesbury), with his secretary, John Locke, 




contained progressive interpretations of representative government and religious 
tolerance. But it also sought to establish a tightly controlled, feudalistic society, 
employing serfs and slaves, controlled by a landed, titled aristocracy. The 
representative parliament was only allowed to debate those subjects pre-approved by 
the Lords Proprietors.  
The Lords Proprietors hoped to profit from land sales, but were forced to lower 
the price when early sales were anemic. Northern Carolina was settled by migrants 
from inland Virginia, who planted tobacco and used Virginian ports to export their 
crops. Settlers in southern Carolina relied more heavily on slave labor to cultivate rice 
and indigo, and exported their crops through Charleston (then Charles Town). The 
Fundamental Constitutions proved unpopular, especially among those in the southern 
half of Carolina, and was never ratified. Political unrest led ultimately to the split 
between North Carolina and South Carolina and, in 1729, the two colonies were 
reorganized as royal colonies. But the institutional impact of the Fundamental 
Constitutions would endure. On one hand, South Carolina would continue to be a 
highly structured, manorial society; in 1790, 43% of the population of South Carolina 
was enslaved (more than half were enslaved in 1820) and more than a third of white 
households owned slaves (Historical Census Browser 2004). On the other, there was a 
tradition of relative religious freedom and male suffrage with low property 
requirements. 
Georgia. In addition to other lesser factors, the experience of Georgia was different 




claim was much less secure; it bordered Spanish Florida, and the French did not cede 
its claim on Georgia for another 30 years. 
James Oglethorpe, trustee of the Province of Georgia, followed in the same 
intellectual tradition as Shaftesbury and Locke. But he created the ‘Oglethorpe Plan’ 
70 years after the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina. While Locke sought a fair 
and sustainable distribution of land across a slave-owning aristocracy, Oglethorpe 
envisioned a slave-free, yeomen society built on a fair and sustainable distribution of 
land. The plan included a detailed script for settling Savannah and the distribution of 
towns across the Province. The Oglethorpe Plan was short lived. The Spanish invaded 
in 1742, and the Trustees turned control of the colony over to the crown in 1752. But 
the impact on Georgia, from the layout of Savannah to differences between it and 
South Carolina, endured.    
 The differences between mid-Atlantic and southern colonies are small in 
comparison with differences between them and colonies further north. Not only are 
Pennsylvania and Massachusetts geographically different than Virginia and South 
Carolina, the intentions of its settlers were different (Vickers 1996). While 
Oglethorpe sought to establish Georgia as a society of yeoman farmers, colonies 
further north came closer to that ideal; only South Carolina and Virginia had more 
slaves per capita than Georgia in 1790 (Historical Census Browser 2004).  
Regional wealth inequalities in 1774 track more or less as we would expect (Jones 
1984). Figure 2.1 tracks the distribution of wealth in each of three regions, the South, 
the middle colonies, and New England, using a Lorentz curve: individual wealth is 




x-axis and cumulative wealth on the y-axis. The gap between this curve and the 
diagonal, denoting equality, is the Gini coefficient, a standard measure of inequality. 
Wealth inequality in the South was greatest, even before accounting for the slave 
population. Wealthy merchants in Salem and Boston drove up inequality in New 
England relative to the middle colonies, where wealth inequality was the lowest.  
 
Institutional Path Dependency. To this point I have highlighted differences between 
colonies, but more important in the long run of US history is the average difference 
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key building blocks of an emerging US institutional environment were 1) the social 
structure and population density of the native population (Engerman and Sokoloff 
2002), 2) the high land/labor ratio, 3) the influence of English institutional traditions 
(North 1990; Coatsworth 1993), 4) the composition of the immigrant populations 
(Vickers 1996) and 5) the economic viability of natural regional products in European 
and West Indian markets. 
The native population in North America was not as dense or hierarchically 
structured as in Central and South America, and more easily removed by force or 
disease. British North America, therefore, was not built on top of an existing social 
structure, and was not built with heavy state military intervention. There were some 
early efforts to meet high labor demands with semi-free and slave native labor, but 
these were largely unsuccessful (Engerman and Sokoloff 2002). 
Following the elimination of the native population, colonized North America was 
heavy in resources but light in labor. Given the distance between labor supplies and 
labor demand, mechanisms were created to bring the two together. Among the 
solutions used were indentured servitude (indentured in Europe or redemptioners), 
prisoners, and slavery. For those not categorically exploited, the high land to labor 
ratio was empowering, economically and politically. For example, Lord Baltimore’s 
failure to transplant the manorial system from England was typical of the North 
American colonies (Galenson 1996).  
Aspects of a more democratic legal, political and economic environment were 




political bodies. Often, these forms re-emerged against the wishes of early proprietors 
and crown officials.  
The institutional environment, which varied regionally, was heavily influenced by 
the joint outcome of the composition of the immigrant population and the economic 
viability of local exports. For example, New England attracted family groups and 
produced goods similar to those produced in England. Consequently, there was an 
emphasis on self-sufficient homesteading. On the other hand, the Carolinas were 
colonized by elites from Barbados. The cultivation of rice on slave plantations was 
encouraged both by the physical and institutional environment. But conditions 
elsewhere were more extreme: 43% of those in South Carolina were slaves in 1790 
versus 94% in Haiti in 1789 (Historical Census Browser 2004). The net result was 
relatively low levels of wealth inequality in the North American colonies versus 
colonies elsewhere (Engerman and Sokoloff 2002; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 
2001). 
The bifurcated legal and economic structures of the North and South was a 
defining principle of US history through the 1960s. Income inequality is still notably 
higher on average in Southern counties relatively to the rest of the United States, and 
intergenerational mobility significantly lower in those same countries (Chetty et al 
2014). These differences can be traced back to the introduction of chattel slavery, 
which can again be traced back to the different economic opportunities available in 
the North and South. But it is myopic to then conclude that the different inequality 
regimes of the North and South were simply a product of local economics. African 




consequences) to global social hierarchies, networks, and ideologies, geographies, 
technologies and infrastructure, and global supply and demand.  
The American Frontier 
The frontier thesis has two components. First, after rejecting native claims on land 
and removing native populations through disease and violence, European settlers had 
more land than people to work it. If we recombine the modern-day states of Virginia 
and West Virginia, this territory is three quarters the size of Great Britain; Carolina 
(North Carolina plus South Carolina) is 94% the size of Great Britain; the territory of 
the 13 original colonies is 61% that of Great Britain, France, Spain, The Netherlands 
and Denmark combined, but in 1790 the booming population of the United States was 
about half that of Great Britain (8 million to 4 million). The high land to labor ratio 
increased the value of labor relative to land, and the relative scarcity of labor reduced 
the marginal benefit of additional land beyond what the owner could work. 
The second component, emphasized by Turner (1893/1996), is that living 
conditions on the American frontier (which stretched to the Atlantic Coast in the 17th 
century) forced social/cultural/political adaptations. “[F]reshness, and confidence, and 
scorn of older society, impatience of its restraints and its ideas, and indifference to its 
lessons, have accompanied the frontier” (Turner 1893/1996: ch. 1).  
The impact of these two components is evident in the first decades of each new 
colony. From John Smith requesting more “diggers up of trees” to Shaftesbury and 
Locke being forced to reduce the price of land in Carolina to attract settlers, the 
relative value of labor (peasantry) to land was apparent. And Lords Baltimore and 




(though this probably had less to do with men abandoning the “garments of 
civilization” for moccasins than Turner claims). 
From this, many have theorized that the American frontier reduced economic 
inequalities (e.g., Turner 1893/1996; Main 1976; Kearl, Pope and Wimmer 1980). 
Specifically, newer settlements had lower levels of inequality as cheap land was 
distributed fairly evenly across the first entrants. Inequality then rose as later arrivals 
took ownership of smaller plots of less productive land or were landless. The shifting 
frontier also offered a safety valve for older settlements, whereby poorer colonists 
moved west, levelling wealth distributions in the east while also populating those 
newer, lower inequality settlements further west (Kearl, Pope and Wimmer 1980). 
The evidence supports this hypothesis only after admitting strong qualifications 
(Curti 1959; Kearl, Pope and Wimmer 1980; Steckel 1990). Kearl, Pope and Wimmer 
(1980) found that time of arrival was the best indicator of wealth in Utah between 
1850 and 1870 (Schaefer 1987 produced similar results for Arkansas and Texas). The 
first settlers grab the best land and entrench themselves economically, politically and 
socially in the region. Inequality rises over time as immigration drives up land prices 
(George 1881). But Curti (1959) found similar wealth distributions in Trempealeau 
County, Wisconsin as in comparable towns in Vermont in that same period; 
Trempealeau County first appears in the US Census in 1860 with 2,560 inhabitants 
(Historical Census Browser 2004). Bolton (1984) found surprisingly high levels of 
wealth inequality in Arkansas in 1840; Arkansas had only 14,000 inhabitants in 1820 




Inequality in newer settlements rose to match that in older settlements, and 
consistently did so within a decade or two. 
The first issue with the frontier as safety valve hypothesis is that successive waves 
of settlers find fewer economic opportunities (Menard and Carr 1979; Kearl, Pope 
and Wimmer 1980; Menard, Harris and Carr 1974). For example, Menard (1973) 
found that 90% of indentured servants that arrived in Maryland in its first decade of 
settlement and stayed for at least 10 years became landowners, and a few of these 
former indentured servants were in time among the wealthiest planters in the colony. 
“One needed only a few simple tools, a few head cattle, and about fifty acres of land 
to set up as an independent planter [in the Chesapeake], all within reach of newly 
freed servants or free immigrants of modest means” (Menard 1996). Just a quarter of 
a century later, though, less than half would become landowners and none would 
become wealthy (Menard 1973; Carr and Menard 1979; Galenson 1996). 
Second, the accessibility of the frontier is also overplayed. The ‘frontier as safety 
valve’ thesis depends on constant westward expansion, but westward expansion was 
not cheap or easy; it required a sizable capital investment for supplies, skills, and an 
enormous investment of labor (Vickers 1996). As settlers moved inland, especially 
into Appalachia, they were partially cut off from larger eastern cities and ports, which 
were necessary to get a return on their investment.  
On the other hand, we can argue that standard measures of wealth inequality on 
the frontier are misleading. New settlements were populated by individuals and 
families that had just invested (or left behind) much of their existing wealth to 




pushed up wealth inequality. But in their migration they purchased a valuable asset—
a new location. They were often rewarded by rapid upward mobility, which is 
captured statistically by low rates of landlessness and high rates of land accumulation 
by the landless in early American history (Steckel 1990; Soltow 1989).  
On the whole, I argue that neither the environmental characteristics of the 
American frontier nor the high resource to labor ratio in the colonies, had a 
substantive effect on wealth distributions on the whole. The opportunities that 
motivated homesteaders to push back the frontier also attracted the relatively young, 
relatively poor migrants from Europe that drove up wealth inequality in colonial cities 
(Williamson and Lindert 1980). 
The Global Context 
What if the New World (or North America specifically), had appeared off the 
Iberian coast near the end of the 15th century? Migrants from Europe to the New 
World could travel by foot. The relatively high land to labor ratio would be quickly 
expunged. Slavery in North America would be much less appealing to landowners. 
Commodity prices would converge, and colonists would have less incentive to focus 
on value dense goods for export. European elites would more easily maintain political 
control over new settlements through better communication and the more rapid 
deployment of force. The politically transformative effect of the frontier would have 
played out very differently. In short, while the geography of the American frontier 
may have played a role, its impact on inequality can only be understood within the 




The cost and danger of crossing the Atlantic kept the population density of 
Europeans in North America low, and a small population meant that little wealth 
could be amassed within the North American colonies alone. The United Kingdom 
and Europe had 20 and 150 times, respectively, the purchasing power of the territory 
that would become the United States in 1700 (those figures would fall to 1.2 and 4 by 
1860; Maddison 2008). Real wealth, and real wealth inequality, was derived from 
trade with Europe.  
But there were three general requirements for a colonist to profit from trade with 
Europe. First, they needed to produce a good that could not be more cheaply supplied 
in Europe; second, the good had to be value-dense; third, they could not be at the 
wrong end of monopolized trade. Unlike the silver mines and sugar plantations 
further south, the early North American colonies were relatively devoid of value-
dense minerals and commodity crops. The few exceptions, rice from South Carolina, 
tobacco, furs, whale oil, etc., highlight the potential economic impact of those crops 
(more on this below). Conversely, John Law’s inability to extract profits from 
Louisiana highlights the challenges faced by export-oriented producers. 
John Law and the Compagnie d'Occident. The disconnect between the territory that 
would become the United States and the contemporary centers of global wealth 
accumulation is highlighted in the brief history of the Compagnie d'Occident. The 
company and its Chief Director, John Law, are better known as a historical case study 
of financial misallocation from “irrational exuberance.” But juxtaposed against the 




demonstrates the challenge of extracting profits from Louisiana before the rise of 
cotton. 
The VOC was established in 1602 with a 21-year monopoly over Dutch colonial 
activities in Asia. The functional goal of the company was to merge existing efforts 
and raise new capital through stocks to form an enterprise large enough to manage 
internally the capital and labor to make long-term investments (i.e., enjoy economies 
of scale). It’s ‘initial public offering’ raised 6½ million guilders, almost eight times 
more than the British East India Company (Frentrop 2003). 
Consistent with the logic guiding the formation of a large, monopolistic trading 
company with powers to wage war and negotiate treaties, establish colonies and 
prosecute, even execute, convicts, the early days of the VOC were oriented more 
towards establishing a larger foothold and greater influence in the region than 
generating profits through trade. VOC officer Jans Pieterszoon Coen was particularly 
infamous for his violent pursuit of market power: “We cannot make war without 
trade, nor trade without war” (quoted in Findlay and O’Rourke 2007: 208). 
In time these efforts paid off financially.  
The commercial profits of this aggressive strategy were substantial. By the 
1650s the VOC had established an effective and highly lucrative monopoly on 
the export of cloves, mace and nutmeg . . . and was becoming a major conduit 
for India textile exports. . . [B]y the 1690s the number of ships [returning 
laden with Asian goods] was 156. . . Between 1700 and 1750 the tonnage of 
Dutch shipping sailing back around the Cape doubled. As late as 1760 it was 
still roughly three times the amount British shipping (Ferguson 2009: 136-7). 
 
VOC shareholders were the principal beneficiaries. By 1650 the initial investors 




return of 27%, and VOC stock increased in value 700% between 1602 and 1733 (De 
Vries and Van der Woude 1997; Ferguson 2009). 
John Law was inspired by the innovation and financial success of the VOC. A 
predecessor to fellow Scot, Adam Smith, Law believed that money was only a means 
of exchange, and that it was the exchange itself that constituted real national wealth. 
He believed that the VOC’s and Amsterdam Exchange Bank’s monetary 
conservatism were limiting (Ferguson 2009). He believed he could maximize profits 
by combining regional monopoly powers with liberal stock issues and the power to 
print money.  
In France he was given the opportunity to test his system. His Company of the 
West was granted a monopoly over commerce with Louisiana in 1717, as well as 
control over internal colonial affairs, for 25 years, and he sold shares in the company 
to raise 100 million livres of initial capital. In subsequent years Law extended his 
financial clout: the royal mint and tax collection, the China and East India companies, 
control over tobacco revenues. He financed these moves with ever higher-priced 
share offerings (Ferguson 2009).  
Ostensibly, the displacement that justified higher share prices was the promise 
of future profits from Louisiana. That was why Law devoted so much effort to 
conjuring up rosy visions of the colony as a veritable Garden of Eden, inhabited 
by friendly savages, eager to furnish a cornucopia of exotic goods for shipment 
to France. . . In reality, the share price was supported by lending printed money 
to buyers (Ferguson 2009: 145). 
  
In other words, Law was managing one of history’s largest pyramid schemes.  
Within 4 years, John Law was persona non grata in France. The value of paper 
money from the royal mint collapsed along with the share price of the Mississippi 




failed to produce the profits necessary to sustain the pyramid, and not because Law 
did not try:  
[A] grand new city was established at the mouth of the Mississippi: New 
Orleans. . . . [A] few thousand impoverished Germans from the Rhineland, 
Switzerland and Alsace were recruited to act as colonists. But what the 
unfortunate immigrants encountered when they reached Louisiana was a 
sweltering, insect-infested swamp. Within a year 80 per cent of them had died 
of starvation or tropical diseases like yellow fever (Ferguson 2009: 145) 
 
New Orleans in 1721 was described as “a place of one hundred wretched hovels in a 
malarious wet thicket of willows and dwarf palmettos, infested by serpents and 
alligators” (Pierre François Xavier de Charlevoix, quoted in Seidenberg and 
Weissman 2012: 439). A year after this flattering description, a hurricane flattened 
the city.  
In reality, Law was ahead of his time: “Such visions, as we know, were not 
wholly without foundation, but their realization lay far in the future” (Ferguson 2009: 
145). The sugar industry first took root in the region at the end of the 18th century. 
The Mississippi River became a major commercial route through the last two decades 
of that century. Then the population of New Orleans doubled in the 1830s, foreign 
exports doubled between 1831 and 1833, and in 1840 New Orleans was the wealthiest 
and third-most populous city in the United States (Lewis 2003). The Louisiana case 
was extreme but not unique. The United States would become the largest, richest 
economy in the world, but it lacked the instant moneymakers of the Spice Islands, 
Cerro de Potosí or Madeira.  
That being said, wealth inequality in the colonies was consistently linked with the 
relative success of exports. After the American Revolution, John Jacob Astor would 




a lucrative, export-oriented market centered in Nantucket. Sugar in Louisiana and 
cotton across the South would also fund large estates in the first half of the 19th 
century. Before the Revolution, there were fewer successful exports. Nine of the 10 
richest colonists in Jones’ (1980) sample of 919 probates in 1774 lived in Charleston, 
South Carolina, and Charleston is by far the wealthiest (and most unequal) “district” 
in her sample (which included Boston and Philadelphia). Wealth in the region was 
tied to exporting rice, which reached 81.5 million pounds in 1773 (Dethloff 1982).  
Likewise, wealth inequality in Maryland fluctuated with tobacco prices, the 
region’s major export (Williamson and Lindert 1980). A levelling of the wealth 
distribution between 1640 and 1670 (Menard, Harris and Carr 1974) correlates with 
tobacco prices (Williamson and Lindert 1980). The pattern repeats itself at the 
beginning of the 18th century; “So capital gains and losses from changes in export 
demand seem to account for Maryland’s colonial wealth instability” (Williamson and 
Lindert 1980: 20). And rising wealth inequality in Boston between 1700 and 1730 is 
tied to asset appreciation in portable personal property (“slaves, servants, currency, 
bonds, mortgages, book debt, stock in trade, and ships”), not physical asset 
accumulation (Nash 1976, Williamson and Lindert 1980: 19). “Thus the ‘cycles’ in 
wealth concentration can be readily associated with Boston’s trade conditions” 
(Williamson and Lindert 1980: 19). 
For colonists, the challenge of accumulating European-style wealth was further 
exacerbated by trade policies explicitly designed to funnel wealth, through a positive 




Mercantilism. Mercantilism emerged in 16th century Europe as a tool to protect the 
interests of the state (and raise revenue for state functions) by controlling (and taxing) 
foreign trade to raise revenue and ensure a positive balance of trade. Mercantilist 
policies regulating trade were also used to create a class of very wealthy merchants 
(with privileged access to restricted trade) to whom the state could turn for financial 
assistance during crises (McCusker 1996; colonial charters were often used as 
compensation for backing the Crown as well). Within this paradigm, more extensive, 
regulated trade generates more wealth for the state and its merchant elite, feeding the 
drive for colonial expansion. North American colonization was largely bankrolled by 
merchants that would never travel to the colonies, but were looking to control a piece 
of the new trade. 
For the colonists, mercantilism limited where to and from whom they could 
export or import certain goods. These policies were explicitly enumerated in the 
Navigation Acts in the 1660s. The 1661 amendment to the original Act of 1660 added 
a list of enumerated articles (sugar, tobacco, indigo, and cotton; rice joined the list in 
1704) that must be exported directly to England from the colonies. The Act of 1663 
required all goods heading for the colonies first pass through England. (Dethloff 
1982). Measuring the impact of the Navigation Acts on economic development in the 
colonies, let alone wealth inequality, is challenging. The most cited estimate of the 
impact of the Acts on income, from Thomas (1965), estimates lost income from 




The letter of the law overstates the impact of the Navigation Acts on the colonial 
economy for two reasons. First, membership in the British Empire granted offsetting 
advantages in a mercantilist world-economy (Thomas 1965; Ransom 1968).  
The acts gave the colonists favorable access to English markets, stimulated the 
rapid expansion of colonial marine industries, contributed to an increase in the 
supply of English manufactured goods and services, established a supportive 
legal framework which eased credit for colonial trade, and provided that trade 
enjoyed the protection of the Royal Navy. The shipping and shipbuilding 
industries particularly prospered. (Dethloff 1982) 
 
Second, through a policy now known as “salutary neglect”, the most notorious 
features of the Navigation Acts were rarely enforced. Fearing war with France from 
the north, the British did not want to irk colonists (at least until the end of the French 
and Indian War). For example, South Carolinians shipped rice directly to Portugal 
and the West Indies even though this was explicitly prohibited (though 80% did go 
directly to England; Dethloff 1982).   
In this environment, colonial merchants and supporting industries fared well in 
many cases. For example, increasing or higher-than-expected inequality in economies 
as diverse as Maryland (Land 1965; G. Main 1977), Philadelphia (Smith 1984), and 
New England (Jones 1984) can be attributed specifically to the emergence of a 
wealthy commercial elite (Main 1965). As far back as 1687, the wealthiest quarter of 
taxable Bostonians, with about two-thirds of the cities taxable wealth, was populated 
by merchants with assets throughout the British Empire (Henretta 1965). 
In reference to rising wealth inequality in Maryland after 1710, Main (1977: 570) 
noted that a  
solution to the paradox of rising inequality in the face of declining proportions 
of immigrants and freed servants in the white population lies in the growth of 




market. Valuable clues to the origin of this wealth lie in the inventoried assets 
themselves, because one characteristic common to the majority of personal 
estates worth £1,000 sterling or more is the involvement of their owners in 
mercantile and financial activities. 
 
Likewise, “[t]he increase in inequality in Philadelphia, the area of pre-Revolutionary 
America for which historians have measured the greatest widening of the gap 
between rich and poor, resulted from economic rather than demographic change, as 
the rewards of commercial development accrued primarily to the affluent groups that 
controlled the economic system” (Smith 1984: 645). The Cabots and Crowninshields 
amassed fortunes and were influential in the international trade of rum, slaves, opium, 
tea, Madeira wine, Valencia oranges and Málaga grapes working out of Salem, 
Massachusetts in the 18th century.  
These examples, though, do not rule out the potential for a more unequal outcome 
in a free-trade counterfactual. For example, a focus on merchant wealth north of 
Virginia ignores the fact that the burden of mercantilist policies was greatest in the 
South (Ransom 1968). Mercantilism was designed to funnel profits to the crown and 
domestic (European) merchants. American merchants were prevented from exploiting 
their local comparative advantage and, like the early settlers on the frontier, British 
merchants were able to enter the new market first and had advantages—experience, 
networks, financing, and political support—that made it difficult for colonial 
merchants to compete directly.  
In summary, we can draw a few general conclusions about wealth inequality in 
the colonies. First, the frontier was a source of mobility, but its impact on overall 
wealth inequality is probably overstated. Wealth, and wealth inequality, is generally 




those export markets. But the bigger conclusion is that there was not just one 
inequality regime, level or trend: 
If one were to take 1690 or 1700 as a base, the wealth inequality series 
reported . . . would suggest mixed trends, but, on average, a drift toward 
greater wealth concentration for the seven or eight decades prior to the 
Revolution. This characterization holds for rural Connecticut (but not for 
Hartford County), for rural Massachusetts (but not for rural Suffolk County), 
for Boston as well as Portsmouth (New Hampshire), and for Philadelphia as 
well as nearby Chester County. It does not hold for Maryland, however, which 
exhibits stability from the 1690s onward [but gently rising inequality from 
1710]. New York City is another exception, since it had a stable wealth 
distribution between 1695 and 1789. (Williamson and Lindert 1980: 16-17). 
Interpreting Colonial Inequality 
There are three key theses on wealth inequality and inequality trends in the 
colonial period (Williamson and Lindert 1980).  
European class structure made its way across the Atlantic, with a highly 
concentrated wealth distribution, but this model was unsustainable against the 
American frontier, and the American Revolution destroyed any remains of the 
high inequality European class structure (JT Main 1965; 1976; Turner 
1893/1996). 
 
The unviability of the European class structure in the colonies was evident. But by no 
means were the arrangements that replaced it overwhelmingly egalitarian: slavery in 
the south, indentured servitude in the middle Atlantic colonies. Inequality on the 
frontier quickly rose to match that in eastern settlements. Williamson and Lindert 
(1980) dismissed the notion that American inequality approached the levels seen in 
Europe (see also Kulikoff 1971; Lindert 2000), and while that may be true (among 
free households), there is little evidence of an egalitarian trend over this period.  
Low inequality was the initial condition, but the supply of labor increased 
relative to land, increasing the value of the latter relative to the former. 
Formidable barriers to migration west limited the effectiveness of the frontier 
‘safety valve’. The result was a tendency for convergence with European 





There is ample evidence that mobility was less pronounced among later arrivals, 
but there is little evidence for a long-run trend towards rising regional inequality 
across the colonies. Instead, we see regional fluctuations with little secular, let alone 
universal, tendency (Williamson and Lindert 1980). One solution to this apparent 
paradox – closing opportunity but stable inequality – is that a burgeoning middle 
class and new demand for labor accompanied the maturation process of a settlement; 
stretching at the tails was offset by growth in the middle of the distribution. 
Wealth inequality in the United States did not rise between the end of the 18th 
and end of the 19th centuries, which means that colonial wealth inequality was 
already high (Soltow 1989; Shammas 1993; Shanahan and Corell 1997; 
Henretta 1965; Lemon and Nash 1968).  
 
This position is significant because it is well established that wealth inequality 
near the end of the 19th century in the United States was as high as any we have ever 
measured in American history. In other words, this third group argues that wealth 
inequality at the time of the American Revolution was already on par with levels in 
Europe. 
The empirical support for this approach comes from two sources. The first is a 
study of the First Direct Tax survey of 1798 by Lee Soltow (1989). Soltow finds that 
wealth inequality in this survey, an assessment of the taxable assets across the United 
States, was as high as that measured in the 1860 census and far higher than measured 
by Jones (1980) for 1774 from probate records. The second source are post-hoc 
adjustments to existing probate sources to include excluded populations (Shanahan 
and Corell 1997).  
Belief in a preindustrial period of equality in America rests largely on an 
accounting that ignores the wealth of colonial officials, British residents, and 




these elements are taken into account, the wealth of the adult population is 
more concentrated in the top quintile of the population in colonial times than 
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The top quintile held 95 percent of 
the wealth, while the other 80 percent of the population held only 5 percent 
(Shammas 1993: 427) 
 
The first point is that a survey of holdings can yield very different results than a 
survey of households, because many of the wealthiest proprietors were actually living 
in England. As a result, A. H. Jones underestimated the wealth share of the richest 1% 
(Shammas 1993). On the other hand, British proprietors helped compress inequality 
among resident households as they claimed rents that would have otherwise 
accumulated in the colonies. 
Second, “the history of wealth inequality over the entire period changes 
considerably if one measures inequality on the basis of the adult population rather 
than by household” Shammas 1993: 415). To demonstrate this, Shammas (1993) 
compared the distribution of wealth across the adult population in 1774 to that in 
1870 (Soltow 1975). Shammas emphasizes the greater concentration of wealth in the 
top quintile in 1774 versus 1870 to argue that belief in an egalitarian pre-industrial 
America rests on ignoring British proprietors, slavery, indenture and coverture. The 
more reasonable interpretation is two part: 1) wealth was more concentrated in the top 
quintile in 1774 (95% to 92%) because the bottom three quintiles were legally 
prevented from owning property; 2) wealth was more concentrated at the very top of 
the distribution in 1870 than 1774, the wealth share of the top 1% increased 32% 
from 1774 to 1870, from 28% to 37%. (Shanahan and Correll 2000 employ a different 




produce similar results – wealth became more concentrated at the top, but the share of 
wealth going to the bottom 60% increased from 1774 to 1860.) 
Conclusion 
And thus our interpretation of inequality in the colonial period depends on where 
we look to find our representative sample. Looking across free adult males, wealth 
was less concentrated at the very top of the distribution in 1774 than in the 19th or 20th 
centuries, but wealth was more concentrated in the top half or quintile of the 
distribution in 1774 than the second half of the 20th century (Williamson and Lindert 
1980). If we look across all adults, categorical inequalities in 1774 mean that wealth 
was much more concentrated in the top quintile in 1774 than in the 20th century and 
concentration at the very top of the distribution in 1774 and the 1950s is on par, but 
wealth is less concentrated at the very top in both periods than in the 19th century 
(Shammas 1993).  
And our interpretation depends on where we look geographically. The wealthiest 
10% in Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey and New York controlled less than 40% 
of the regions wealth, less than 50% in Connecticut, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, 
and New Hampshire, and just under 70% in Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, and Georgia (Jones 1980). Likewise, there was variation in regional 
trends up to 1774, inequality rising in some places but not others.  
These variations are more than empirical artifact. Instead, they reflect the unique 
intersection of institutional and physical environment. Where the United States today 
has regions marked by higher levels of inequality, and others by greater equality (and 




makes empirical and theoretical sense to also treat the United States today as having a 
single distribution. To theorize an inequality state and trend for the entire region in 
the colonial period, a region that changes in size and composition over time, is a 
meaningless exercise in aggregation. The impact, even presence, of slavery, 
indentured servitude, coverture, mercantilist trade policies, transportation 
technologies, export-oriented production, the frontier or headright land grants on 





Chapter 3. Commercial and Corporate Inequality Regimes 
Wage and wealth inequality rose through the 19th century and into the 20th.  
Through the first half of the century, American merchants exploited gaps in the 
frayed remnants of the mercantilist organization of the world-economy and profited 
from huge price gaps between the United States and Europe. I refer to this as the 
commercial inequality regime. Through the second half of the century, new 
transportation technologies and the British emphasis on free exchange eroded 
arbitrage profits in cross-Atlantic trade. But the combination of intensive (more 
efficient) and extensive (more inputs, e.g., land and workers) growth of the US 
economy allowed those in a position to take an early lead in key industries to amass 
extraordinary amounts of wealth. More precisely, the modern corporation exploited 
the more rapid movement of information, goods and capital to control markets, secure 
profits, and enrich their owners. I refer to this as the corporate inequality regime. The 
focus of this chapter is to describe how these developments are correlated with and 
causally linked to the British cycle of accumulation (see Figure 0.3).  
I begin the chapter with a discussion of a few trends and developments 
(convergence, rising wage inequality, slavery and emancipation, and the military 
subordination of Native Americans) that underlie the economic space of the 
commercial and corporate inequality regimes: westward expansion, economic 
development, particularly in the North, and better, faster, more reliable movement 
between the American frontier and Europe. I then discuss the available data, and 
limitations of those data sources, on wealth concentration and wage inequality 




We then take a step back to the 18th century and the Dutch cycle of accumulation 
to the put the American Revolution and Napoleonic Wars, and their impact on wealth 
inequality in the United States, in context; American merchants were well-positioned 
to exploit war in Europe that marked the beginning of the British cycle of 
accumulation. Beyond the immediate impact of war, new transportation technologies, 
internal improvements in the United States, and the death of mercantilism in the 
Atlantic brought American merchants unprecedented access to both European 
markets and the American frontier. Wealth initially accumulated in the hands of those 
best positioned to move goods between previously isolated (or mostly isolated) 
markets, and wealth inequality increased. 
I then turn our attention to the end of the commercial inequality regime and the 
beginning of the corporate inequality regime. Freer trade initially produced 
extraordinary profits for merchants, but competition increased and profit margins fell. 
Specifically, prices in Europe and the United States converged, so that the profit 
potential of buying goods in one market and selling in another collapsed. But as 
prices converged, the size of the US economy boomed, so that domestic capitalists no 
longer needed to export to Europe to become wealthy. Instead, the key to wealth 
accumulation in the second half of the 19th century was controlling access to markets. 
The modern corporation integrated new transportation and communication 
technologies with a new organizational form and mechanisms for accumulating 
capital that allowed a smaller number of individuals to grab ever larger shares of key 




specifically in the hands of their largest shareholders. Wealth concentration in the 
United States again increased.  
The 19th Century Transformation and Processes of Convergence 
The United States’ 19th century is a dynamic bridge between the isolated colonial 
period and the hegemonic 20th century. I note in chapter 2 that a key variable in the 
character of the (multiple) inequality regimes of the North American colonies was 
their functional distance from the core of the world-economy. On the other hand, the 
current cycle of accumulation centers on the United States (see chapters 4 and 5 and 
Figure 0.3 above). It was during the British cycle of accumulation that the US 
economy, and its position in the world-economy, was transformed. I posit this 
transformation is best understood in terms of convergence. 
Convergence took two forms. First, the multiple, localized inequality regimes of 
the colonial period converged into a single, national US inequality regime. There 
continue to be important institutional variations across the United States, but in the 
19th century the impact of slavery and emancipation on wealth inequality merits 
special attention.  
The slave population in the United States increased from 700,000 to 4,000,000 
between 1790 and 1860, slaves made up more than half of the populations of 
Mississippi and South Carolina in 1860 and almost half of the populations of Texas, 
Florida, Georgia, and Alabama, and the share of the South that was enslaved 
increased between 1790 and 1860 (Historical Census Browser 2004). The production 
of cotton (in bales) increased 1,300 times, from 3 to 3,841 over that same period 




below 40% before 1830 to about 60% in the 1850s. In the last decade before the Civil 
War land, slave, and wealth ownership were relatively concentrated in the South: 
farmers with more than 1,000 acres owned 21% of the total improved acreage in the 
Cotton South (versus less than 1% through most of the Midwest), only 25% of 
Southern families owned slaves (Wright 1970), and 90-95% of Southern wealth was 
owned by slaveowners (Soltow 1989). All signs point to a large, growing, and highly 
concentrated economic sector, conditions that should produce concentrated wealth; 
conversely, emancipation should have resulted in a massive redistribution of wealth.  
But the narrative of economic development in the North trumped that of the 
South. Despite huge gains in cotton production, the slave population as a share of the 
total US population fell from 18% to 13% between 1790 and 1860 (Historical Census 
Browser 2004). Cotton represented a greater share of exports in 1860 than in the past, 
but the ratio of exports to total GDP fell by two-thirds, from more than 15% in 1800 
to about 5% in 1860. The South lost its colonial income-per-capita advantage over the 
North during the post-Revolution recession, and had not yet rebounded to pre-
Revolution incomes as late as 1840; in the meantime, Northerners doubled their 
incomes in real terms during that period (Lindert and Williamson 2012). In short, 
wealth was still concentrated in the South (Williamson and Lindert 1980), but the 
relative size of the pie was smaller. Ironically, Southern cotton exports provided the 
foreign reserves the North needed to import capital goods from England (North 
1961). 
At the other end, emancipation could have reduced wealth inequalities across the 




categorically denied that opportunity in the past. Unfortunately, the material benefit 
of emancipation to slaves was less than one might have hoped for, and the 
redistribution of wealth shares from South to North through the Civil War far 
outweighed any effect of emancipation (Williamson and Lindert 1980). The impact of 
emancipation on wealth concentration across the United States was limited, in short, 
because Southern wealth was less important than it had been in the past. Even in 
1860, the national size distribution of wealth is largely unaffected by how slaves are 
counted methodologically (Gallman 1969). On the other hand, the trend of 
concentrating wealth between 1774 and 1860 is more steep if we exclude slaves (as 
property and as population) because their impact on the economy as a whole was less 
substantial in 1860 than 1774 (Williamson and Lindert 1980). 
Convergence is also manifest in two processes that shrunk the functional distance 
between the United States and the core of the world-economy. First, new technologies 
and trade policies removed trade barriers between the United States and Europe, so 
that by the end of the century, Americans and Europeans were effectively competing 
in a single market. The best evidence of this is price convergence; for example, prices 
in Chicago and Liverpool were very different at the beginning of the 19th century and 
similar at the beginning of the 20th (North 1955; Persson 2004). If a good was 
substantially more expensive in one location versus another, an entrepreneurial 
merchant would buy goods from the latter and sell them in the former.  
The second process bringing the United States closer to the core of the world-
economy was that the core of the world-economy moved in that direction. The 




1820, four times greater in 1870, and 1¾ times greater in 1913. The US economy 
would have been tied (with Spain) for the fifth largest economy of Europe in 1820, 
the largest by the end of the 1870s, and many times larger than any other by 1913 
(Maddison 2008). Some of this growth was due to increased productivity – per capita 
purchasing power in the United State quadruped between 1820 and 1913 – but more 
important was extensive growth – the population of the United States increased 
almost 25 times over that period (Maddison 2008; Historical Census Browser 2004). I 
will argue in the conclusion that because convergence reset the rules of access to the 
sites of wealth accumulation, it was associated with wealth concentration.  
Critical to the story of US economic development and convergence with Europe is 
westward expansion and the military subordination of Native Americans. The British 
opposition to westward expansion was a factor in the American Revolution, the 
politics of westward expansion (free or slave) was a critical source of tension between 
North and South before the Civil War, and Hitler expressly cited US Lebensraum as a 
precedent that he pursued in World War II (Baranowski 2011). The key process, then, 
of 19th century US economic and political development was westward expansion and 
development on territory that was involuntarily relinquished by its original 
inhabitants. It is beyond the scope of this project to attempt an empirical assessment 
of the impact of this process on the distribution of wealth across the entire continent, 
but it is important to note that westward expansion and the extensive development of 





Wealth and wage inequality in the United States increased through the 19th 
century, but the timing of that growth is hard to pin down due to imperfect 
comparability across data sources. In this next section I discuss the available sources, 
some of the particular complications in those sources, and offer an interpretation of 
inequality trends through the century. Specifically, wealth became more concentrated 
and the distribution of wages more unequal between 1790 and 1860, and again 
between 1860 and World War I. 
Wealth. The complexity of the American economy increased through the 19th century, 
but data on the distribution of wealth in the 19th century are little better than what is 
available for the colonial period. After the samples from 1774 (Jones 1980) and 1798 
(Soltow 1989), the next reliable benchmarks on the distribution of wealth are the 
censuses of 1850 (real estate only), 1860, and 1870 (Soltow 1975; Steckel 1990). 
King (1927), Gallman (1969) and Kopczuk and Saez 2004 have estimated the 
distribution of wealth in the United States from 1916 using tax records. 
Unfortunately, because all four major benchmarks—1774, 1798, mid-19th century and 
1916—draw on different data sources—probates, survey, census, and tax returns—
reliability and comparability between them have been a source of debate. 
There are a number of regional samples, but they lack the necessary coverage to 
draw conclusions for the nation as a whole: Kulikoff 1971 (Boston, 1790 to 1845, tax 
records), Bolton 1982, 1998 (Arkansas 1800 to 1860), Sarson 2000 (Maryland 1800 
and 1820), Smith 1973 (Hingham, Massachusetts, 1765 to 1880), Main 1976 




1971 (Wisconsin, 1860 forward), and Steckel and Moehling 2001 (Massachusetts, 
1820 to 1910). There is also an extensive literature on height and standard of living 
with implications for inequality between regions and classes (Fogel 1986; Steckel 
1979; 1986; 1995; Komlos 1987; 1998; Hiermeyer 2010). 
I note at the end of chapter 2 that wealth in the United States probably became 
both more concentrated and more broadly diffused through the first half of the 19th 
century: existing wealth trickled down to populations that had been excluded 
previously (e.g. indentured servants), but new wealth went disproportionately to those 
at the very top of the distribution. One important caveat here is the timing of rising 
wealth inequality. Williamson and Lindert (1980) argue that wealth inequality rose 
between 1820 and 1860 (based on a few regional samples from disproportionately 
urban populations). This position, though, contradicts Soltow’s (1989) 1798 results, 
which show relatively high inequality at the beginning of the 19th century. These 
latter results are frequently used to argue that colonial wealth inequality was already 
high, but from this grand historical perspective we often forget that much can, and 
did, change in the 25-year period between 1774 (the first “national” benchmark) and 
1798. Specifically, I will argue that wealth became substantially more concentrated in 
the 1790s with the onset of the commercial inequality regime.  
Williamson and Lindert (1980: 47) argue that wealth inequality after the Civil 
War remained at a high, uneven plateau, but admit that “the half-century between the 
1870 census and the onset of modern estate tax returns [1919] . . . is an empirical 
Dark Age.” Using the 1890 census, Gallman (1969: 13) estimated that the (gross) 




around 7.2-7.6% to 14.3-19.1%. Drawing on the same census, Holmes (1893; 
Williamson and Lindert 1980) estimated that wealthiest 1% controlled 25.8% of net 
worth. Williamson and Lindert (1980) note that this is only marginally below the 
figure produced by Lampman (1962) for 1922, but this conclusion may be misleading 
for two reasons. First, wealth inequality in 1922, after World War I, was significantly 
lower than a decade earlier; the income share of the richest 1% fell 20% between 
1914 and 1920 (Piketty and Saez 2003), and King (1927) and Williamson and Lindert 
(1980) estimate that the wealth share of the wealthiest 1% also fell about 20% 
between 1912 and 1923. Second, Kopczuk and Saez (2004) put the wealth share of 
the top 1% in 1922 at 36%, 33% higher than Lampman (1962). While issues with 
data comparability (asset and sample coverage, gross versus net wealth, etc.) mean 
that the results are far from conclusive, there is plenty of room for wealth inequality 
to have risen throughout the period from the Civil War to 1913 (and again through the 
1920s).  
Wages. The transformation of the US economy entailed a redefinition of labor. The 
emancipation of slaves, the end of indentured servitude, the forced expulsion of 
native populations and mass immigration of Europeans changed the way labor was 
organized. The expansion of semi- and fully proletarianized labor powered 
industrialization in the United States, and also increased the importance of both wage 
inequalities and inequalities between labor and capital. The emphasis of this 
dissertation is on income and wealth concentration at the top of the distribution. 
Because wage and income data before 1913 do not capture trends at the top of the 




inequality alone until the 20th century. That being said, a quick note on trends in skill 
premia through the 19th century is warranted, as this helps set the stage for an analysis 
on income inequality in the 20th century.  
The story of wage inequality through the 19th century is complicated by limited 
data. We have well-established bookends: US wage inequality was low by European 
standards at the beginning of the 19th century, but high at the beginning of the 20th 
century (Phelps-Brown 1968; Habakkuk 1962; Rosenburg 1967; Williamson and 
Lindert 1980). Before the American Revolution, colonists frequently complained 
about British regulations against immigration—more immigrants meant more labor in 
a labor starved nation, and greater regional influence. Habakkuk (1962) noted the 
relative abundance of skilled labor in 1820. “English visitors a century earlier 
characterized America as a nation endowed with cheap skills and expensive ‘raw’ 
labor” (Williamson and Lindert 1980: 67). A British machinist was paid 105% more 
than a common laborer in 1825; an American machinist received only 50% more 
(Rosenberg 1967). 
A century later conditions had reversed; “shortly before World War I, the 
premium on skilled labor was extraordinarily high in America” (Williamson and 
Lindert 1980: 67). Taussig (1927: 58-60; quoted in Atack and Passell 1994) found the 
“comparatively low rate of pay for the unskilled” prior to World War I “markedly 
peculiar.” In building trades, the skilled to unskilled wage ratio was 2.17 in the 
United States versus 1.54 in the United Kingdom in 1909 (Phelps-Brown 1968). And 
the relative dearth of skilled labor in the United States influenced technological 




machinery in production, then cheap skilled labor in Britain may have made it 
unprofitable to adopt capital-intensive methods. In America, by contrast, the relative 
scarcity of skilled workers may have required the adoption of machines that could be 
operated by the relatively abundant unskilled workers. This would also be perfectly 
consistent with the existence of difference in productivity between the two countries” 
(Atack and Passell 1994: 205). 
The timing of rising wage inequality is more contentious in the literature. 
Estimates on wage inequality trends in this period are informed by a number of wage 
series; researchers have collected advertised wages for jobs in a particular place and 
requiring a particular set of skills over time. The most important sources before 1890 
are the Report of Persons and Articles Hired (Margo 1999; 1820 to 1860), and the 
Aldrich and Weeks Reports (Burgess 1920, Coehlo and Shepherd 1976; these series 
have been indexed by Williamson 1975, see figure 3.1). Unfortunately, these wage 
series hardly represent the full distribution of material well-being—e.g., rising urban 
skilled to unskilled wage ratios in the antebellum period may have signaled a 
significant wage trend, but antebellum skilled workers were hardly the period’s 
economic elite and urban residents were still a demographic minority, so the impact 
of this trend on the overall distribution of incomes or wealth is difficult to assess. 
Other series include Adams (1968, Philadelphia laborers), Rothenberg (1992, 
agricultural day laborers in Massachusetts), Layer (1955, textile workers), Zabler 
(1972; iron workers in Eastern Pennsylvania), and Lebergott (1964, various sources 
and occupations). From 1890 to the 1940 Census (the first to collect data on wage and 




1920, Douglas 1926, Long 1960; these and more are included/discussed in 
Williamson and Lindert 1980, Goldin and Margo 1992, and Margo 1999), which 
helps to compensate for a dearth of other data sources. 
As with wealth, Williamson and Lindert (1980) argued that rising wage inequality 
was concentrated in an antebellum surge (see Figure 3.1), but this position has been 
widely criticized on empirical and theoretical grounds (Grosse 1982; Margo and 
Villaflor 1987; Atack and Passell 1994: 540). In reality, while we can identify trends 
for specific worker groups—e.g., clerks in Massachusetts—there is insufficient 
coverage to draw meaningful national conclusions.  
 
Kuznets (1955) directed attention to industrialization as a source of rising 
inequality during this period. According to Kuznets, mechanization of production in 
the United States created tiered wages across the United States, higher in 
manufacturing, lower in agriculture. When workers were concentrated in one sector 
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Figure 3.1 Urban Skilled to Unskilled Wage Ratio, 1817 to 1939




two, inequality was high. The evidence suggests a more complex story involving 
immigration, capital intensity and firm size. 
First, immigration tended to increase skill premia. Beginning with a wave of Irish 
immigrants after 1845, followed by a larger wave of southern and eastern Europeans, 
American laborers found that they were increasingly forced to compete not only with 
European goods but also Europeans themselves for work. Consistent with the 
Hecksher-Ohlin trade model, Williamson and Lindert (1980) found a strong empirical 
link between a growing labor force (natural growth and from immigration) and wage 
inequality (O’Rourke and Williamson 1999). 
Also, workers that used new technologies (or the white collar workers that 
managed their use) benefitted from an institutional environment that lacked the tools 
to broadly distribute the literacy, numeracy and other skills required. Unlike 
husbandry, industrial skills are not learned by children through home-based 
production, and the existing institutions for distributing skills—e.g., guilds and trade 
unions—were ill-equipped for training an industrial labor force. Workers employed in 
the largest firms with the greatest capitalization also earned the highest wages (Margo 
1999). It was not until the high school movement early in the 20th century that these 
skills were broadly diffused, and wage gaps immediately began to compress despite 
increased automation of production through World War II. The universal importance 
of skill-acquisition through education in this period is demonstrated by the large 
returns to education enjoyed by Iowa farmers (Goldin and Katz 1999). In short, the 




new skills, new technologies, and larger firms worked their way into all industries, 
benefitting some workers at the expense of others.  
I focus the rest of the chapter on wealth concentration. Empirically, wealth 
became more concentrated from the last decades of the 18th century through the first 
decades of the 20th century, but the mechanisms of accumulating wealth evolved 
through the century. I turn our attention next to the commercial inequality regime and 
wealth concentration through the first half of the 19th century. 
The Commercial Inequality Regime 
The empirical evidence suggests that wealth concentration in the United States 
rose between 1774 and 1860, and perhaps considerably between 1774 and 1798. This 
concentration marks the end of the colonial inequality regime and the beginning of 
the commercial inequality regime, and it is correlated with the end of the Dutch cycle 
of accumulation and the beginning of the British cycle.  
The shift from Dutch cycle to British cycle of accumulation can be mechanically 
tied to wealth concentration in the United States through two related processes. First, 
American political independence and war in Europe at the end of the 18th century 
granted American merchants special access to European markets that had been closed 
previously; among these pioneers of the commercial inequality regime are the United 
States’ first dollar millionaires. The second process involved a fundamental shift in 
the relationship between the United States and the rest of the world-economy. I 
highlight three developments: the end of mercantilism, better transportation 




merchants to connect an expanding US economy with resource hungry European 
markets, and get very rich in the process. 
In the next section, I detail the narrative that links the end of the Dutch cycle of 
accumulation to American political independence and the Napoleonic wars and, in 
turn, the first American dollar millionaires and the beginning of the commercial 
inequality regime. In the subsequent section we look beyond the epiphenomenon of 
re-exporters and smugglers to the roots of the commercial inequality regime in the 
British cycle of accumulation.  
The End of the Dutch Cycle of Accumulation and the Exploits of War 
In his 1728 A Plan of the English Commerce, Daniel Defoe argued that “the 
Dutch must be understood as they really are, the Carryers of the World, the middle 
Persons in Trade, the Factors and Brokers of Europe: That, as is said above, they buy 
to sell again, take in to send out; and the greatest Part of their vast Commerce consists 
in being supply’d from all Parts of the World, that they may supply all the World 
again” (Defoe 1728: 192, emphasis and spelling in original). Defoe’s economic 
insight must be critically received as he would die three years later while hiding from 
creditors, but he did offer an apt, often quoted, description of the Dutch mercantile 
empire that stood at the center of a world-economic material expansion. 
But Defoe’s description was more accurate of his past than his present. The Dutch 
world-trading system depended on market access, and that access was being 
materially threatened by the broader adoption of mercantilist policies. “Down to 1720 
countries such as Prussia, Russia, Sweden, and Denmark-Norway had lacked the 




years around 1720 a heightened sense of competition among the northern powers, 
combined with the diffusion of new technology and skills . . . led to a dramatic 
change. Within the next two decades most of northern Europe was incorporated into a 
framework of systemic industrial mercantilist policy” (Israel 1989: 383-4; quoted in 
Arrighi 1994/2010: 144-5).  
But as one door closed another opened. By restricting the exchange of goods, the 
northern European powers created trade imbalances and investment opportunities in 
newly isolated markets, and a greater incentive to fight for market access. Dutch 
money could reach markets even when Dutch goods were blocked. Before mid-
century, leading Dutch business entities began moving capital instead of goods 
through their international networks (Arrighi 1994/2010: 146). “By the 1760s, all the 
states of Europe were queuing up in the offices of the Dutch money-lenders: the 
emperor, the elector of Saxony, the elector of Bavaria, the insistent king of Denmark, 
the king of Sweden, Catherine II of Russia, the king of France and even the city of 
Hamburg (although it was Amsterdam’s successful rival) and lastly, the American 
rebels” (Braudel 1984: 246-7; quoted in Arrighi 1994/2010: 146).  
The transition from Dutch material to financial expansion is important not only as 
a precursor to the emergence of British hegemony, but Dutch finance also played an 
important role in the series of wars that drove the transition from the colonial 
inequality regimes to the commercial inequality regime in the United States. The first 
of these is the Seven Years War from 1754 to 1763. Great Britain sought to extend 
control over colonies and trade at the expense of France and Spain; Prussia sought to 




French-Austrian-Spanish front. British success in the war set the stage for it to 
emerge as the new global hegemon over the next quarter century. Great Britain 
gained colonial territory in Africa and the West Indies in addition to Spanish Florida 
and the bulk of New France in North America. France lost colonial territory (e.g., 
New France and French Louisiana) and gained war debt. 
Critical for our purposes is the link between the Seven Years War and the 
American Revolution. “The year 1763 marked a turning point in the British-colonial 
relationship”:  
Britain had emerged victorious from the long war with France. But the war 
had left Britain with an enormous public debt—all the larger because 
Parliament had reimbursed over 40 percent (1.069 million “pounds”) of 
colonial government contributions to the war effort—and a growing 
conviction that the colonies must bear a greater share of the cost of 
maintaining the empire. . . . Therefore, the Crown imposed a series of new 
taxes and reformed colonial administrative practices to enforce new and 
existing taxes better in order to generate additional revenues (Atack and 
Passell 1994: 67-68). 
 
The British had hesitated to impose strict rule on the colonies in the past (e,g., 
salutary neglect) because it feared French interference from the north. With the 
French effectively removed from North America, and war debts weighing on the 
treasury, the British sought to collect dues from the colonists. The colonists violently 
objected.   
When war in the colonies did break out, the colonists turned immediately to the 
French for assistance. The French spent 1.8 billion livres in the Seven Years War, 
inflating the national debt to a value seven times greater than revenues. Confronted 
with these obligations, the French spent another 1.3 billion livres in support of the 




culminated in the financial crisis of 1787. The French Revolution and European wars 
that followed in the 1790s and early 19th century were crucial to wealth concentration 
in the United States at the beginning of the commercial inequality regime (a point I 
return to below). 
The immediate impact of American independence on wealth inequality was more 
a matter of international politics than domestic institutional change. The colonies had 
long enjoyed relative self-rule by popular assembly under the British (an attempt to 
impose minimal taxes led to war). The Articles of Confederation recognized state-
based sovereignty built around existing political bodies, but established a weak 
national alliance. The individual states largely lacked the status to pursue meaningful 
foreign, monetary or fiscal policy.  
But after the Revolution the former colonies operated outside of the British 
Empire. American merchants were no longer legally constrained by British 
mercantilism, but some trade routes within the Empire that had been open to the 
colonists were now closed. And even where British and Americans might have 
competed on equal footing legally, British merchants benefitted from a substantial 
competitive advantage. The British were more experienced and drew on established 
trade and financial networks, had access to London insurance markets, enjoyed the 
protection of the British navy, and shipped goods in superior ships. By trouncing the 
Dutch in the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War (1780-1784), British naval power was 
dominant in the Atlantic. 
And the British sought to extend their advantage over the United States. Lord 




sailors and as much shipping as possible” and capture all Anglo-American trade in 
British ships, and for some time these efforts were moderately successful (Sheffield 
1783; quoted in Bruchey 1990: 114). That Sheffield’s pamphlet was deemed worthy 
of response by Thomas Paine (1783) and Tench Coxe (1791), among others, no doubt 
reflects its impact on American commerce: “Since the publication of this pamphlet in 
England, the commerce of the United States to the West Indies, in American vessels, 
has been prohibited; and all intercourse, except in British bottoms, the property of and 
navigated by British subjects, cut off” (Paine 1783).  
The impact on American commerce was tangible. “Trade appeared to decline in 
the post-Revolutionary years, and shipping interests did complain bitterly about their 
plight” (Atack and Passell 1994: 73). Official exports fell by half between the early 
1770s and 1793 (Bruchey 1990); actual exports (including smuggled goods) grew 
over that period but failed to keep pace with population growth (Atack and Passell 
1994); and per capita income fell about 10% between 1774 and 1805 (Atack and 
Passell 1994). Given that concentrated wealth in the colonial period was associated 
with mercantile interests in the North and export-oriented plantations in the South, the 
post-Revolutionary suppression of American exports undoubtedly compressed wealth 
distributions through the 1780s. 
Sheffield also noted that American shipping suffered because the individual states 
lacked leverage in commercial negotiations with foreign powers (Sheffield 1783; 
Bruchey 1990). Under these conditions, Alexander Hamilton (1787) noted that “there 
is scarcely anything that can wound the pride or degrade the character of an 




and international influence: “Are we entitled by nature and compact to a free 
participation in the navigation of the Mississippi? Spain excludes us from it. . . Is 
commerce of importance to national wealth? Ours is at the lowest point of 
declension. Is respectability in the eyes of foreign powers a safeguard against foreign 
encroachments? The imbecility of our government even forbids them to treat with us. 
Our ambassadors abroad are the mere pageants of mimic sovereignty.” (Hamilton 
1787). On these grounds, Charles Beard argued in 1913 that federalism in the United 
States was driven by “merchants, money lenders, security holders, manufacturers and 
shippers, capitalists, and financiers” who sought to benefit from consistent, national 
institutions and better terms for trade and credit (Beard 1913: 17; quoted in Atack and 
Passell 1994: 75). McGuire and Ohsfeldt (1984) analyzed voting patterns and 
concluded that delegates with merchantile interests were more likely to vote for 
ratification than other delegates. 
The new Constitution went into effect in 1789 and foreign trade was already 
accelerating by 1790. But growth in trade was more a result of war in Europe than the 
new legal framework (Atack and Passell 1994; Bruchey 1990). “By virtue of 
American neutrality during the European wars, American ships could trade with both 
sides. The demand for U.S. products increased substantially, and the demand for 
American shipping services increased yet more dramatically” (Atack and Passell 
1994: 77). The French opened their ports to American ships in 1793. Foreign exports 
doubled from $19 million to $40 million between 1790 and 1800 (Atack and Passell 




(relatively) free trade effectively replaced mercantilism by the end of the Napoleonic 
Wars (McCusker 1996). 
More important than traditional exports, though, was the new business of re-
exports. In an ironic reversal of pre-Revolution mercantile roles, Americans were able 
to exploit a legal loophole, a war-induced salutary neglect: British West Indian 
products were shipped to the United States, relabeled as American, and then shipped 
to Britain (or elsewhere in Europe) without being unloaded or facing much risk of 
confiscation by the French or British Navies (Bruchey 1990). The dollar value of re-
exports grew from nothing in 1790 to $45 million in 1800, more than ordinary 
exports (Atack and Passell 1994).  
The power of this embryonic commercialization to create wealth (and inequality) 
is best captured by the fact that America’s first (literal) millionaires were merchants 
at the end of the 18th century, and much of their wealth came from re-exports 
(Bruchey 1990). In fact, the predominant feature of the who’s-who of America’s 
wealthy at the turn of the century was participation in trading practices of dubious 
legality. Before the Revolution, the Cabots made their fortune operating a fleet of 
privateers running opium, rum and slaves. Elias Hasket Derby profited immensely 
from the American Revolution as he equipped or owned shares in dozens of 
privateering ships. He grew his wealth in the 1790s and was probably the wealthiest 
American in 1799. Stephen Girard is also reputed to have profited from the American 
Revolution by trading with the British, but it was through neutral shipping in the 
midst of war in Europe that Girard became one of the wealthiest individuals, in 




at the end of the post-independence recession may help to explain the incongruous 
results from Soltow’s (1989) First Direct Tax of 1798 to A.H. Jones’ (1980) sample 
from 1774. 
Commercial Wealth beyond the Dubiously Legal 
The re-exporters and smugglers demonstrate the importance of access to 
consumers, especially when that access is limited. But just as important through the 
rest of the first half of the 18th century was access to raw materials within the United 
States. Those who entered those markets first, often employing shady business 
strategies to do so, and connected them with distant buyers often became very 
wealthy. 
John Jacob Astor, then, is emblematic of the commercial inequality regime. Astor 
did not shy from smuggling opium, but his major industry was furs. Astor exploited 
the Jay Treaty in 1794, which opened trade with Canada, to build a fur empire. By 
1800, Astor was worth about $250,000, well short of Girard and Derby, but still a 
wealthy man for the period. Where Astor differed from Girard and Derby, though, is 
that his business was as much about expanding west as accessing markets to the east. 
In addition to a global fleet that traded regularly with China, Fort Astoria in 1811 
became the first US community on the Pacific Coast, and Astor built a trading empire 
in the Great Lakes region. Astor was the wealthiest antebellum American; Forbes 
estimated that his peak net worth was equal to about $110 billion in 2006 dollars, far 
more than any American today (Forbes 2007).  
I highlight three developments that defined the commercial inequality regime. 




1776 and Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations. American merchants rushed to exploit the 
gaps opening in old mercantilist networks. To do so, they transported goods using 
new technologies and new infrastructure, the second and third developments of the 
commercial inequality regime.  
Adam Smith and the End of Mercantilism. After mercantilism helped expedite the 
end of the Dutch cycle of accumulation, the British cycle of accumulation is best 
defined by a rapid push towards free trade imperialism. This evolution has its roots in 
wars the Dutch funded during their financial expansion in the second half of the 18th 
century. In the shadow of a generation of costly wars to defend mercantilist trade 
interests, and the relationship between these mounting costs and political instability in 
France, the economic and political foundations of mercantilism as a philosophy of 
political economy were shaken. Adam Smith provided the theoretical sledge hammer 
that was used to destroy the remaining supports.  
Adam Smith opened the Wealth of Nations by noting “the nation will be better or 
worse supplied with all the necessaries and conveniences for which it has occasion” 
as production (GDP in modern parlance) “bears a greater or smaller proportion to the 
number of those who are to consume it” (Smith 1776/2004: XV). This premise is 
precisely in line with mercantilist logic, but he quickly strayed from the party line. 
Where mercantilists sought to bloat this proportion by discouraging the consumption 
of imports and otherwise manipulating the terms of trade, Smith emphasized instead 
“the skill, dexterity, and judgment with which its labour is generally applied” (Smith 




How, then, does one increase the “skill, dexterity and judgment” with which labor 
is applied? “The greatest improvement in the productive power of labour, and the 
greater part of the skill, dexterity, and judgment with which it is any where directed, 
or applied, seem to have been the effects of the division of labour” (Smith 1776/2004: 
3). In other words, productivity is increased through specialization. Specialization 
depends on exchange; without exchange we must all be autarkic and utterly without 
specialization.  
Because exchange encourages specialization, specialization increases 
productivity, and productivity generates wealth, wealth is maximized through 
exchange: “As it is the power of exchanging that gives occasion to the division of 
labour, so the extent of this division must always be limited by the extent of that 
power, or, in other words, by the extent of the market” (Smith 1776/2004: 15). 
Smith’s conclusion was revolutionary—national wealth was maximized by extending 
markets, not manipulating them.  
That Adam Smith began with a mercantilist premise but a classical (economic) 
conclusion reflects more than original thought. Mercantilism sought to maximize the 
specie wealth of the crown and its loyal supporters with a positive balance of trade. 
This wealth could then be deployed to extend royal influence, soft and hard power. 
Smith’s logic reflected an economic democratization, the modernization of the 
economy and warfare (and thus classical economics stands as the first modern school 




In a classic dialectical turn, this transition finds its roots in mercantilism itself. 
Mercantilism required an internalization of war- and state-making capacity in order to 
profit from the territorial expansion mercantilism encouraged. 
Partly through commands to state bureaucracies and partly through incentives 
to private enterprise, the rulers of France and of the United Kingdom 
internalized within their domains as many of the growing number of activities 
that, directly or indirectly, entered as inputs in the war-making and state-
making process as was feasible. In this way they managed to turn into tax 
revenues a much larger share of protections costs . . . By spending these 
enhanced tax revenues within their domestic economies, they created new 
incentives and opportunities to establish ever new linkages between activities 
and thus make wars pay for themselves more and more. . . . [A]n increasing 
number of civilians were mobilized to sustain indirectly, and often 
unknowingly, the war-making and state-making efforts of rulers. War-making 
and state-making were becoming an increasingly roundabout business which 
involved an ever-growing number, range, and variety of seemingly unrelated 
activities. (Arrighi 1994/2010: 51) 
 
Adam Smith, then, anticipated the “wave of rebelliousness,” beginning with the 
American Revolution, that brought about “a thorough transformation of ruler-subject 
relations” and “the establishment of an entirely new kind of world hegemony (British 
free-trade imperialism)” (Arrighi 1994/2010: 53). In short, the end of mercantilism 
was important not only for what it meant in terms of foreign access to domestic ports, 
but it marked a revolution in the relationship between the state and the economy; we 
will see this pattern replicated at the end of the British cycle of accumulation and the 
beginning of the US cycle.  
The geography of classical economic thought is also no accident. The British rode 
mercantilist logic to a position of preeminence in the Atlantic, but from that position 
imperialism made sense only as a means to open closed markets, not to close open 
markets. Thus, the Scottish Adam Smith argued that political economy should be 




food chain, and so it was apparent to the British economist David Ricardo that it 
should specialize and exploit its comparative advantage – thus relegating the 
periphery to providing British with the raw materials to feed industry. 
Adam Smith was not the first to critique mercantilist thought, and the change in 
policy towards the colonies after the Seven Years War reflected a material change in 
attitudes in the British Empire regarding it relationship with its colonies. The British 
began a project of unilateral trade liberalization in the 19th century (McCusker 1996), 
and the repeal of the Navigation Acts and Corn Laws in the late 1840s marked the de 
jure end of mercantilism.  
Transportation Technologies. After 1790, Britain increased public expenditures six 
fold, from 22 million pounds to 123 million pounds, to meet the demands of war. This 
spending boom fueled a rapid expansion of the capital goods industry, particularly 
iron. Two decades later war ended but the productive capacity remained; repurposing 
these capital goods fueled a transportation revolution: iron ships and iron train cars on 
iron railways powered by steam engines (Arrighi 1994/2010; McNeill 1984). 
“Combined with the contemporaneous spread of mechanization within the textile 
industry, these innovations transformed the British capital goods industry into an 
autonomous and powerful engine of capitalist expansion” (Arrighi 1994/2010: 165). 
There are few better examples of how crisis gives birth to a new spatial configuration 
and material expansion of the world-economy. 
The transportation revolution made British free-trade imperialism logistically 
possible. In order to pursue their Ricardian comparative advantage, the British needed 




industry and reduce the relative cost of British industrial exports. Repealing the Corn 
Laws at mid-century was an important legislative step, but cheaper ocean 
transportation was also essential.  
The transportation revolution was fundamental to the commercial inequality 
regime, but it was also a major player in the end of the commercial inequality regime. 
For example, clippers were competitive with steam-powered ships until mid-century 
(Atack and Passell 1994), but in the second half of the 19th century transportation 
costs collapsed. For example, Liverpool paid a 60% premium on grain relative to 
Chicago, 93% on meat and animal fats, and 80% on iron in 1870. In 1912, the price 
gap shrunk to 14% on grain, 18% on meat and animal fats, and 20% for iron 
(O’Rourke and Williamson 1992). Merchants depend on arbitrage for profits - buying 
a good at a lower price in one market and selling it at a higher price in another. 
Shrinking price gaps are antithetical to mercantile profits.  
And the new steamships brought more than goods across the ocean. For example, 
20% of New Yorkers were foreign immigrants in 1820, but 50% of the population 
and 80% of the wage-earning workforce were born outside the United States in 1850; 
400,000 immigrants entered the city in the 1840s alone (Licht 1995). Immigration 
transformed labor in the United States and provided the muscle behind the American 
industrial revolution. Intensive and extensive growth of the US economy meant that 
capitalists in the second half of the 19th century could focus their attention on 
producing for a domestic market and depend less on exports. I will revisit these points 




Internal Improvements. The ocean-going transportation revolution required little in 
the way of infrastructural investment, but it also found an entrenched and stubborn 
technology in the form of the wind-powered clipper (Atack and Passell 1994). Land-
based transportation, on the other hand, required a more substantial initial investment, 
but the potential gains, even in the first half of the 19th century, were immense.  
Through the colonial period, wealth generation in the colonies was largely limited 
to coastal regions. As noted in chapter 2, though theoretically open to homesteaders, 
migration inland was difficult, dangerous, and expensive. “Penniless immigrants, 
even those from European farms, went mainly to the cities to do wage labor by 
necessity. Successful agriculture pioneering required extensive capital, including 
working family members” (Hughes and Cain 2002: 92). Massive transportation costs 
consumed any profits that could be earned through exchange, so farmers that were not 
effectively close to markets were limited to subsistence farming, which did not justify 
the investment to move west (Atack and Passell 1994).  
Three variables, then, influenced westward expansion: the cost of migrating 
(including land purchases), the price of exports, and the cost of transporting those 
exports. For example, higher grain prices following a series of disappointing harvests 
in the 1830s induced a wave of settlers to go west through that decade (land entries 
exceeded 20 million acres in 1835 versus a previous annual peak of about 6 million in 
1819; Robbins 1942; Atack and Passell 1994).  
Lower transportation costs were brought about by a wave of internal 
improvements. Investment in canals took off after 1825, dipped a decade later, and 




Erie Canal opened in 1825 and was a huge success; by 1860 it was carrying almost as 
much trade as the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers (Atack and Passell 1994). Investment 
in canals waned as the popularity of railroads grew. There were 3,000 miles of rail in 
the United States in 1830, 9,000 miles in 1850 and 30,000 miles in 1860 (Historical 
Statistics 2006).  
The result was a major reduction in transportation costs over land. Charles Paullin 
(1932) estimated travel times from New York City to points across the United States 
(see Figure 3.2). In 1800 (Paullin 1932: Plate 138A), Paullin estimated that it would 
take more than four weeks to reach New Orleans and six weeks to reach Chicago. 
Those times would be cut in half by 1830, three weeks to Chicago and two weeks to 
New Orleans (Plate 138B). In 1857 (Plate 138C), the travel time to New Orleans 
would be cut in half again to about six days, but the time to Chicago would be slashed 
to less than two days. By 1930 (Plate 138D), a traveler from New York could reach 
any point in the United States in four days or less by rail. 
The case of New Orleans is illustrative of the commercial inequality regime. The 
Louisiana territory, once at the center of Law’s failed Mississippi Company, passed 
from French to Spanish and back to French hands before being sold to the United 
States when Napoleon abandoned plans for an American empire. Unfettered access to 
the Mississippi River (no longer would Hamilton need to worry about Spanish 
interference), combined with steamboats, gave Americans a direct route from frontier 
to ocean. New Orleans blossomed in subsequent decades, and was among the richest 











     Source: Paullin 1932 
Where New Orleans is illustrative of the commercial inequality regime, it is in the 
juxtaposition of Chicago and New Orleans that we can see the relationship between 
internal improvements and the transition to the corporate inequality regime in the 
United States. New Orleans was a commercial center, one of the largest and probably 
the richest city in the United States after 1830. But Chicago was the hub of a growing 
internal economy. Paullin (1932) produced another series of maps showing the 
extension of rail between 1840 and 1870 in the United States (Plates 138L and 140A; 
Figure 3.3). Rail connected much of the northern coast in 1840. In 1870, Chicago was 
at the center of a massive rail network that connected the Midwest and Northeast and, 
through the transcontinental railroad completed in 1869, a single route to the west 




After the Civil War, wealth in the United States was increasingly associated with 
internal, industrial growth, not raw exports (e.g., sugar and cotton) to Europe.  
   Figure 3.3 Railroad Density 
 
  Source: Paullin 1932 
Returning to the impact of the commercial inequality regime on wealth 
concentration in the United States, expanding market access to the east and west 
allowed merchants to profit extraordinarily from arbitrage, purchasing goods in one 
market at a lower price in one place and selling them at a higher price elsewhere. 
Wealth also accumulated in commercial nodes (e.g., New York and New Orleans). 
Again, John Jacob Astor is a useful example; Astor was also a major investor in New 
York real estate.  
Unfortunately, we cannot definitively compare these predictions against the 
empirical record. Wealth was more concentrated in 1860 than 1774, and more 




distribution of real estate in 1860 was only marginally higher than in 1798, and this 
gap can be explained by measurement error. Taken together, we can conclude that 
wealth concentration either increased rapidly to 1798 from 1774 (and most likely 
from 1790) and then plateaued until the Civil War, or wealth concentration increased 
to 1798, and then portable wealth became significantly more concentrated to 1860. I 
cannot differentiate empirically between the two scenarios, but the above narrative is 
generally consistent with either, more so with the latter. 
The End of the Commercial Regime 
As is the case with each inequality regime, the conditions that defined the 
previous regime would, in time, drive the transition to the next. Immigration, internal 
improvements and westward expansion grew the US economy and reduced American 
dependence on European markets. Falling transportation costs (both in terms of 
time/risk and the initial capital investment) and greater access to international ports 
increased competition and reduced the potential for arbitrage profits. And the 
technology behind the British industrial revolution that absorbed raw materials from 
around the world diffused. In other words, those conditions that produced America’s 
first dollar millionaires were the same that eventually ate into their profit margins. 
In this next section I identify the origins of the corporate inequality regime. 
Specifically, Americans borrowed and adapted British technologies and employed 
semi-proletarianized labor to launch their own industrial revolution. The politically 
and economically more powerful North became more interested in protecting infant 
industries than profiting from raw exports. New productive, transportation and 




growing global competition for raw materials prompted vertical integration in those 
enterprises to protect access to raw materials and other markets. Early entrepreneurs 
were able to capture industries within innovative organizational forms and ride US 
economic growth to accumulate massive amounts of wealth and power until the US 
government intervened in the 20th century to encourage competition between firms 
and manage competition between labor and capital. Wealth concentration was higher 
in the decades before the Great Depression than at any other point in US history. 
Bringing British Technology to the United States. To protect their technological 
advantage in textile manufacturing, the British banned the export of that technology. 
And when the technology was stored in the heads of trained artisans, they forbad the 
embarkation of those individuals. To sneak past custom officials, Samuel Slater 
disguised himself as a farm laborer when emigrating from England for the United 
States (Licht 1995). The technology had to be adapted to the unique material 
conditions of the United States; for example, Samuel Slater contracted entire families 
to work in his factory because he was unable to find wage laborers, and early 
manufacturing labor was provided primarily by young women and children (Licht 
1995). But in time Slater and others helped initiate a technological revolution in the 
United States. 
More important for our purposes is where Samuel Slater turned to finance the 
implementation of the templates in his head. “In 1790 the textile mill of Almy and 
Brown opened in Pawtucket, Rhode Island, using British technology pirated by 
Samuel Slater. This venture was financed out of the merchant capital accumulated by 




Boston, for example, used their extensive mercantile fortune to establish the nation’s 
first industrial city on the falls of the Merrimack River—Lowell, Massachusetts.” 
(Atack and Passell 1994: 178). In fact, the primary backer of Lowell, Massachusetts 
was Samuel Cabot Lowell, a node joining the Cabot and Lowell families, among the 
two most important merchant families in Boston at the time (Atack and Passell 1994). 
John Jacob Astor built his fortune on the fur trade, but he also profited immensely 
by investing that wealth in New York real estate. John Avery Parker used his 
shipbuilding resources to become a whaling kingpin and then gain a controlling 
interest in an iron mill (whaling provided the oils that lubricated the industrial 
revolution before petroleum; Atack and Passell 1994). The embargo of 1807 and 
increased competition in subsequent decades were particularly important in 
motivating merchants to diversify (Atack and Passell 1994). “The great mercantile 
families that had accumulated wealth in the colonial commerce placed their surplus 
capital in large-scale ventures: in Lowell mills, but also in further trade, banking, 
canal and railroad construction, and mining development” (Licht 1995: 35). As in the 
case of Samuel Slater, those to benefit from new American industry were often not 
members of the merchant elite, but they did often turn to that merchant elite, directly 
or indirectly, for financing. 
The huge upfront costs on canals and railroads required new financial 
mechanisms and institutions (Atack and Passell 1994), and “the expansion of trade 
and the growth of business enterprise led (indeed compelled) some merchants to 
specialize in finance” (Klein 2007: 11). The New York Stock Exchange was 




largely available only from private investors until the end of the 19th century, and the 
banking system was far from stable during this period. 
Manufacturing output increased at a rapid clip in the decades before the Civil 
War, faster in percentage terms than after the war. When there was an intersection of 
a growing immigrant, urban, less-skilled labor force, mercantile capital, and access to 
Midwestern raw materials, manufacturing expanded. “In 1820 agricultural workers 
accounted for 58 percent of the Massachusetts labor force. By 1840, when absolute 
agricultural employment in Massachusetts was at its peak, the share of labor in 
agriculture had fallen to 40 percent. In the next decade farm employment fell 
precipitously from 87,500 to 55,700, or only 15 percent of the labor force. This 
precipitous decline coincided with the opening of rail links to the West.” (Atack and 
Passell 1994: 178).  
By combining the extensive growth of the US economy (from migration and 
westward expansion) with the intensive growth offered by industrialization, the US 
economy was transformed. Before the Civil War, real wealth in America was tied to 
demand in and access to European markets, because the potential purchasing power 
in Europe was much greater than in the United States. In 1820, France and the United 
Kingdom each produced three times more than the United States, and Germany 
produced twice as much. The United States passed France and Germany in terms of 
gross domestic product between 1850 and 1860, and it passed the United Kingdom by 
1870. In 1870, the United States produced 40% as much as those three countries 
combined; that figure jumped to 85% in 1910. By 1920 US GDP was greater than that 




developmental strategy. The export-oriented South—slave plantations were a 
corporate adaptation to maximize profits from the European trade—preferred an 
export-oriented economic policy; cotton made up more than half of total exports 
between 1815 and 1860 (Klein 2007). The industrializing North preferred protection 
from British imports. Cotton textiles were particularly vulnerable to British 
competition (Atack and Passell 1994). 
The trade economics of the Civil War can be succinctly summarized in Figure 3.4 
below. James (1981) estimates the effect of a tariff on real incomes for various groups 
in 1859. James estimates that a tariff up to 40% of the price of imports would be 
positively correlated with incomes for laborers and capitalists, but negatively 
correlated with incomes for land and slaveowners. Others have produced different 
income elasticities, but the general conclusion stands: Northern manufacturers stood 




Figure 3.4 Domestic Manufacturing Output as a Function of the Tariff Rate
 
Victory by the North accelerated the transformation of the US economy. Many 
Southerners believed “King Cotton” would force the British to come to their aid in 
the case of open conflict with the North, but their confidence backfired. Instead, the 
British intensified production in India. In the years before the war, two organizations 
formed in England "to encourage the increased cultivation of cotton in every part of 
the world suited for its growth" (Fifth Annual Report of the Cotton Supply 
Association, quoted in Logan 1958: 472). They identified India as a suitable home for 
investment, and the Indian share of British cotton imports grew from 31% in 1861 to 
90% in 1862. India increased exports by more than 40% during the Civil War (Logan 




1958). Combined with slowing growth in the demand for cotton (Wright 1974), 
cotton after the Civil War was no longer king. 
The North exploited its grip on federal power during and after the Civil War. In 
addition to abolishing slavery, a Northern Congress passed the Morrill Tariff and 
Revenue Act (the first attempt at a national income tax) and the Legal Tender Act 
(authorizing the Treasury to issue $150 million in greenbacks) in 1861, the 
Homestead Act (opening up more of the West to settlers), the Morrill Land Grant Act 
(creating agricultural colleges) and the Pacific Railway Act (providing federal funds 
for the transcontinental railroad) in 1862. The demands of war drove policy during 
this period, but another theme with a longer time frame emerged: The United States 
was adopting more aggressive, expansive federal fiscal and monetary policies. The 
net result was a fundamental transformation, economic and political, of the United 
States. 
The Corporate Inequality Regime 
At first blush, the story of the corporate inequality regime is simple: a small set of 
massive corporations rose up in the last half of the 19th century, and those at the top 
of the ladder became excessively rich. We are familiar with those at the apex— 
Carnegie (US Steel), Rockefeller (Standard Oil), Henry Ford (Ford Motor), Jay Gould 
(the archetypal ‘robber baron’) —but further down the ladder compensation was also 
higher for those in larger corporations (Margo 1999). To place the rise of the 
corporate inequality regime in context, I highlight four developments: the growth of 
the domestic market, infrastructural integration of the Union, cut-throat competition 





Growth of the Domestic Market and Infrastructural Integration. The United States 
surpassed the United Kingdom in the early 1870s to become the largest economy in 
the world (Maddison 2008), but the maturation of the US economy involved more 
than extensive growth. According to Maddison, the per capita purchasing power of 
the United States fluctuated around 80% of that in the United Kingdom from 1820 
until the end of the 1870s, but would match that of the United Kingdom in 1901 and 
was significantly higher (about 7%) by World War I (Maddison 2008; author’s 
calculations). The US economy was more productive and capital intensive (more 
efficient and using more machines) than its European peers by 1900 (Atack and 
Passell 1994). For example, as late as 1870 blast furnaces in the United States needed 
about 67% more fuel and 40% more workers to match Belgian furnaces in pig iron 
production. US furnaces would match those in Belgium in both respects in 1890, and 
were more efficient in 1900 (Allen 1977). 
The extensive and intensive growth of the economy was facilitated by upgraded 
infrastructure. Canals and rail moved goods more quickly and cheaply than roads and 
unimproved rivers. But the revolution in information was more dramatic. Until the 
1840s, news travelled along the same routes as everything else. By 1852, though, the 
United States had 23,000 miles of telegraph wire, 23,000 more than in 1844, and 
information could be moved almost instantaneously between major cities (Atack and 
Passell 1994). Markets expanded in the first half of the 19th century as barriers to 
exchange were lowered and transportation costs fell. But the combination of 




“The railroad and the telegraph provided the means for market coordination.” (Atack 
and Passell 1994: 471). Instead of seeking out new trade partners, firms could expand 
their operations geographically. 
At the intersection of industrialization and improved infrastructure, manufacturing 
output increased and shifted westward. Table 3.1 lists counties by decade that 
produced over $100 million in manufacturing (in current dollars; prices were largely 
stagnant over the period in question; Historical Census Browser 2004; author’s 
calculations). New York and Philadelphia first make the list in 1860. Twenty years 
later in 1880, New York and Philadelphia still top the list, and Massachusetts had 
more representatives than any other state, but Chicago (Cook Co.) surged into third, 
and Cincinnati (Hamilton), Pittsburgh (Alleghany), and St. Louis also topped $100 
million. In 1900, New York City continues to dominate US manufacturing – 
Manhattan (New York Co.) and Brooklyn (Kings Co.) were both in the top five, and 
Hudson Co., New Jersey is also on the list. But Chicago (Cook), Pittsburgh 
(Allegheny), and St. Louis are also among the top six. Of the counties producing 
more than $100 million in manufacturing in 1900, 48% were more than 300 miles 
from the East Coast. Consequently, in 1850, 49 of the top 100 counties by 
manufacturing output were in the Northeast, but that number fell over the next 50 
years as the Midwest (1860 to 1880) and then the rest of the country (1880 to 1900) 





Table 3.1 Counties, Value of Manufacturing > $100 million (in $100 millions) 
1850 1890  1900 
(None)  NEW YORK (NY) 7.8  NEW YORK (NY) 9.8 
  COOK (IL) 6.7  COOK (IL) 9.1 
1860 PHILADELPHIA (PA) 5.8  PHILADELPHIA (PA) 6.0 
NEW YORK (NY) 1.6 KINGS (NY) 2.7  ALLEGHENY (PA) 4.3 
PHILADELPHIA (PA) 1.4 ALLEGHENY (PA) 2.4  KINGS (NY) 3.4 
  ST LOUIS CITY (MO) 2.3  ST LOUIS CITY (MO) 2.3 
1870 SUFFOLK (MA) 2.2  SUFFOLK (MA) 2.2 
NEW YORK (NY) 3.3 HAMILTON (OH) 2.1  MIDDLESEX (MA) 1.9 
PHILADELPHIA (PA) 3.2 MIDDLESEX (MA) 1.6  HAMILTON (OH) 1.7 
ST LOUIS (MO) 1.6 ESSEX (MA) 1.5  ESSEX (MA) 1.7 
MIDDLESEX (MA) 1.1 BALTIMORE CITY (MD) 1.4  BALTIMORE CITY (MD) 1.6 
SUFFOLK (MA) 1.1 SAN FRANCISCO (CA) 1.4  PROVIDENCE (RI) 1.6 
  PROVIDENCE (RI) 1.2  HUDSON (NJ) 1.6 
1880 CUYAHOGA (OH) 1.2  CUYAHOGA (OH) 1.6 
NEW YORK (NY) 4.7 WORCESTER (MA) 1.1  ESSEX (NJ) 1.5 
PHILADELPHIA (PA) 3.2 ERIE (NY) 1.1  MILWAUKEE (WI) 1.4 
COOK (IL) 2.5 ESSEX (NJ) 1.1  WORCESTER (MA) 1.4 
KINGS (NY) 1.8     ERIE (NY) 1.3 
SUFFOLK (MA) 1.3     NEW HAVEN (CT) 1.3 
MIDDLESEX (MA) 1.3     SAN FRANCISCO (CA) 1.3 
ST LOUIS CITY (MO) 1.1     DOUGLAS (NE) 1.1 
HAMILTON (OH) 1.1     HENNEPIN (MN) 1.1 
ALLEGHENY (PA) 1.1     WAYNE (MI) 1.1 
ESSEX (MA) 1.0     WYANDOTTE (KS) 1.0 
       BRISTOL (MA) 1.0 
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Europe’s Long Depression. Stagnant prices through the last quarter of the 19th century 
were a matter of great political concern. Europe in particular was beset by two 
decades of price deflation and low growth during the Long Depression (1873-1896). 
Popular opinion about the severity of the crisis did not match reality: "A depression 
of prices, a depression of interest, and a depression of profits; there is that 
undoubtedly. I cannot see any reason for believing that there is any considerable 
depression in any other respect” (Alfred Marshall, quoted in Musson 1959). This was 
particularly true of the United States, where strong economic growth resumed after 
1879. But it was not immune to the deflationary pull exerted by Europe—price 
convergence was particularly strong during this period. The Civil War dramatizes the 
price effects, but prices for farm products, textiles, and metals were higher in the mid-
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The Long Depression was central to Kondratieff’s (1925) model of major 
economic cycles, and Arrighi (1994/2010) associates the Long Depression in Europe 
with the collapse of the British-centered material expansion.                          
Generally speaking, our analysis of systemic cycles of accumulation has 
shown that every material expansion of the capitalist world-economy has been 
based on a particular organizational structure, the vitality of which was 
progressively undermined by the expansion. . . . as the mass of capital that 
sought reinvestment in trade increased under the impact of rising or high 
returns, a growing proportion of the economic space needed to keep returns 
rising or high was being used up (Arrighi 1994/2010: 232) 
 
From this position, the Long Depression was a depression not in the sense that 
output flagged, because quite the opposite was the case, but in the sense that 
production expanded too fast to maintain profits. Specifically, rapid industrialization 
in Germany and the United States was leaving Britain behind.  
There is other evidence of stagnation and inefficiency in several of the major 
industries, such as iron and steel, coal, and cotton. In iron and steel, for 
example, Britain was losing her technological lead; she was failing to 
modernize her plant, to develop new processes (like the Thomas basic 
process, for example), or to modify her industrial structure with the same 
rapidity as Germany and the United States-owing to conservatism, the heavy 
cost of replacing old plant, and deficiencies in technical education. . . . The 
cotton industry also experienced a declining growth both of production and 
productivity, and though Lancashire goods still dominated world markets, 
there was evidence of declining efficiency and of conservatism, as shown for 
example by the slow adoption of ring spinning and automatic looms in this 
country and by the very slight fall in real costs during this period as compared 
with the United States. Similarly, in the development of new industries, such 
as chemicals and electrical engineering, Britain was lagging behind Germany 
and the United States (Musson 1959: 206-7). 
 
We can attribute British “conservativism,” their dependence on older, less 
efficient technologies, with the strictures of the existing spatial configuration. From 
the mid-1860s, British capital flowed internationally in hopes of finding higher 




and Germany were in a better position to adopt newer, more efficient technologies 
(Atack and Passell 1994). The result, as we will see 100 years later in the United 
States, was the financialization of the British economy (Musson 1959).   
As prices and profits in Europe fell, the economic fruits of exporting to Europe 
from the United States soured. “The discipline of the market posed a serious threat to 
the growing investment in increasingly specific capital goods and human capital. As a 
result, firms sought to maintain or increase profits and reduce risk by controlling price 
and output—that is, through monopolization. Increasingly, competition was viewed 
as ‘ruinous’ or ‘cutthroat.’” (Atack and Passell 1994: 481). American firms were in a 
unique position because the United States had the scale, both geographically and 
demographically, to specialize internally. Firms in the United States sought to exploit 
this advantage by internalizing and integrating production and distribution. When 
American firms did turn outward, it was to secure access to cheaper inputs abroad: 
direct investment from large US companies reached 7% of GNP in 1914 (Atack and 
Passell 1994). 
The Corporate Form. The mechanization of the US economy exaggerated the impact 
of business cycles because the cost of fixed capital was less variable than labor; i.e., 
the firm could not layoff or cut wages to their machines (Prechel 2000). As such, 
there was little incentive to cut production when prices fell, and in some cases 
production would increase in response to lower prices in order to generate the same 
level of profits against slimmer profit margins.  
Trade associations began to organize pooling agreements in the 1870s to establish 




only artificial solutions. Instead of segmenting markets, firms sought to strengthen 
ties to “centralize control over independent firms competing for the same market” 
(Prechel 2000: 28). Firms turned to mergers and holding companies, but legal and 
organizational complications with these arrangements led ultimately the creation of 
trusts; small owners relinquished control of business activities in exchange for trust 
certificates that guaranteed a share of profits (Prechel 2000).   
The final step in the horizontal and vertical integration of production in the 
modern corporation depended on the unique political geography of the United States. 
First, in a capitalist world-economy defined by the discontinuity of economic and 
political institutions (Wallerstein 1979), the United States enjoyed the advantage of 
being sufficiently large in size, geographically and demographically, to internalize a 
division of labor. In this environment, the United States was a leader in protectionist 
economics and isolationist politics at a time when the economic orthodoxy of the 
hegemon pushed regional specialization and exchange. Second, the US economy was 
partially segmented between states. For example, firms were defined as foreign, with 
no legal rights, outside their state of incorporation (Prechel 2000). But competition 
between states for tax revenue, with New Jersey at the cutting edge, forced states to 
liberalize incorporation laws in the 1890s.  
The result was a proliferation of large, integrated trusts and holding companies. 
“Almost nonexistent at the end of the 1870s, these integrated enterprises came to 
dominate many of the most vital industries within less than three decades” (Chandler 
1977: 285). Through horizontal integration (i.e., merging firms producing similar 




(i.e., integrating supply and distribution chains), they secured access to inputs. In so 
doing, they also became themselves the leading sites of innovation having captured 
access to the abundant resources, sources of profit and the capital to fund 
development and implementation. Where the independent American inventor was a 
major player decades before, innovation became the realm of large research 
departments within or funded by the largest firms (Bruchey 1990).  
These arrangements, in turn, were dependent on the faster transfer of goods, 
capital and information made possible by internal infrastructural improvements.  
The integration of mass production with mass distribution allowed 
manufacturers to lower costs and increase productivity largely through the 
more effective management and coordination of production and distribution. 
The result was a new kind of firm—the modern business enterprise—
characterized by many distinct operating units and managed by a hierarchy of 
salaried employees. In these firms the level of economic activity was such that 
administration coordination within the firm was more efficient and profitable 
than coordination through the market. The visible hand of the manager had 
replaced the invisible hand of the market. These firms are those whose names 
are familiar to this day: Pillsbury, Singer, International Harvester, Armour, 
Swift, Standard Oil, Remington, American Tobacco, and Diamond Match, to 
name but a very few. Big business had arrived. It brought with it lower costs, 
quality control, and dependability. Unfortunately, it was often the brainchild 
of “robber barons” who sought to reap the profits from monopoly. (Atack and 
Passell 1994: 472-73) 
 
While the primary beneficiaries were those that owned the capital and managed the 
exchange networks, workers in large firms also enjoyed profits above those available 
to workers that were exposed to the full force of global competition. 
This new organizational form gave American capitalists an advantage 
domestically and internationally, and played a critical role both in their ability to 
accumulate huge amounts of wealth and in the United States emerging as the global 




The most imposing barrier to entry in these industries was the organization the 
pioneers had built to market and distribute their newly mass-produced 
products. A competitor who acquired the technology had to create a national 
and often global organization of managers, buyers, and salesman if he was to 
get the business away from the one or two enterprises that already stood 
astride the major marketing channels (Chandler 1977: 299, quoted in Arrighi 
1994/2010) 
 
The Bigger the Better 
Bringing together the growing size and integration of the US economy, stiffening 
competition from Europe, and new organizational forms (and the legal and financial 
institutions to support them), firms in the United States had every incentive to grow 
large. This was not the case in the very recent past. “Most American industry in 1860 
. . . was widely dispersed, rural, small-scale, and simple” (Atack and Passell 1994: 
458). The reason for this is twofold. First, transportation costs made it impossible for 
larger firms to exploit economies of scale (centralizing production) since the raw 
inputs first had to be shipped in and then the output shipped out. “A number of 
authors have tried to measure the importance of scale economies using a variety of 
different production function forms. Most have concluded that scale economies, if 
and when they existed, were small and soon exhausted. Firms did not have to be large 
to be competitive in the first half of the 19th century” (Atack and Passell 1994: 193). 
Returns on investment were lower in larger firms (Atack and Passell 1994: 206). 
Falling transportation costs killed small firms that depended on distance from larger, 
more efficient competitors to survive. Through the second half of the 19th century, the 
theoretical benefits of economies of scale grew, so that James (1983) estimated that 




Second, even where the incentives were right, firm size was dictated by access to 
capital, and organizing large amounts of capital for a centralized production facility 
required a financial sophistication that did not yet exist. The evidence is in the 
exceptions. New York and Philadelphia were manufacturing hotbeds in the 1870s, but 
manufacturing establishments in Rhode Island and Massachusetts had twice as many 
workers on average as establishments in New York and Pennsylvania in 1870 
(Historical Census Browser 2004; author’s calculations). The largest establishments 
in the Northeast were funded by wealthy New England merchant families (e.g., the 
Lowells). The New York Stock Exchange (1817), Chicago Board of Trade (1848), 
and more informal networks built around canals and railroads facilitated the 
financialization of the economy. Early holding companies and trusts were motivated 
by the need to accumulate capital (Prechel 2000). 
As incentives changed, firm size grew. The average value produced annually by 
manufacturing establishments in the United States doubled between 1840 and 1890 
(Historical Census Browser 2004; author’s calculations). The change was more 
dramatic in certain industries. Between 1869 and 1919, wage earners per 
establishment tripled in textiles, paper, and lumber, quintupled in furniture, stone, 
clay and glass, primary and fabricated metals, and machinery, and increased almost 
tenfold in petroleum and coal (O’Brien 1988). This last case is particularly relevant as 





America’s New Wealthy 
Wealth concentration in the corporate inequality regime was historically high as it 
created a new class of super-wealthy Americans. At the beginning of the 19th century 
there were a handful of millionaires across the United States. Soltow’s (1989) survey 
identified 130 men among 1.7 million sampled with wealth exceeding $50,000 in 
1798. The New York Sun counted 25 millionaires in 1845 (though this was most 
likely an undercount; Klein 1995). That number exploded to 4,047 in 1892 according 
to a survey by the New York Tribune. Of those, 82% did not inherit their wealth; 
Chicago was second only to New York City in the number of millionaires, and only 
2% of those derived their wealth from an inheritance (New York Tribune 1892; Klein 
1995). Then in 1918, at which point price inflation does become a factor, Forbes 
identified more than 200 Americans with an annual income over $1,000,000 (Forbes 
1918). 
The growth of millionaires and multimillionaires is not, alone, evidence of wealth 
concentration because there was more wealth to go around by the end of the century 
than at the beginning. But there is still evidence of wealth concentration when we 
control for the overall size of the economy. Klepper and Gunther (1996) produced a 
list of the 100 wealthiest Americans as a ratio of the national GNP at the time. When 
we chart these 100 individuals by birth year, the results are overwhelming (see figure 
3.7). Of the 100, 71 were born in the 19th century and 22 between 1831 and 1841. 
Refining the filter a bit more, five of the 11 wealthiest Americans of all time 
(inflation-adjusted dollars) were born between 1834 and 1839 (John Rockefeller, 




Times 2007). These men began their business careers during the Civil War (Licht 
1995) and were at the cutting edge of new wealth creating opportunities. 
Figure 3.7 Distribution of America’s 100 Wealthiest by Year of Birth 
 
Conclusion 
I included the commercial and corporate inequality regimes in a single chapter 
because there is value in their juxtaposition. First, the transformation from colonial 
outpost to emerging global power is critical to understanding the commercial and 
corporate inequality regimes, and also sets the stage for inequality trends in the 20th 
century. Rising wealth inequality in the first half of the 19th century reflected the 
disparities, in size and technological sophistication, between European and American 
markets. Merchants accumulated unprecedented levels of wealth by tapping European 
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the second half of the century was built on domestic industrial empires, tapping into 
the largest, most efficient economy in the world.  
The inequality experience of the United States through the 19th century 
complicates efforts to theorize a direct relationship between “globalization” and 
within-country inequality. Globalization is a multifaceted process, and its impact on 
the distribution of wages, incomes or wealth will vary across countries and across the 
distribution within countries. For example, the variable linking liberalization of the 
Atlantic economy in the first half of the 19th century with rising wealth concentration 
in the United State was the wealth disparity between the United States and Europe. 
But progressive trade liberalization through the century encouraged competition and 
eliminated arbitrage profits. Then, in the second half of the century, the variable 
linking globalization and wealth concentration was international economic 
convergence (and the related institutional adaptations to deal with falling prices and 
profits). At first glance we might note a positive correlation between trade 
liberalization and rising inequality in both periods and draw some meaning from that, 
but the relationship is obviously much more complex as the principle mechanism 
(i.e., the value of European markets relative to US markets) linking trade and 
inequality switched signs. 
Instead of theorizing a direct relationship between globalization and inequality, 
we need to identify the sites of wealth generation and accumulation, and constrained 
access to them. The inequality regime of the first part of the 19th century in the United 
States was defined by constrained access, through trade, to global sites of wealth 




politics and networks, large capital investment – that drove up wealth inequality in 
the United States, not international trade per se. Then, in the second half of the 19th 
century, a wave of globalization and “free trade” was marked by rising wealth 
concentration in the United States, but the relationship was again more complex. The 
United States was now a key site of wealth accumulation globally, and the modern 
corporation offered restricted access to that wealth through the vertical and horizontal 
integration of business activities.  
In other words, the process of globalization is important to inequality and 
concentration trends because it redistributes market access. For some, globalization 
means greater access to new markets; for others, this means new competition in old 
markets. The Heckscher-Ohlin model tells us that inequality should be negatively 
correlated with trade where labor is relatively abundant, as those regions will 
specialize in labor-intensive exports, increase the demand for labor, and close the gap 
between labor and capital. The opposite is true where capital is abundant. But the 
story is more complicated because the capital, networks, and institutional support to 
engage in trade are not evenly distributed across a population; market access is also a 
property and it can be monopolized. For example, cotton was a labor-intensive 
activity, so its export to new markets should have increased the demand for, and 
compensation to, labor. Demand increased, but because the labor was enslaved, 






Chapter 4. The Keynesian Inequality Regime 
Income, wealth and wage inequality in the United States, and in other countries 
around the world, dropped markedly through the second quarter of the 20th century. 
The more important outcome is that income and wealth were still more broadly 
distributed two decades later. I argue that the Great Depression and World War II, 
terminal crises of the British cycle of accumulation, drove a spatial reconfiguration 
with an accompanying revolution in institutions, ideologies, technologies, and power 
structures, the backbone of the Keynesian inequality regime (see Figure 0.3). As a 
result, the benefits of economic growth after World War II were more broadly 
distributed than before the war. 
Income and wealth inequality fell dramatically between the onset of the Great 
Depression and the end of World War II. The income share of the top 1% of earners 
in the United States fell from 19.6% to 10.5% between 1928 and 1944 (Piketty and 
Saez 2003). The share of total wealth owned by the wealthiest 1% fell from 36.5% to 
25.5% over that same period (Kopczuk and Saez 2004; see also Kuznets 1953 and 
Lampman 1962).  
Income and wealth compression between 1928 and 1944, in isolation, can be 
chalked up to current events, namely a financial crisis followed by an industrial, 
labor-intensive world war. The former devalues financial assets owned 
disproportionately by the rich, and the latter can destroy financial and physical assets 
and increases demand for labor. But two decades later, in the mid-1960s, income and 
wealth inequality remained at or below levels reported in the mid-1940s: “The more 




(Piketty and Saez 2006: 203). Income and wealth inequality tend to rebound quickly 
after a crisis, often at a higher level than before (Atkinson and Morelli 2011), but 
Goldin and Margo’s (1992) ‘Great Compression’ persisted. 
Trends in wage inequality suggest that the shock of the 1930s and 1940s masked a 
subtler transition that began earlier. After rising monotonically (though 
inconsistently) through the 19th century, wage gaps between more-skilled and less-
skilled workers began to shrink around 1910 (Williamson 1975; Golden and Katz 
1999). Growth in the supply of labor slowed and access to education spread 
(Williamson and Lindert 1980; Goldin and Katz 1999).  
Presented with these results for the United States, Germany, and England, Simon 
Kuznets (1955) hypothesized that industrialization was at its core. He explicitly 
couched within-country inequality within a modernization framework by asking, 
“Does inequality in the distribution of income increase or decrease in the course of a 
country's economic growth?” (Kuznets 1955:1). He argued that inequality rose and 
then fell in England, Germany and the United States as these countries industrialized, 
and that this inverted-U of rising and falling inequality could be a universal tendency 
of industrializing economies.  
What Kuznets did not discuss is that the experience of England, Germany and the 
United States was not unique. In the face of global economic and political crises, 
income concentrations fell in other core countries and their colonial offshoots 
between the end of the 1920s and the mid-1940s. In a sample of eleven countries, the 
income share of the top 1% fell by an average of 35% (Alvaredo, Atkinson, Piketty 




As the ‘Great Compression’ was global, it needs a global explanation; a model 
that looks only at processes within countries (Kuznets inverted-U curve); even an 
explanation that allows for networked flows of goods, people and capital (e.g., the 
Heckscher-Ohlin trade model, see Lindert and Williamson 2001), cannot capture the 
coordinated compression of income distributions.  
Piketty (2014) offers an alternative explanation for income compression in 
countries around the world in the 1940s. Piketty associates the size distribution of 
incomes with the ratio of the value of capital to the total national income in a country. 
Because capital tends to be more concentrated than labor incomes, as the ratio of 
capital to income in a country increases, the share of all incomes (including rents and 
capital gains) going to those at the top of the distribution increases. With the Great 
Depression and World War II, capital was physically destroyed by war, devalued by 
financial crisis, or liquidated by its owners to maintain their standard of living during 
a prolonged recession. Inequality stayed low over the next two decades as 
capital/income ratios were slow to recover against rapid labor productivity gains and 
high top marginal tax rates. The Great Depression and World War II are exceptional 
and external to Piketty’s central narrative of capital accumulation. 
Developed around the experiences of Great Britain and France, this narrative has 
little explanatory power when applied to the United States. The capital/income ratio 
in the United States did fell only 28% between 1930 and 1950 (see Figure 4.1), while 
the income share of the richest 1% fell by more than half during that period. 
Assuming capital generated returns of 5% (borrowing here from Piketty’s own 




during the period. Even if all capital in the United States were owned by the richest 
1%, the effect of a falling capital/income ratio on top income shares would fall well 
short of the figures Piketty himself helped produce (Piketty and Saez 2003). Looking 
ahead, a steadily increasing capital/income ratio in the second half of the twentieth 
century is also not enough to explain observed trends. This is especially true if we 
remove housing, the ownership of which is more broadly distributed than other forms 
of capital.  
 
When we overlay the capital/income ratio in France on the income share of the 
top 1% of earners in that country, the fit is imperfect (see Figure 4.2). Specifically, 
the capital/income ratio collapsed between 1910 and 1920, but was fairly stable 
thereafter; on the other hand, the income share of the richest 1% in France fell by half 
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Figure 4.1 Capital Income Ratio, United States, 1770-2010
Ratio of Capital to Income C/I minus Housing





The capital/income ratio is not enough to explain the compression of incomes in 
the United States, nor is it impressively correlated with top income shares in France. 
But even without a convincing bivariate relationship with income concentration, the 
capital/income ratio can still be a piece of the narrative. It is consistent with Arrighi’s 
cycles of accumulation and my proposed relationship with the concentration of 
incomes and wealth within countries that World War I, the Great Depression and 
World War II re-prioritized some capital forms (increasing the value of some while 
devaluing others) and caused capital to change hands within and between countries.  
Where we fundamentally disagree, though, is that this was an exceptional event. It 
is my contention that this global great compression reflects a reconfiguration of the 
world-economy – a reorganization of the physical spaces and technologies of 
production, of inter- and intranational economic and political relations, and an 




































Figure 4.2 Capital Income Ratio and Top Income Share, France 
1910-2010
Capital/Income Ratio (Right) Top 1% Income Share (Left)




In the chaos and competition of the period, the entire continuum of theorized 
social arrangements came into play, and a wide variety were realized, from fascism to 
communism. In the aftermath of war, the victors were able to encourage the adoption 
of a new social contract (of which the welfare state was an important component) that 
had evolved in their countries. States implemented policies that emphasized domestic 
demand, financial insurance and regulation, and boosting state capacity to manage 
these new responsibilities. States invested directly in human capital development 
through education, and encouraged domestic investment in physical capital. 
Combined with the economic leveling of financial collapse and war, these new 
arrangements empowered labor, raised wages, and established a new inequality status 
quo in the global core. 
The transition was, in part, an ideological reaction against the failed arrangements 
of the 19th century, but it also reflected changes in the material conditions of 
production and the global organization of economic life. As noted by Karl Marx in 
the mid-19th century and Simon Kuznets one hundred years later, industrialization 
and urbanization fundamentally changed the organization of economic, social and 
political life. For example, a new policy emphasis on full employment was discussed 
in terms of economic growth (i.e., maximizing production and demand), but there was 
also a growing awareness of the political threat represented by an underemployed 
proletariat.  
Globally, the United States exploited its unique geopolitical position to emerge 
from war as the new global and financial hegemon. As such it exerted its ‘moral 




hosting talks to create new rules for international finance and trade, but Washington 
also imposed its productive, financial and military clout to influence domestic 
institutions elsewhere. Innovative ‘New Deal’-style institutional arrangements 
replaced the gold standard, which had been the requirement for full participation in 
the British-centered world-economy before World War I. 
I began the chapter by examining the evidence of a national and global great 
compression. In the next section I take a closer look at the contradiction and crisis 
that brought an end to the British systemic cycle of accumulation; specifically, a 
spatial configuration organized around British hegemony, free trade and a rigid gold 
standard could not accommodate emerging superpowers in the United States and 
Germany. I then turn to the ideological response to the Great Depression, which 
included a new appreciation for the interrelationship of political and economic 
stability and the state’s role in maximizing production and demand. Finally, I detail 
many of the mechanisms linking the Great Depression and World War II to lower 
income inequality in the United States. 
The Data 
Bourguignon and Morrisson (2000) offer the most complete empirical estimates 
of global inequality between and within countries historically. They estimate income 
shares for nine income decile shares and two vintiles for 33 country groups over 11 
benchmark years from 1820 to 1992. The authors conclude that there was a 
“substantial decline in within-country inequality between 1910 and 1950” (pg. 734).  
Figure 4.3 charts global inequality and the Theil decomposition of inequality into 




1950 within-country inequality falls almost 40%. Outside of this one historical 
moment, the authors estimate that global within-country inequality has been markedly 
stable over the last two centuries (see Korzeniewicz and Moran 2009 for a theoretical 
treatment of this point). 
 
When we shift our focus to top income shares, inequality falls faster and further. 
Top income shares are inherently more volatile: they reflect a smaller population and 
capital gains make up a larger share of top incomes and are also more volatile than 
wages. But because top income shares represent a unique population and have a 
different composition than other incomes, the rise and fall of top income shares can 
be theoretically distinct from other measures of inequality that consider the entire 
distribution of incomes (e.g., Gini coefficient). 
Over the last decade, Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez and colleagues have 

















Figure 4.3 Decomposition of Global Inequality Between and Within 
Countries, 1820 to 1992
Within Between Total




(Alvaredo, Atkinson, Piketty and Saez 2012; see Atkinson, Piketty and Saez 2011 for 
a discussion of data reliability). Figure 4.4 charts the average income share of the top 
1% of earners (excluding capital gains) for the 11 countries with at least one data 
point for 1926-1928 and 1944-1946. In all eleven cases, the income share of the top 
1% fell. On average, the income share of this group fell 35%. While the fall was 
greatest in France and Japan, countries that bore the brunt of World War II, countries 
as diverse as Canada, India, and New Zealand also saw the income share of their 
richest 1% fall.  
 
In the United States, the income share of the top 10% of earners fell from about 
1/2 to 1/3 of total income during the period; the income share of the top 1% fell from 













Figure 4.4 Income Share of the Top 1% (Excluding Capital Gains)
1926-1928 1944-1946




To put this in perspective, we can translate these points into a minimum Gini 
coefficient. If we are given only one data point, we can estimate a minimum Gini 
coefficient as S-P, where S is the income share of the group and P is the percentage of 
the population represented from the top. For example, the average income share of 
the top 1% in the United States between 1926 and 1928 was 18.8%. If this 18.8% was 
evenly distributed among that group and the remaining 81.2% was evenly distributed 
among the remaining 99%, the Gini coefficient (the minimum Gini) would be .188-
.01 = .178. By 1944-1946 the top share fell to 11.1% for a minimum Gini of .101. 
The difference, .178-.101=.077, is roughly equal to the increase in the Gini 
coefficient in the United States from 1967 to 2011 (Bee 2012), but in less than half as 
much time.  
More revolutionary than the collapse of top income shares was the lack of 
rebound after the war (Piketty and Saez 2006). Figure 4.5 shows that the income 
share of the top 1% in nine of the 11 sampled countries was lower two decades later 
than it had been at the end of World War II. Only in Finland and France were the 
richest 1% grabbing a larger share of total income, and these shares were still 





A closer look at the United States establishes two distinct points during which top 
income shares dropped sharply (see Figure 4.6). First, the stock market crash cut the 
income share of the top 1% of earners from 19.6% to 15.3% between 1928 and 1931. 
Between 1931 and 1940 this value fluctuated some but was fairly stable. Then 
between 1940 and 1944 the income share of the richest 1% fell from 15.7% to 10.5%. 
Highlighting the global nature of the Great Compression, Figure 4.6 compares the de-
concentration of incomes in France and the United States. The experience is similar in 
the two countries in terms of extent and timing; for example, if we fix the mean and 
standard deviation of year-on-year change for France and the United States but allow 
for the timing of change to vary, the probability that the correlation between the two 
lines (top income shares in the United States and France between 1925 and 1955) 
would exceed the measured value (.953) is 1.63%. This probability is small enough to 












Figure 4.5 Income Share of the Top 1% (Excluding Capital Gains)
1926-1928 1944-1946 1964-1966




relative to one another. In short, top income shares fell in both countries by the same 
amount and at the same time. 
 
Using estate tax returns, Kopczuk and Saez (2004) estimate that the share of 
wealth owned by the wealthiest 1% fell from 40.3% to 28.4% between 1930 and 1932 
and then steadily to 22.6% in 1949, just over half of what it had been two decades 
earlier.  
The picture of economic inequality through the rest of the distribution is less 
certain. The 1940 census collected data on wages, and the Gini coefficient for family 
incomes can be estimated back to 1947 using the Current Population Survey. 
Researchers have collected wage series to track absolute and relative wage trends for 
various occupations (e.g., Burgess 1920, Douglas 1926, Long 1960; Margo 1999). 
Drawing on these sources, beginning from 1910, there is clear evidence in the United 
States that wages of less-skilled workers increased relative to gross domestic product 
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caught up with those of more skilled workers (Williamson and Lindert 1980). Goldin 
and Margo (1992) found no pre-1940 compression of white collar wages with 
unskilled labor. 
Wage compression during World War II was more dramatic. “Education and skill 
premiums plummeted, geographical differences in wages were reduced, and the 
variance of wages within these groups fell substantially” (Goldin and Margo 1992: 2). 
The range between the logged wage at the 10th and 90th percentile in 1940 was 1.41; it 
fell to 1.06 in 1950 (Goldin and Margo 1992) 
In an effort to estimate a more complete distribution of incomes, I combined top 
income share estimates with the unemployment rate. Using the income share of the 
top .01%, .1%, 1%, 5% and 10% and the unemployment rate, I estimated the Gini 
coefficient in family incomes reported by the Census Bureau (2011) from 1947 to 
2008. These six variables explained more than 95% of the variance in the Gini 
coefficient between 1947 and 2008.  
I then projected these results back to 1917 (see Figure 4.7). Projected family 
income inequality fell some in 1929 before unemployment overpowered the impact of 
the stock market losses. Inequality fell some through the 1930s as unemployment 
settled down, and then plummeted after 1940 as the war fueled full employment. Of 
course, the validity of this projection requires that the relationship between top 
income shares, unemployment and aggregate inequality holds over time, and it 
extrapolates beyond the data as unemployment at the height of the Great Depression 




reemployment of almost a quarter of the labor force between 1932 and 1944 made for 
the most significant inequality event in the history of the United States. 
 
Contradiction and Crisis 
As with the previous chapters, I hypothesize that contradictions in the spatial 
configuration of the world-economy (principally defined here by British liberalism 
and the gold standard) led ultimately to interstate chaos, the destruction of physical 
and financial assets, a relocation of centers of power and production, and, as a result, 
space and momentum for institutional change. The three decades from 1914 to 1945 
fit the bill perfectly: two world wars and a global Great Depression, mass destruction 
of the means of production (primarily in continental Europe), a relocation of the 
center of power from England to the United States, the emergence of new political 
and economic ideologies, and accelerated political and institutional change. A new 







1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Sources: (Unemployment) Romer 1986 (1917-1928); Darby  1976 (1929-1939); BLS 2011 (1940-2008); (Income Shares) 
Piketty and Saez 2003, updated to 2008; (Inequality) Census 2011; R2 = .959






policies to buoy demand and manage unemployment, more investment in human 
capital, greater government intervention in the relationship between capital and labor, 
and new progressive taxes to fund a more active state. As a result, within-country 
inequality fell in countries around the world. 
Unresolved Crises. In the United States between 1929 and 1933, GDP per capita fell 
47.0% in nominal terms. Double digit deflation exaggerates the collapse; in constant 
dollars, GDP per capita fell 28.6% (Williamson 2013; BLS 2013, CPI; author’s 
calculations). The value of industrial products fell more than 50% between September 
1928 and June 1932 (FRED 2013, INDPRO), as did prices on farm products (BLS 
2013, WPU01). Unemployment peaked around 25% and the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average fell more than 85% (FRED 2012, DJIA).  
The impact of the Great Depression was not limited to the United States. Between 
1929 and 1932 industrial production fell more than 20% in Great Britain and France 
and more than 40% in Germany; foreign trade fell more than 60% in all three 
countries (Blum, Cameron and Barnes 1970). Of the 16 major economies of Western 
Europe (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United 
Kingdom), real GDP per capita (Geary-Khamis dollars) fell in 12 between 1929 and 
1932, and rose only 2% over three years in the other four (Portugal, Ireland, Norway, 
and Denmark). GDP per capita fell more than 10% across Western Europe and more 
than 25% in the western offshoots (Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United 




Recession between 1929 and 1933 was only the first of two in the decade. Though 
less severe and shorter lived, recession in 1937 and 1938 further highlighted the 
fundamental weakness of the economy. The recession of 1937 is often attributed to 
Roosevelt’s first steps to pull back the reflationary policies instituted during his first 
term, and the Banking Act of 1935, which reigned in liquidity (Eggerttson and 
Pugsley 2006); that is to say, an effort to retract Depression-era, emergency economic 
policies pushed the US economy back into recession. 
Also, US recovery before 1937 was driven largely by monetary reflation 
(Friedman and Schwartz 1963; Bernanke 2000), which was made possible in part to 
the deteriorating political situation in Europe. The economy showed little sign of self-
correction (Romer 1992). In other words, the same fundamental misallocations that 
led to the Great Depression were not corrected; the economic contradictions of the 
past were not resolved. 
Likewise, a decade before the Great Depression, Keynes (1919) feared that the 
Treaty of Versailles did nothing to resolve the problems that led to and were 
exacerbated by World War I 
The Treaty includes no provisions for the economic rehabilitation of 
Europe,—nothing to make the defeated Central Empires into good neighbors, 
nothing to stabilize the new States of Europe, nothing to reclaim Russia; nor 
does it promote in any way a compact of economic solidarity amongst the 
Allies themselves; no arrangement was reached at Paris for restoring the 
disordered finances of France and Italy, or to adjust the systems of the Old 
World and the New. (ch. 6) 
 
War had disrupted the organization of economic and political life through much 
of Europe, and the resolution of war did not provide any solutions. 
This population secured for itself a livelihood before the war, without much 




organization, of which the foundations were supported by coal, iron, transport, 
and an unbroken supply of imported food and raw materials from other 
continents. By the destruction of this organization and the interruption of the 
stream of supplies, a part of this population is deprived of its means of 
livelihood. (ch. 6) 
 
Keynes ended The Economic Consequences of the Peace prophetically: “But who 
can say how much is endurable, or in what direction men will seek at last to escape 
from their misfortunes?” (ch. 6).  
To capture the absurdity of the 1920s global economic system (and, specifically, 
America’s isolationist and protectionist policies therein), Roosevelt (quoted in 
Frieden 2007: 145-6) situated the following fictional dialogue in Lewis Carrol’s Alice 
in Wonderland: 
A puzzled, somewhat skeptical Alice asked the Republican leadership some 
simple questions: 
 
“Will not the printing and selling of more stocks and bonds, the building of 
new plants and the increase of efficiency produce more goods than we can 
buy?” 
 
“No,” shouted Humpty Dumpty. “The more we produce the more we can 
buy.” 
 
“What if we produce a surplus?” 
 
“Oh, we can sell it to foreign consumers.” 
 
“How can the foreigners pay for it?” 
 
“Why, we will lend them the money.” 
 
“I see,” said little Alice, “they will buy our surplus with our money. Of course 
these foreigners will pay us back by selling us their goods?” 
 
“Oh, not at all,” said Humpty Dumpty. “We set up a high wall called the 
tariff.” 
 





“That is easy,” said Humpty Dumpty. “Did you ever hear of a moratorium?” 
 
And so, at last, my friends, we have reached the heart of the magic formula of 
1928. 
 
Many Europeans were dependent on loans from the United States, but excess 
capital dried up in 1928. A speculative boom in the United States absorbed excess 
liquidity, and then the crash of 1929 resulted in a liquidity crunch (Landes 1966; 
Arrighi 1994/2010).  
US economic and financial policy in the interwar period, and the inadequacies of 
the Treaty of Versailles, highlight the fundamental contradictions of the 19th century 
British-centered free trade system: a system that depended on international 
cooperation was increasingly defined by interstate competition and uncertainty 
because economic and political power shifted from those who were the primary 
beneficiaries of a financially organized system of free trade to those whose 
participation was less lucrative. 
Crisis and War. Vladimir Lenin (1917) famously attributed the outbreak of World 
War I to competing imperialisms: “the war of 1914-18 was imperialistic (that is, an 
annexationist, predatory, plunderous war) on the part of both sides; it was a war for 
the division of the world, for the partition and repartition of colonies, ‘spheres of 
influence’ of finance capital, etc.” In the most immediate sense, war in the 1910s and 
1940s can be attributed to German efforts to match its growing military-industrial 
power with control over world resources, “this obsession [with Lebensraum] drove 
German rulers to try first to follow in the British [external], and then in the US 
[internal] path of territorial expansion. However, their attempts triggered a sudden 




Ironically, while post-hoc observers have documented a list of causal conditions 
before the Great War, contemporaries discounted the possibility of war among the 
major powers (Ferguson 2008). In 1914, the socialist journalist Henry Noel Brailsford 
argued that “In Europe the epoch of conquest is over and . . . it is as certain as 
anything in politics that the frontiers of our national states are finally drawn. My own 
belief is that there will be no more wars among the six great powers” (Brailsford 
1914, quoted in Ferguson 2008: 299). Financial markets did not bat an eye at the 
assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand as traders were convinced of the security of 
the European political and financial system (Ferguson 2009). 
This confidence emanated from international economic and financial 
interdependence. Much like Friedman’s Golden Arches (2000) and Dell (2005) 
theories of conflict prevention, contemporaries believed that interlocking supply 
chains and investments offered sufficiently strong incentives to prevent the escalation 
of conflict to war (Rowe 2005). European and American capitalists had a shared 
interest in a system that was making some of them exceptionally wealthy: “The belle 
époque of the Edwardian era marked the high point of Britain’s free-trade 
imperialism. The wealth and power of the propertied classes, not just in Britain but of 
the entire Western world, had attained unprecedented heights” (Arrighi 1994/2010: 
277). 
But this security was a façade. The “twenty years . . . of great splendor” followed 
a reflation of prices that allowed capitalists to escape the stagnation of the 1870s and 
1880s, but the new financial liquidity was due in part to an escalation of the arms race 




but a delicate balance of power organized as economic interdependence 
communicated conditions of international assistance (Rowe 2005; Arrighi 
1994/2010). 
The fundamental source of conflict was that the global economy grew beyond the 
capacity of its primary beneficiaries to manage. The argument for free trade is that it 
encourages specialization based on comparative advantage. This organization of 
production benefits most those small (but relatively rich) countries that cannot 
specialize internally; the most dogmatic free traders at the turn of the 19th century 
were England and the Low Countries (Frieden 2007). A global economy centered on 
these countries was stable when they held the world’s workshops, but over the 40 
years from 1870, “modern manufacturing spread from its limited base in Britain and 
northwestern Europe” (Frieden 2007: 59). 
In 1850, the gross domestic product of the United Kingdom was 70% that of the 
United States and Germany combined. That figure fell below 60% around 1870, 
below 50% around 1880 and below 40% at the turn of the century. In the last few 
years before World War I, the GDP of the United Kingdom fell below 30% of the 
United States and Germany combined, less than that of Germany alone, and less than 
half the GDP of the United States. In 1890, the combined economies of Australia, 
New Zealand, Canada, and Argentina were 15% the size of the United Kingdom. In 
1910, that figure topped 40% (Maddison 2008, author’s calculations; Frieden 2007). 
In 1870, Britain, Belgium and France together produced nearly half of the world’s 
industrial output. Industrial output in Germany and the United States was on par with 




Belgium and France fell to a fifth of the global total (Frieden 2007). Economic power 
was shifting away from northwest Europe.  
Ironically, though predictably, the late-19th century spatial configuration 
contained the seeds of its own demise. For example, facilitated by relatively free trade 
and the gold standard, Britain exported more than half of its capital in the years 
before World War I, much of that to the United States, and earned significantly higher 
returns on foreign investments than the domestic variety. Ten percent of British 
national income came from foreign investments, shipping, insurance and other 
international services (Frieden 2007). Successful investment encouraged rapid 
economic growth elsewhere, shifting power to countries whose interests were not in 
line with the existing configuration. 
Rapid industrialization, particularly in Germany and the United States, increased 
competition for world resources, but where the United States and United Kingdom 
were able to control access through their internal and external empires, respectively, 
Germany was forced to pay an indirect tribute to each, the UK as the center of world 
commerce and the US as a recipient of German labor and capital (Arrighi 1994/2010: 
62). Economic competitiveness depended on access to scarce resources that, 
particularly for European states, depended on access to colonies.  
This “discontinuity between economic and political institutions” (Wallerstein 
1979: 35) seeded the transition from inter-enterprise to inter-state competition and an 
arms race. Before the nations of Europe battled with bullets they found other ways to 
compete. Tit-for-tat trade tariffs rocked the global economy after the stock market 




Hawley tariff in the United States was met with retaliatory measures from Europe and 
Canada.  The impact was substantial.  
U.S. imports from Europe declined from a 1929 high of $1,334 million to just 
$390 million in 1932, while U.S. exports to Europe fell from $2,341 million in 
1929 to $784 million in 1932. Overall, world trade declined by some 66% 
between 1929 and 1934. More generally, Smoot-Hawley did nothing to foster 
trust and cooperation among nations in either the political or economic realm 
during a perilous era in international relations. (US Department of State 2003) 
 
Madsen (2001) estimates that economic and legislative barriers caused trade to 
contract 33% between 1929 and 1932. 
Another tool was currency manipulation. By purchasing foreign currency, a 
country could (and can) make its currency relatively cheap (expanding the supply) 
while making the foreign currency relatively dear (decreasing the supply). For 
example, in the early 1930s, New Zealand devalued its currency relative to the pound 
sterling. This gave them a relative, and significant, advantage over Denmark as the 
two were the principal suppliers of butter to Great Britain. This launched a series of 
retaliatory devaluations between the two countries over the next three years. “By the 
end of 1933 the two currencies were back to roughly where they had started against 
each other, but . . . competitive devaluations had heightened political tensions and 
protectionist pressures” (Frieden 2007: 185). 
The Anglo-German confrontation was the most notorious arms race, but much of 
Europe and even South America got involved. The race was principally naval as the 
British threatened and devised plans to blockade German ports, and the Germans 
sought to build a fleet capable of preventing such a blockade. In 1889 the Royal Navy 
officially adopted the two-power standard, to field a navy equal to the combined 




American navies). Despite aggressive investments to this end, the two-power standard 
eventually proved impossible due to the rapid expansion of the German and American 
navies. The world’s oceans were being filled with ever larger, more powerful, more 
destructive ships (see Figure 4.8). 
 
Intensifying competition and political tension, manifested in trade and currency 
manipulation and an arms race, raised the costs while reducing the benefits of 
international economic participation. To place war in Europe in the second decade of 
the twentieth century at the feet of over-accumulation, during a period of financial 



















Figure 4.8 Design Displacement of Capital Ships, 1905-1922
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ties that were supposed to prevent war were instead the mechanisms that dragged the 
world into a provincial conflict (Rowe 2005). 
World War I revolutionized the financial world in two critical ways. First, Britain 
borrowed heavily from the United States to manage “the necessities of life and 
warfare” and liquidated assets in the New York Stock Exchange at heavily discounted 
prices (R.H. Brand, quoted in Milward 1970: 46; Arrighi 1994/2010: 279). As a 
result, liquidity began to flow to the United States, and less flowed back to Britain 
(Williamson 1964). This had two important (and related) impacts: first, it was a key 
first step towards the United States emerging as the new global financial hegemon 
after World War II – the United States no longer depended on British capital; second, 
the liquidity crunch in the United States a decade later would be all the more 
contagious internationally as the United States had become a major source of liquidity 
in international markets. 
The second revolution of the financial world from World War I was that global 
finance collapsed almost completely between July and November 1914 (Ferguson 
2009). John Maynard Keynes, the principal economic ideologue of the post-war era, 
made a name for himself digging up cash for the British war effort while working at 
the Treasury. After the war, an international consensus emphasized restoring currency 
stability and convertibility, but individual nations deployed controls on capital, trade 
and migration to secure stability: “While the intent was the freeing of trade, the effect 
was its strangulation” (Polanyi 1957: 27, quoted in Arrighi 1994/2010: 282).  
The mishmash of prewar institutions (e.g., the gold standard) and postwar 




The gold standard is the key to understanding the Depression. The gold 
standard of the 1920s set the stage for the Depression of the 1930s by 
heightening the fragility of the international financial system. The gold 
standard was the mechanism transmitting the destabilizing impulse from the 
United States to the rest of the world. The gold standard magnified that initial 
destabilizing shock. It was the principal obstacle to offsetting action. It was 
the binding constraint preventing policymakers from averting the failure of 
banks and containing the spread of financial panic. For all these reason, the 
international gold standard was a central factor in the worldwide Depression. 
Recovery proved possible, for these same reasons, only after abandoning the 
gold standard (Eichengreen 1992: xi).  
 
As noted earlier, the economic absurdities of the 1920s fed directly into the economic 
catastrophe of the 1930s. 
In turn, economic crisis, both of the immediate recession and the fundamental 
contradictions in the structure of the world-economy, ultimately offered an answer to 
Keynes (1919) rhetorical question about what men can endure and where they will 
seek escape. In this, there is a clear causal connection between the inevitable 
economic collapse, extremist politics and war near the end of the 1930s (James 1990). 
For example, the Weimar Republic depended on American loans, but American 
banks closed the spigot at the onset of the Great Depression. In the face of economic 
recession and consistent with the financial theory of the day, Chancellor Bruning 
implemented a strict policy of austerity and deflation, and unemployment rose above 
30% before his ouster in 1932. (Fisher’s theory of debt deflation, arguing that the 
Great Depression was caused by an accumulated consumer debt followed by a period 
of massive deflation, was published later that year.) Hitler was sworn in as Chancellor 
in January 1933, and in 1939 he invaded Poland. 
More than 100 million people served in military units during World War II, and it 




United States, industrial production trebled between May 1938 and February 1944 
(FRED 2013, INDPRO), and food prices doubled between 1939 and 1943 (BLS 
2013, WPU01). Unemployment essentially disappeared, falling from 14.6% to 1.2% 
between 1940 and 1942 (BLS 2011) and output per capita increased 82% between 
1939 and 1944 (Williamson 2013). Because the other belligerent countries were 
actively engaged in destroying each other’s productive capacity, production in the 
United States soared relative to Europe. Before the end of the world, US production 
was on par with the rest of the world combined (Bolt and van Zanden 2013; see 
chapter 5). As New Deal policies were introduced to manage an economy in crisis, a 
series of measures (e.g., price and wage controls) were implemented to manage an 
economy in total war; we will return to these measures below. 
 The net result was that the economic globalization that defined the British-
centered spatial configuration was dead. The gold standard, a central feature of the 
system, was abandoned. Trade and migration networks collapsed. Though victorious 
in war twice over, British hegemony ended, and the United States rose up to take that 
crown. After the war, US production equaled all of Western Europe combined, and 
the US controlled 50% of the world’s gold reserves and two-thirds of global monetary 
reserves (Eichengreen 1996). After World War II, the sun set on the American 
“empire”, but it did not set on its armed forces. 
Bringing the narrative back to the focal point of this study, emerging 
contradictions in the late-19th century global spatial configuration led to economic 
depression and war. In addition to destroying assets owned disproportionately by the 




experimentation that led ultimately to lower levels of economic inequality in the 
United States and elsewhere. In the next section I take a closer look at the evolving 
intellectual environment through the Great Depression to World War II. 
The Intellectual Response 
Economics as a discipline tends to emphasize its evolutionary progressivity as a 
science, but it is also historically produced knowledge (Cohen and Emmett 2012). A 
quick study of the history of economic thought highlights the intimate relationship 
between system-wide economic failure and theoretical ‘paradigm shifts’. The 1930s 
was no different.  
Economic orthodoxy in the 19th century achieved a theoretical purity that has not 
and never again can be matched in the social sciences. Classical economics rested on 
a single, empirically established relationship, Adam Smith’s observation that 
specialization increased productivity. From this point, Smith, Ricardo and their ilk 
deduced that the degree of specialization (and thus productivity) was inextricably 
linked to the scale of autarky, the unit within which all the necessities of life could be 
produced. Larger markets, linked through exchange, encouraged greater 
specialization, productivity, and wealth. Any barriers to that exchange effectively 
shrank the size of the market, and therefore reduced specialization, productivity and 
wealth. The timing of the development and application of this logic in the world-
economy is not a coincidence; transportation technologies exploded the functional 
size of markets in the first half of the 19th century (see chapter 3). 
The theoretical principles supporting the gold standard were fuzzier; many 




metal fetish (Frieden 2007). Instead, we can interpret it as a political stipulation of 
laissez-faire economics across political boundaries.  
Most orthodox supporters of the system argued that substantial state 
intervention in the market would interfere with the natural operation of the 
gold standard. They believed that unemployment compensation, aid to 
troubled farmers, and extensive social programs for the poor would impede 
adjustments required by the gold standard; such programs would keep wages 
and prices from falling as necessary to keep economies in balance. (Frieden 
2007: 30). 
 
In other words, the gold standard hamstrung government intervention through fiscal 
and monetary policy that, in turn, was conducive to the operation of the free market. 
Economic orthodoxy was not consensus. Williams Jennings Bryan famously 
centered his bid for the presidency of the United States in the 1890s on decrying the 
gold standard: “you shall not crucify mankind upon a cross of gold.” Participation in 
the global economy, though, required that the state and its treasury abide by the rules 
of the game under British hegemony (Frieden 2007).  
The intellectual paradigm shift of the 1930s was fundamentally different from 
other transitory periods in one critical sense: “the Depression [gave] birth to 
macroeconomics as a distinct field of study” (Bernanke 1995: 1). Where 
microeconomics continues to be the domain of neoclassical economics, the crisis of 
the 1930s turned intellectuals and policy makers away from the constraints of the 
gold standard and in pursuit of tools for managing economies nationally and 
internationally. More than a new field of study, the emergence of macroeconomics as 
a field of study marked a fundamental shift in the relationship between the state and 
the economy. There are myriad examples of this new relationship, from new 




fundamental in the United States than the Current Population Survey. The CPS was 
initiated in 1940 by the Work Projects Administration under the name Monthly 
Report of Unemployment (BLS 2013a); it was a new tool, introduced by a new 
agency, to closely monitor an economic indicator that had only recently been 
technically defined. 
As had been the case in the past and would again be the case in the future (see 
chapter 5), the social and economic theories of the Edwardian era were completely 
unprepared for the chaos of the subsequent decades; decades of relative stability and 
security (low interest rates) and strong economic growth (especially for those 
controlling mobile capital) had offered the contemporary political and economic elite 
a sense of arrival (Ferguson 2009). As that illusion shattered, existing paradigms were 
quickly reimagined. I highlight three thinkers that offered insights into the crisis but 
also captured the revolution in economic thought: Karl Polanyi, Joseph Schumpeter 
and John Maynard Keynes. 
Polanyi 1944 - The Great Transformation. Polanyi argued that markets played a small 
role in human societies in the past, and that the apotheosis of the self-regulating 
market was an intentional project of the modern nation-state.  The system required 
that all components of production, including land, labor and money, be subjected to 
the market principle; workers were intentionally proletarianized: “under such a 
system we can not exist unless we buy commodities on the market with the help of 
incomes which we derive from selling other commodities on the market” (p.97). 
Fundamentally, the transition dis-embedded economic activity from social 




economics—in a sense, every and any society must be based on it—but that its 
economy was based on self-interest. Such an organization of economic life is entirely 
unnatural” (p.249).  
Such an institution could not exist for any length of time without annihilating 
the human and natural substance of society; it would have physically 
destroyed man and transformed his surroundings into wilderness. Inevitably, 
society took measures to protect itself, but whatever measures it took impaired 
the self-regulation of the market, disorganized industrial life, and thus 
endangered society in yet another way. It was this dilemma which forced the 
development of the market system into a definite groove and finally disrupted 
the social organization based upon it (p.3-4) 
 
The result was political chaos, national and international, as groups violently 
pursued a broad range of measures to secure “professional status, safety, and security, 
the form of a man’s life, the breadth and depth of his existence, the stability of his 
environment” (p.153). In reference to the chaos of the 1930s, Polanyi argued that the 
“only alternative . . . was the establishment of an international order endowed with 
organized power which would transcend national sovereignty” (pg. 22). 
Schumpeter 1942 – Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. While the mechanisms 
involved are very different, Schumpeter also argued that there is a fundamental 
tendency in capitalism to destroy the institutions organizing economic and social life: 
“its very success undermines the social institutions which protect it, and ‘inevitably’ 
creates conditions in which it will not be able to live” (p.61). 
The contradiction is rooted in the duplicitous character of capitalism itself – 
creative destruction. In this sense, Schumpeter was responding to institutionalism, 
another stream of economic thought that gained popularity in the 1930s and 




1933; Chamberlin 1933). He argued that the success of capitalism was rooted in 
innovation, not perfect competition (see chapter 1).   
Innovation is both creative (the introduction of a new technology or good) and 
destructive (the old technology or good become redundant), and so the success of 
capitalism amounted to a constant churning of technologies, skills, firms, markets, 
institutions, etc. “Capitalism, then, is by nature a form or method of economic change 
and not only never is but never can be stationary” (p.84). As such, capitalism is 
constantly producing both winners and losers, and “[s]ecular improvement that is 
taken for granted and coupled with individual insecurity that is acutely resented is of 
course the best recipe for breeding social unrest” (p.160), and so it is undermined by 
its own success. 
Schumpeter’s unique perspective on capitalist progress offered a unique remedy. 
Because progress is fundamentally rooted in innovation and not price competition, 
barriers to perfect price competition are not contrary to the capitalist project: “There 
is no more of a paradox in this than there is in saying that motorcars are travelling 
faster than they otherwise would because they are provided with brakes” (p.88). 
Regulated, corporate capitalism could speed along faster than an economy defined by 
perfect competition because it faced less risk of crashing. 
Keynes 1936 – The General Theory. The fundamental argument of Keynes’ General 
Theory of Employment, Interest and Money is that fiscal policy works (see chapter 5 
for the monetary rebuttal). Economic policy should be oriented towards achieving full 
employment (the exclusion of deficient-demand unemployment). Employment is a 




pursue their economic goal of full employment by spending to eliminate deficient-
demand unemployment.  
If the Treasury were to fill old bottles with banknotes, bury them at suitable 
depths in disused coalmines which are then filled up to the surface with town 
rubbish, and leave it to private enterprise on well-tried principles of laissez-
faire to dig the notes up again (the right to do so being obtained, of course, by 
tendering for leases of the note-bearing territory), there need be no more 
unemployment and, with the help of the repercussions, the real income of the 
community, and its capital wealth also, would probably become a good deal 
greater than it actually is. It would, indeed, be more sensible to build houses 
and the like; but if there are political and practical difficulties in the way of 
this, the above would be better than nothing (p. 129). 
 
State intervention is essential because economic recessions have an irrational 
component. Demand depends on consumer confidence, which is in turn undermined 
by economic recession. Government spending is necessary to “kick start” private 
spending. 
Keynes extended this logic to emphasize reducing interest rates and international 
monetary reform to encourage spending – consumption and investment – in the 
private sector (Tily 2007; Davidson 2002). The logic relating interest rates and 
unemployment would be formalized in the Phillips curve, and, combined with 
counter-cyclical spending, would become the most important economic levers of 
macroeconomic policy. 
The need for domestic and international oversight of the economy can also be 
related to a field that was first formally defined by John Von Neumann in a paper in 
1928 and then in book form in 1944. Game theory emphasizes interactive decision-
making. Both domestically and internationally, the outcome of an individual strategy 
depends on the strategy adopted by other agents. For example, in a recession, an 




invest and are therefore willing to spend. As Keynes emphasized, government 
spending can substitute for consumer confidence until consumer confidence is 
restored.  
Though their logics varied substantially, Polanyi, Schumpeter and Keynes agreed 
that markets should not be left to their own devices. Taken together, they offered a 
damning critique of classical, laissez-faire economics: 
1) “Self-regulating” markets take a huge toll on human relationships and 
the environment, are socially disruptive and self-destructive 
 
2) Government intervention is essential to prevent market failure and 
limit the human and environmental cost.  
 
3) National state intervention is not enough; stable economic and 
financial systems require international cooperation and regulation.  
 
The intellectual and institutional response to evolving material conditions began 
before intellectuals formalized the logic. For example, the Works Progress 
Administration was active in 1935, before Keynes recommended the Treasury bury 
bottles of cash; the United States was organizing international talks in Bretton 
Woods, New Hampshire before Polanyi argued that the alternative to chaos was an 
“international order endowed with organized power”; Josiah Wedgwood added a 
preface in 1939 to his book, The Economics of Inheritance, “political democracies 
that do not democratize their economic systems are inherently unstable” (quoted in 
Piketty 2014: 520). But Keynes’ work, especially, became the ideological core of the 
new inequality regime, and framed public economic debate for decades afterwards. It 
is within this new intellectual framework that the ‘Great Compression’ persisted. 
Korzeniewicz and Moran (2009) argue that low inequality in high income 




a tradeoff between within and between country inequalities. This requires that the 
state has both the incentive and capacity to perform these functions. The concurrence 
of rising inequality between countries and falling inequality within many countries in 
the first half of the 20th century suggest that capacity and incentive converged 
between 1913 and 1950. State capacity (revenue and regulatory powers) increased 
with the threat and then execution of war. Immigration and trade policy and the gold 
standard were modified to give states more leeway in fiscal policy and to control the 
movement of capital, goods and people over their borders. The revolution in 
economic thought targeted this new capacity on maximizing demand, stabilizing the 
financial system, and regulating trade and immigration in a sustainable way.  
The Mechanisms of the Great Compression 
Research into the causes of inequality change, particularly in the United States 
over the last four decades, favors analyses that decompose inequality change into 
component parts. As I noted in chapter 1 and reiterate in chapter 5, this approach has 
limits. A decomposition of change requires some assumption of the counterfactual – 
inequality change while holding the single variable constant. The assumption of a 
counterfactual is complicated by 1) omitted variable bias and 2) dependence between 
the variables – the change in variable x and its impact on inequality are both 
dependent on variable y. The attempt to measure effect size while accounting for 
these complications, especially when looking only at a single case (e.g., the United 
States), is more than ambitious. General equilibrium analysis claims to overcome 
these limitations, but only by binding human agency and reflexivity; it is a 




Fortunately, it is not my goal to weight and rank the specific mechanisms driving 
inequality change. Instead, in the following section I relate the crisis and the 
subsequent intellectual response described above to mechanisms that have a clear 
relationship to falling levels of wealth, wage and income inequality. These 
mechanisms can be organized into three categories: 1) supply and demand of less-
skilled labor; 2) destruction of and constraints on financial incomes and wealth; 3) 
long-term consequences of emergency institutions.  
Supply and demand of less-skilled labor. The most famous statement on falling 
inequality in the first half of the 20th century comes from another intellectual, Simon 
Kuznets (1955: 18): “One might thus assume a long swing in the inequality 
characterizing the secular income structure: widening in the early phases of economic 
growth when the transition from the pre-industrial to the industrial civilization was 
most rapid; becoming stabilized for a while; and then narrowing in the later phases.” 
For Kuznets, the principal mechanism driving inequality through this process is 
sector dualism. Productivity is higher in industry than agriculture, so wages are higher 
as well. Because of this wage gap, wage inequality is higher if workers are spread 
between the two, industrial and pre-industrial, than if they are clustered in one or the 
other. The effect is that inequality tracks an inverted U-curve as the majority of labor 
shifts from agriculture to manufacturing, or traditional to modern employment. 
But as we noted in chapter 3, rising inequality in the last half of the 19th century 
involved much more than a bifurcation of labor. While there was a wage gap between 
agriculture and manufacturing, “American inequality trends appear within sectors and 




(Williamson and Lindert 1980: 142). Sector dualism has little to say about the 
concentration of incomes at the very top of the distribution. 
The evidence outside of the United States for an inverted U-curve is far from 
overwhelming; to borrow the oft-cited line from Ravallion (1995:415), “The rejection 
of the inverted U hypothesis could hardly be more convincing.” While additional 
research has corroborated the cross-national inverted-U relationship between 
development and inequality, there is no relationship between growth and inequality 
within a country over time (Ravallion 1995; Deininger and Squire 1998; Schultz 
1998), and Fields and Jakubson (1994) even found a significant U pattern (not 
inverted) between growth and inequality. Korzeniewicz and Moran (2005) argue that 
the static inverted-U reflects the hierarchy of the world-economy, so that middle-
income countries tend to have higher levels of inequality even as global wealth, and 
thus the definition of middle income, rises. If economic development does not drive 
within-country inequality the modernization thesis has no paddle. 
But technological change and industrialization played a key role in the inequality 
narrative for the United States. A change in the mode of production can 
fundamentally change the relationship between the state, business and labor. For 
example, the capital to labor ratio is significantly higher in manufacturing than 
agriculture in the early 20th century (Williamson and Lindert 1980). Industrialization 
in the United States meant profits were increasingly extracted from machines instead 
of workers. Investment patterns in physical and human capital vary across sectors, 




the aggregate evolved as well (Williamson and Lindert 1980; Lichtenstein 1995; 
Levy and Temin 2007).  
An anecdotal example is Ford’s $5 wage. In 1914, Ford instituted a $5/day wage 
for many workers. The public relations claim was that the company wanted workers 
to be able to buy their own Ford, but the policy had the more critical goal of reducing 
attrition. Assembly-line work was miserable, especially for a labor force unfamiliar 
with industrial discipline. Given the high costs of turnover and mechanization of 
automobile production, Ford was willing to invest more in wages to reduce costs in 
recruitment and training. In the coming decades, employers would accept other, more 
formal, compromises with labor, occasionally negotiated by the state. 
Unfortunately, the literature on the labor-saving and labor-augmenting 
technological change and labor demand is painfully confused by limited and 
inconsistent definitions of skill. Skill is variably defined in terms of education and 
occupation, and the relationship between these indicators and skill are tautologically 
confirmed by wage hierarchies. The categorization of skilled and unskilled by 
education varies over time; a high school educated worker can be skilled in the late 
19th century and unskilled in the mid-20th. When, exactly, did an artisan with little 
classroom education but a lengthy apprenticeship stop being highly skilled?  
A sectoral shift to manufacturing and a surge in manufacturing productivity in the 
early 20th century is causally linked in the literature to rising inequality in this period 
(Morishima and Saito 1968; Keller 1973; Williamson 1976). But demand for workers 
in manufacturing is associated with a massive wage compression and low levels of 




manufacturing was “skill-intensive” relative to agriculture (Williamson and Lindert 
1980), but manufacturing employment was often a substitute, not a compliment, to 
high school enrollment (Goldin and Katz 1997). An attempt to reduce any 
development during this period as a trend in the relationship in wages between 
“skilled” and “unskilled” workers is folly. 
Despite these complications, some relationships are fairly easy to establish. 
Immigration into the United States reduced wages (see chapter 3; Goldin 1994; 
O’Rourke and Williamson 1999). It would then follow that falling immigration rates 
would have the obverse effect. Immigrants as a share of the US population began to 
fall after 1913 with the outbreak of World War I and legislation restricting 
immigration in 1921 and 1924; only after 1970 did that figure begin to rebound 
(Gibson and Lennon 1999). Along those lines, and related to Kuznet’s model of 
economic modernization and demographic transition theory, the US fertility rate fell 
through the first half of the 20th century to 1946. The correlation between the growth 
rate of the labor force and the wage premium for ‘skilled’ labor is non-negligible (see 
Figure 4.9; Williamson and Lindert 1980). 
The implication of the figure below goes beyond the mere relationship between 
wages and supply of labor; the measure opposite labor force growth is the skilled 
wage premium (skill being a loosely defined concept aggregated from various wage 
series). Labor force growth through US history generally reflects the addition of a 
disproportionate share of less-skilled workers, either because they are young, from 





Figure 4.9 Labor Force Growth and Skilled Wage Premium        
 
      Source: Williamson and Lindert 1980, Table 9.1 
 
Notably, the period from 1929 to 1948 falls well below the linear fit between 
labor force growth and change in the wage premium. The implication is that, for this 
period in particular, the wage premium fell more than would be explained by slowing 
labor force growth (the opposite is true for 1820 to 1840). The simple solution is that 
there was a change not just in labor force size, but composition. 
The High School Movement beginning in 1910 served the function of changing 
the composition of the US labor force. The percent of US youths with a high school 
diploma exploded from 9% to 50% between 1910 and 1940 (Goldin and Katz 1997). 
In 1940, 73% of 15 to 18 year olds were enrolled in high school (Goldin and Katz 




education, from an emphasis on training for college to an emphasis on training for life 
(Goldin and Katz 2007), though greater access to public universities in the 1940s 
would cause that emphasis to again reverse. The US labor force was fundamentally 
transformed—the typical American was better educated, and women’s access to 
education, and then employment, also surged (Goldin 2006). This undoubtedly played 
a role in compressing wages (Goldin and Katz 1997). Access to tertiary education 
would expand rapidly after World War II. 
The narrative becomes more complicated when we also consider the other side of 
the coin, labor demand. On one hand, changes in demand through this period can be 
explained by historical events: “Most of the narrowing in wage differentials, for 
example, took place in the 1910s and the 1940s, periods close to or coinciding with 
the two world wars” (Goldin and Katz 2007: 29). Likewise, Chiswick and Mincer 
(1972) show that falling unemployment during World War II was an important factor 
in falling inequality during that period, and my analysis above concurs. But the world 
wars ended, and the impact on wage differentials did not.  
Goldin and Katz (2010) estimate changes in skill premia (college to high school, 
high school to high school dropout) since 1915 using changes in relative supply and 
various time dummies to reflect changes in relative demand. The sparseness of data 
for the earlier period limits the precision with which they can identify changes in 
relative demand, but consistent with results reported above they find that the relative 
demand for college educated workers fell from 1915 to 1949. 
The economic solution points to technological change. Technological change is 




increase in the ratio of capital to labor indicates that new technology increased the 
returns of capital relative to labor. A number of studies indicate that technological 
change had a labor-saving bias from the beginning of the 19th century and again 
through the 1920s, but reversed course in the 1910s and after the 1920s (see 
Williamson and Lindert 1980, Morishima and Saito 1968). More specifically, output 
shifted to less-skilled labor-intensive sectors during periods of labor-augmenting 
technological change (Williamson and Lindert 1980).  
The potential contribution of technological drift on wage differentials is limited. 
For example, wage differentials trended up and down through the 1910s, 1920s and 
1930s, but they collapsed in the first half of the 1940s just as industrial output tripled 
(Goldin and Margo 1992). Demand for industrial products to feed the war effort was 
met by exploiting the growing class of high school educated workers. This was not 
exogenous technological change, but a planned and structured reorganization of 
economic activity.  
Destruction of and constraints on financial incomes and wealth. As noted earlier, 
financial systems shuddered in the first year of World War I. The income share of the 
top 1% of earners in the United States fell from 18.2% to 14.5% between 1914 and 
1920, only to rebound soon after. A decade later, the Dow Jones Industrial Average 
lost 80% of its value from 1929 to 1932 (FRED 2012). Because only 5% of families 
were actively associated with the stock market in 1929 (Galbraith 1954), the top 1% 
of earners in the United States were disproportionately affected, and their share of all 




In a preliminary study, Atkinson and Morelli (2011) find that top income shares 
can move up or down with a financial crisis, and that “there is more evidence that 
financial crises are followed by rising inequality” (pg. 49). For example, top income 
shares excluding capital gains were higher in 2010 than in 2007 (Alvaredo, Atkinson, 
Piketty and Saez 2012). There is no doubt that top income shares were adversely 
affected by the stock market crash of 1929, but these shares could have rebounded. 
But the crash of 1929 was followed by a significant restructuring of American and 
global finance with the goal of preventing another collapse.  
The Securities and Exchange Commission was created in 1934 to regulate the 
securities industry and stock and option exchanges. The 1933 Banking Act introduced 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to insure commercial banking deposits. 
Four provisions of the 1933 Banking Act, generally known as Glass-Steagall, limited 
the involvement of commercial banks in securities and separated commercial and 
investment banks. The act also introduced other forms of regulation: it prohibited 
interest payments on demand deposits (e.g., checking accounts); it allowed the 
Federal Reserve Board to limit interest rates on time deposits; it sought to limit 
“speculative” uses of bank credit through oversight from the Federal Reserve Banks.  
Given the financial chaos of the period, it is difficult to isolate the impact of these 
measures from the noise, but the Dow Jones Industrial Average grew at a 
significantly faster rate between 1921 and 1929 in constant terms than at any other 
point in history (FRED 2012, author’s calculations), and wages in finance relative to 




will see in more detail in chapter 5, financial deregulation is associated with a 
concentration of income and wealth in the financial services sector.  
Long-term consequences of emergency institutions. As noted above, the global 
economic system prior to World War I was not conducive to government intervention 
through fiscal or monetary policy. But the political and economic chaos in the last 
half of the 1910s created space and demand for government social services.  
The spread of social insurance and welfare statism both in terms of countries 
covered and concerning the scope of provisions and its beneficiaries 
increasingly became part of social and economic policy in the aftermath of 
World War I. While previous decades had seen rather cautious 
experimentation with various schemes of social insurance, social security 
principles were now gaining ground, developing rapidly in most European 
countries and European settler nations and also spreading to the European 
periphery and beyond Europe. (Kuhnle and Sander 2010:75) 
 
The transformation of the relationship between the state and its citizens (an 
important distinction from residents) over the next quarter century is anecdotally 
captured by the publication of the Beveridge Report in 1942. The British economist 
William Beveridge chaired the inter-departmental group tasked with performing a 
survey of existing social services in the UK and to make recommendations. 
Beveridge did not shy from the opportunity; he argued that this “revolutionary 
moment in the world’s history is a time for revolutions, not for patching” (Beveridge 
1942: 6). 
The recommendations of the report traced the new logic of reformed capitalism. 
Beveridge argued that social security would be achieved through cooperation between 
the state and individual, but that “the State in organising security should not stifle 
incentive, opportunity, responsibility; in establishing a national minimum, it should 




more than that minimum for himself and his family” (Beveridge 1942: 6-7). The 
report became the explicit reference point for the foundation of the post-war welfare 
state in the UK and elsewhere. While not without its critics, the report was well 
received and explicitly referenced in policy discussions around the world (Barnett 
2001; Ferguson 2009). 
“The arguments for state insurance extended beyond mere social equity” 
(Ferguson 2009: 33). Through two world wars and the Great Depression, attention 
turned to uncertainty. War and economic chaos highlighted the inadequacies of 
individual or private institutional approaches to insurance. The lesson first introduced 
in World War I was further impressed during the Great Depression – the liquidity 
crunch affected actors well outside the financial services industry and around the 
world – and World War II: “In Japan, as in most combatant countries, the lesson was 
clear: the world was just too dangerous a place for private insurance markets to cope 
with. . . [I]ndividuals could not be expected to insure themselves against the US Air 
Force” (Ferguson 2009: 207).  
Greater intervention by the state in economic affairs, particularly where that 
intervention was oriented towards security, insurance and protection, was accepted by 
capital and labor alike as a necessary response to the chaos of previous decades. 
Business interests were not particularly excited about the full range of changes being 
implemented, especially since some programs redistributed incomes through 
progressive taxes and means-tested transfers. But the state could no longer operate on 
the grounds that the “business of government is business.” “Unrestrained competition 




the proletariat that they are exploiting. . . . [S]tates, perceiving that it is impossible to 
leave employers and employees to contend in anarchy, elaborate a social legislation” 
(Pirenne 1953: 516, quoted in Arrighi 1994/2010). Before World War II, conflict 
between capital and labor fed political instability. During World War II, the 
mechanization of war obliterated any remaining division between industrial 
production and state power. After the war, the threat retained physical form in the 
Soviet Union. 
The concentration of workers in factories and densely populated urban 
neighborhoods influenced the outcome of state intervention. 
[I]n democratic societies the growing political power of the urban lower-
income groups led to a variety of protective and supporting legislation, much 
of it aimed to counteract the worst effects of rapid industrialization and 
urbanization and to support the claims of the broad masses for more adequate 
shares of the growing income of the country (Kuznets 1955: 17). 
 
In other words, economic modernization is not merely an economic process, but is 
also political and institutional.  
For the United States, four institutional developments are particularly important in 
the history of wage and income inequality: progressive federal income tax, 
government transfers, collective bargaining rights, and wage regulation. 
The 16th amendment was ratified in 1913, granting the federal government the 
right to directly tax individual incomes. The amendment sat astride two eras. On one 
hand, the income tax was argued to be a more efficient means of generating revenue 
than tariffs; this appeased free traders. On the other hand, Theodore Roosevelt 




arms race and generate funds to pursue the Progressive Republican agenda (Buenker 
1981). 
Top marginal tax rates, and tax rates in general, followed a consistent pattern 
through the first half of the 20th century. During each crisis – World War I, the Great 
Depression, World War II – tax rates rose. After the crisis, rates would fall but to a 
higher level than before the crisis. For example, an individual with an income of 
$500,000 (1982 dollars) in 1916 paid 2.2% of that in federal income taxes. That 
figured jumped to 18.0% in 1918, and then fell to 9.9% in 1924. That same income 
would be taxed at 7.8% in 1931, 12.2% in 1932, and 14.0% in 1935. Before tax rates 
had an opportunity to fall, World War II raised taxes on that $500,000 of income to 
35.0% in 1941 and 52.0% in 1945. The rate fell to 41.2% in 1949 (Tax Foundation 
2013, author’s calculations).  
Because income taxes tend to be progressive, they can have a significant impact 
on the distribution of incomes. The relationship between inequality and taxes post-tax 
is mechanical, but high taxes can also effect incomes pre-tax as firms adjust their 
investment decisions based on expectations of returns (Piketty and Saez 2003; Piketty 
2014); ceteris paribus, higher taxes on higher incomes reduces the return on that 
investment, so firms direct funds elsewhere. 
By this logic, a focus on top marginal tax rates is insufficient; we must also 
consider the progressivity of taxes. To operationalize tax progressivity (see Figure 
4.10), I used a uniform distribution of incomes from 0 to $1,000,000 (1982 US$) and 
estimated the total taxes paid by individuals across that distribution. I subtracted the 




largely a product of top tax rates, as the tax rate on an income $500,000 and the 
progressivity measure track very closely. They do diverge some in the 1940s when 
tax rates on lower incomes rose significantly. 
 
Isolating the impact of income taxes on the distribution of incomes during this 
period is made functionally impossible because of the complexity of causal 
relationships between income tax rates, crisis, and other economic and institutional 
changes (many of which depended on new federal revenues to cover costs), but the 
correlation between top marginal tax rates and top income shares through the 20th 
century is substantial (Piketty and Saez 2003). As I discuss in chapter 5, empirical 
research has linked tax rates and inequality (Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz 2012; Altig 
and Carlstrom 1999), and the 1980s offered a wonderful natural experiment: Reagan 
twice substantially reduced tax rates and top income shares jumped in response.  
The impact on new government spending on inequality is obvious in some cases, 







































Figure 4.10 Effective Tax Rate and Tax Progressivity




role in reducing poverty among the elderly. Less obvious is the impact of 
unemployment insurance and make-work programs. They act as competitors to 
private employers. A worker should be less likely to accept a pay cut during a 
recession and more selective when seeking employment if there is a safety net in 
place. More broadly, life course research has demonstrated that the impact of negative 
events – unemployment, injury, divorce – accumulate over time as they increase the 
probability of other negative events. This can drive up inequality within a cohort over 
time (Albrecht 2007). Public insurance schemes can break that cycle. 
The relationship between labor-related legislation in the 1930s and union 
membership is undeniable. In 1932, Norris-La Guardia declared that work contracts 
disallowing union membership as a condition of employment were unenforceable by 
federal law, and it prevented federal courts from issuing injunctions against non-
violent labor disputes. More important, the Wagner Act in 1935 guaranteed private 
sector workers the right to organize, bargain and act collectively. It established the 
National Labor Relations Board to monitor union elections.  
Union membership among nonagricultural workers (Wagner does not cover 
agricultural workers) was at 11.3% in 1933. That figure rose to 13.2% in 1935, 27.5% 
in 1938 and 35.5% in 1945 (Hirsch and Macpherson 2003). Of course, legislation on 
paper was not enough to ensure the growth of trade unions in the United States; the 
last half of the 1930s was rife with political, legal and street battles. Union 
membership growth halted after 1946; Taft-Hartley in 1947 repealed some 




Again, the correlation for this period between income inequality and union power 
is non-negligible. Union membership fell between 1920 and 1929; the income share 
of the richest 1% rose from 14.5% to 18.4% in that period (Williamson and Lindert 
1980; Piketty and Saez 2003; see also Baran and Sweezy 1966 and Keller 1973). That 
figure fell to 14.7% in 1938 and 10.5% in 1944 as union membership rose.  
Economic historians are often critical of a hypothesized relationship between 
union membership and inequality. The correlation might be spurious: “unionization 
and union strength may be only a manifestation of strong market demands for labor in 
general and unskilled labor in particular—demands which themselves must be 
explained” (Williamson and Lindert 1980: 140). Even at their height trade unions 
represented only a minority of US workers, and they may have been responsible for 
driving down wages for non-union workers – although union demands were more in 
line with the interests of “low-skill” workers after the 1930s than before (Williamson 
and Lindert 1980). 
Unions influence wage inequality directly and indirectly. Directly, unions 
compress wages among union workers by 1) promoting equal pay for equal work and 
2) trimming the gap between high and low wage workers (Freeman 1980; Card, 
Lemieux and Riddell 2003). Indirectly, trade unions institutionalize “norms of 
equity”.  Wage inequality tends to be lower when wage rates are institutionalized. 
Western and Rosenfeld (2011) find that inequality in wages among non-union 
workers is lower in areas with high union membership. Reuther’s Treaty of Detroit, a 




social contract by which wages kept pace with rising labor productivity for the next 
few decades (Levy and Temin 2007; Lichtenstein 1995). 
Organized labor more effectively supports pro-labor politicians than unorganized 
labor. For example, Republicans gained 72 seats in the House of Representatives in 
1938. The recession of 1937 was the key factor, but a bitter split between the AFL 
and fledgling CIO also played a role. A Republican congress would later repeal some 
New Deal legislation and pass Taft-Hartley over Truman’s veto.  
In addition to organic changes in supply and demand, higher taxes, and stronger 
unions, wage compression in the United States was also a direct act of Congress. The 
Federal Labor Standards Act established a minimum wage of $.25 an hour (about 
$3.90 in 2010 dollars, 54% of the actual 2010 value; see Figure 4.9; DOL 2013; BLS 
2013, CPI; author’s calculations). Then, in an effort to manage an economy 
overheating in World War II, the National War Labor Board (NWLB) was created in 
1942 to regulate wages.  
Wage compression was not within the mandate of the NWLB, but many policies 
had that effect. For example, standardized wages reduced within-firm and within-
industry variance in wages; wages could be increased to $.40 an hour without NWLB 
approval (33% greater than the minimum wage). The net effect, because the NWLB 
offered more exceptions for “substandard” wages, was wage compression by fiat 
(Goldin and Margo 1992).  
The real value of the minimum wage doubled in the two decades after FLSA, and 
coverage expanded in the 1960s (see Figure 4.11). The federal government continues 




wage in recent decades is one potential source of rising inequality in recent decades 
(DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux 1996; Lee 1999; Teulings 2000; 2003). Conversely, it 
seems plausible that introducing and raising the minimum wage in the three decades 
after 1938 would compress wages. But in this case the minimum wage was moving in 
step with rising living standards generally, so its impact was limited. 
 
The NWLB was dissolved in 1945, but Thurow (1975) argues that legislated 
wage compression established new normative expectations about wage differentials 
that were influential long after the immediate justification for controls vanished. 
Another possible explanation for the stickiness of command economy wage 
compression is that firms adjusted their practices – capital investments, employee 
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A New Social Contract 
The United States emerged from World War II in a new, lower inequality regime; 
as I have detailed above, it reflected changes in the underlying material, normative, 
institutional, political, and ideological conditions. While these changes produced 
lower levels of inequality, it is important to note that egalitarianism was rarely a 
guiding principle. Beveridge (1942) listed want, disease, ignorance, idleness and 
squalor, not inequality, as the obstacles to reconstruction. The new social contract 
hinged on two principles: 1) economic security requires strong domestic demand 
from a secure, productive, high-wage labor force; 2) economic security and 
international peace require nationally and internationally regulated finance and trade 
(Eichengreen 1996).  
Domestic demand. Henry Ford’s explicit intention with the $5 wage, that workers 
would be able to buy their own Ford, is relevant. A firm cannot survive selling its 
products only to its employees, but a country can. The first half of the 20th century 
highlighted the costs and risks of depending on global trade and finance. 
Specialization may be associated with greater productivity, but it also creates an 
economic dependence on political entities with conflicting interests. The political 
consequences of economic recession are compounded because 1) the state has little 
power to mitigate its impact and 2) this economic impotence is put on display.  
Keynesian economic thought offered an alternative. Fiscal and monetary policy 
can effectively manage economic downturns by manipulating domestic demand. 
Through the 1930s it became economic orthodoxy to employ counter-cyclical 




manipulate interest rates to encourage investment and spending when appropriate. 
While counter-cyclical spending makes sense to boost demand in the short run, in the 
long run greater demand must be matched with increased productivity. Otherwise 
domestic demand will target foreign imports with debt (see chapter 6).  
Make-work projects, unemployment and old-age insurance schemes, expanded 
public education, collective bargaining rights and negotiated arrangements with 
capital to avoid work stoppages, and public investments in infrastructure had the net 
effect of raising and stabilizing demand while also encouraging productivity gains to 
match. Within the new social contract, the state was responsible for encouraging job 
creation and investment, education, and eliminating or managing economic 
recessions. This was a dramatic change from earlier decades, during which 
corporations secured markets through mergers, horizontal and vertical integration to 
protect against "cut-throat" competition. Legislation (antitrust laws) and academic 
opinion (e.g., Robinson 1933 and Chamberlin 1933) turned against monopolistic 
corporations. In the Keynesian regime, "cut-throat" competition was to be avoided by 
continuously expanding the pie, not by allowing a single corporation to control more 
of the same pie. 
As such, after the compression of wages, incomes and wealth through the Great 
Depression and World War II, economic gains in the post-war era were not equally 
distributed; those at the top of the distribution grabbed a larger share of profits. But 
gains were distributed proportionately; income shares were fairly stable for two 





Regulated Finance. As war raged in Europe, there was quasi-consensus that the 
international financial system had failed its functionaries, and that a post-war 
arrangement would restrict capital flows.  
It is now highly responsible doctrine, in academic and banking circles alike, 
that a substantial measure of direct control over private capital movements, 
especially the so-called hot money varieties, will be desirable for most 
countries not only in the immediately ahead but also in the long run as well. . . 
. This doctrinal volte-face represents a widespread disillusionment resulting 
from the destructive behavior of these movements in the interwar years. 
(Arthur Bloomfield, 1946, quoted in Abdelal 2007: 45) 
 
Keynes agreed that “control of capital movements . . . [would be] a permanent feature 
of the post-war system” (quoted in Abdelal 2007: 46). These controls were a central 
part of the post-war social contract (Eichengreen 1996). 
But it was also apparent that control over financial flows would require explicit 
international coordination. “The absence of a high degree of economic collaboration 
among the leading nations will…inevitably result in economic warfare that will be 
but the prelude and instigator of military warfare on an even vaster scale” (Harry 
Dexter White, quoted in Pollard 1985). To this end, Franklin Roosevelt organized a 
conference of 44 allied nations in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire in 1944. 
In that conference, the delegates agreed on a system for organizing exchange 
rates, created the International Monetary Fund to encourage financial cooperation and 
temporarily offset payment imbalances, and the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development which would expand later into the World Bank Group. (See chapter 





In addition to international cooperation in finances, the beggar-thy-neighbor 
response to the Great Depression highlighted the importance of international 
cooperation in trade as well. The charter for the International Trade Organization was 
negotiated in 1948, but it never received approval from the US Congress. The less 
ambitious General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was signed in 1947. In 
addition to a series of trade rounds to negotiate multilateral reductions in trade tariffs, 
GATT offered mechanisms to negotiate and arbitrate trade disputes.  
The US-Centered Spatial Configuration 
I noted at the beginning of this chapter that top incomes became less concentrated 
in countries around the world, not just in the United States. But no two countries took 
the same path to lower inequality – some of the discussion above is irrelevant to or 
contradicts the experience of the ten other countries in Figure 4.2. It is beyond the 
scope of this project to consider these national experiences independently, but some 
experiences are shared and highlight one way the global can influence the local.  
First, the political response to interstate chaos varied across countries, but the 
stimulus was broadly the same. Wealth and income distributions were compressed by 
the destruction of rich-owned assets and strong labor demand. Second, faced with the 
bedlam of war and depression, “the answer adopted more or less everywhere was for 
government to take over, in effect to nationalize risk” (Ferguson 2009: 207). Third, 
there was some institutional convergence after the war as the institutional innovations 
of the victors were adopted elsewhere. For example, the Japanese Advisory Council 
for Social Security in 1949 acknowledged the influence of the British welfare state, 




(Ferguson 2009). Likewise, the Holding Company Liquidation Commission had the 
express purpose of liquidating the largest holding companies in Japan, much as the 
Sherman and Clayton antitrust acts had sought to do in the United States. 
Finally, institutional diffusion was not left to chance. Through December 7, 1941 
the physical distance between the United States and the chaos enveloping Europe was 
a major geopolitical advantage that it exploited wholeheartedly. The United States 
had long been a leader in protectionist economic policies; the Smoot-Hawley Tariff 
was particularly egregious. Though its own political leadership played a lead role in 
the organization of the League of Nations, the United States never ratified the 
covenant, primarily because it included an obligation to assist members beset by 
external aggression. The United States refused to formally engage in either world war 
until there was an attack on its citizens. And the United Kingdom was servicing war 
debt to the United States until 2006 despite fighting on the same side.  
During World War II, though, the United States stepped into its new hegemonic 
role (“the power associated with dominance expanded by the exercise of ‘intellectual 
and moral leadership’” [Arrighi 1994/2010: 29]) and began to actively structure the 
post-war global economy. In addition to various international institutions, the United 
States took an active role in domestic politics. For example, one of the objectives of 
the post-war American occupation of Japan was “to replace a feudal economy by a 
welfare economy” (Ball 1948: 15, quoted in Ferguson 2009). As with the British-
centered system, participation in the postwar global economy required that one play 




The Marshall Plan served a dual function. On one hand, it was a tool to encourage 
reconstruction in Europe to prevent the spread of communism. On the other, the 
asymmetry between the wealth and cohesiveness of the United States and 
fragmentation and poverty of foreign markets created the “roots of the impasse which 
after the Second World War prevented the recycling liquidity back into the expansion 
of world trade and production. Eventually, the impasse was broken by the ‘invention’ 
of the Cold War” (Arrighi 1994/2010: 304).  
Conclusion 
The 20th century, industrial global economy was centered on a 19th century 
colonial empire. The mismatch between industrial capacity and inputs, despite the 
theoretical emphasis on free trade, was exacerbated by space and politics. Powerful 
people campaigned to open borders to trade and keep the world on gold (Frieden 
2007), but World War I and then the Great Depression made the purist neoclassical 
argument untenable.  
The 1930s saw a fit of experimentation of national political and economic models 
but with some consistent themes, e.g., increased state capacity and economic 
intervention. This Cambrian explosion was followed by a Darwinian paring in the 
1940s. The United States emerged from war as the center of global economic activity 
by any conceivable measure (see chapter 5) and, with its allies, sought to construct a 
new world economic order, a moderated, negotiated and arbitrated version of British 
liberalism based on the “neoclassical synthesis”: Keynesian macroeconomics and 




moderation was essential when local markets were scaled up, especially 
internationally. 
Income inequality fell in countries around the world, but the new economic 
ideology rarely recognized egalitarianism as a driving principle. War and the Great 
Depression destroyed assets owned disproportionately by the rich, while war drove up 
the demand for labor, especially less-skilled labor, but the resulting compression of 
income and wealth would have been temporary if the economic fundamentals had not 
changed.  
The new inequality status quo, to some degree, reflected the rejection of Say’s 
law – that supply creates its own demand. Escaping the Great Depression required 
more than reducing wages to again spur production. Instead, growth was driven by 
demand, not supply. Because the state could not secure foreign demand, it focused on 
the domestic variety. Transfers and make-work projects funded demand during a 
recession. Higher, secure wages, matched by investments in human and physical 
capital and infrastructure to increase productivity, were key to a strong, stable 
economy. 
Lower inequality, though, cannot be explained completely by the economic 
paradigm shift. Labor was empowered by war and the political instability of the 
1930s, and slower growth in the supply of labor related to industrialization and World 
War I. This translated into a political and legal environment that was more conducive 
to collective action (with an implicit, and in the late 1940s explicit, condition that 




fundamental in securing wage growth tied to gains in productivity, and the gains of 
economic growth were shared proportionately through the 1950s and 1960s.  
The Keynesian inequality regime had a limited shelf life. The levers that 
Washington used to execute Keynesian adjustments broke in the 1970s. The material 
and legal foundations of organized labor began to erode almost immediately. And the 
new, post-war world order collapsed as the world-economy evolved. The financial 






Chapter 5: The Financial Inequality Regime 
Income inequality in the United States was relatively low for more than two 
decades after World War II. By the 1970s, though, the institutional arrangements that 
had defined the post-war low inequality regime became untenable. No longer could 
the United States profitably be the world’s workshop. Attention shifted from 
maximizing productivity, employment and demand, and financial stability, to freeing 
financial capital flows, reducing costs, and monetary economic policy. As a result of 
these changes, the financial services industry was able to extend its influence in the 
economy, alter investment strategies, and grab a higher share of business profits. 
Corporate management profited from weaker labor laws, financial regulation and 
corporate governance. The net impact is that incomes and wages for many Americans 
have been stagnant for decades while those at the top of the distribution have enjoyed 
rising profits and compensation. This shift from low inequality to rising inequality in 
the United States, the beginning of the financial inequality regime, correlates with the 
transition from material to financial expansion in Arrighi’s most recent cycle of 
accumulation (see Figure 0.3). 
The standard approach for explaining rising income inequality in the United Sates 
since the 1970s is to identify a covariate of inequality change – e.g., economic 
restructuring, technical change, financialization – and use some form of 
decomposition or correlation analysis to estimate its relative contribution to rising 
inequality.  
My approach is fundamentally different. I focus on the interrelationships between 




transition with economic, political, even ideological ramifications. After World War 
II, domestic and international institutional arrangements reflected a global economy 
with the United States firmly in the center. These arrangements broke down as 
competition from Europe and Japan intensified and more peripheral countries pushed 
back against American hegemony. In the 1970s, the United States was beset by high 
inflation and high unemployment. Employment and wages in manufacturing began to 
decline. Economic uncertainty spawned a neoliberal revolution that Ronald Reagan 
rode to the White House in 1980 (by promising that his office was not the solution to 
what ailed the nation). Finance (among other industries) was deregulated, federal 
income taxes slashed, and union membership fell dramatically. Economic 
restructuring, technical change, deregulation and lower top marginal tax rates are 
among the interrelated pieces of the new equilibrium born in the 1980s that has 
allowed the size distribution of incomes to grow. These should not be treated, 
ultimately, as independent explanatory variables because they are each key pieces of 
a broader narrative. 
This argument is similar to that offered by Hacker and Pierson (2010): those at the 
top of the income distribution exercised political power to deregulate finance, slash 
taxes, and constrain corporate governance and labor unions. The results are similar. 
But while Hacker and Pierson discount the role of “globalization” in favor of politics, 
it is my position that the proposed political shift is embedded in the global-historical 
transition of the 1970s.  
In the next section, “the data”, I take a closer look at the empirical evidence that 




familiar proximate determinants of rising income inequality in the United States and 
their interrelationships. In the next three sections, “transformation of American 
hegemony”, “the crisis”, and “the response”, I place those proximate determinants 
within a broader global-historical context. I use the Bretton Woods Agreement to 
represent a spatial configuration of the world-economy constructed in the aftermath 
of World War II, and discuss its inability to cope when economic and political power 
shifted outside the United States (or at least beyond the control of the US 
government). I conclude the chapter with some speculative comments on the end of 
the financial inequality regime and the American cycle of accumulation, and future 
directions. 
The Data 
I noted in the introduction that income inequality in the United States began to 
rise at some point in the 1970s. The Gini coefficient for household income inequality 
rose 26% from .326 to .411 between 1974 and 2006 (DeNavas-Walt, et al 2012). To 
put that in perspective, a Gini of .326 would put the United States today in the same 
neighborhood as Canada and below Belgium and Switzerland, but instead the US is 
actually in the vicinity of Georgia, Qatar and Turkey (World Bank 2013). 
Incomes have become more concentrated at the top of the distribution. While 
average incomes for the richest 20% grew by $51,409 (2010 $US) between 1973 and 
2010, incomes for the bottom quintile fell (see Figure 5.1). According to estimates 
from the Congressional Budget Office (2011), which account for occupational 




grew 275% between 1979 and 2007 versus just 18% for the poorest fifth of American 
households.  
 
Two mechanisms drove income concentration (CBO 2011). First, all forms of 
market income (e.g., labor, capital gains, business income) became more concentrated 
at the top of the distribution. Second, those sources of incomes that were already most 
concentrated, capital gains and business income, grew faster than other sources 
during this period.  
Using the top income share estimates from Piketty and Saez (2003, updated to 
2011), the 95% poorest tax units saw their incomes fall between 1973 and 2008 in 
constant dollars, and the richest 1% captured 72% of income growth over that period. 
Estimates from the Census Bureau (2010) are more conservative, but still the bottom 
60% of households captured only 10% of income growth between 1973 and 2008. 


































Figure 5.1 Average Income by Quintile and % Change, 1973-2010
1973 2010 % Change (1973-2010)





doubled between 1980 and 2007, from 10.0% to 23.5%, and the experience of the top 
10% and top .01% are similar (Piketty and Saez 2003, updated to 2011).   
Growing income gaps are not exclusive to the very top of the distribution:  
The slowing of the growth of overall wage inequality in the 1990s hides a 
divergence in the paths of upper-tail (90/50) inequality—which has increased 
steadily since 1980, even adjusting for changes in labor force composition—
and lower-tail (50/10) inequality, which rose sharply in the first half of the 
1980s and plateaued or contracted thereafter (Autor, Katz and Kearney 2008: 
300). 
 
Inequality in hourly wages increased over 40% between 1973 and 2007 (Western 
and Rosenfeld 2011). In addition to a significant educational income gap, residual 
inequality (inequality within groups) grew with wage instability – inequality is higher 
when earnings fluctuate more wildly – and now represents a significant portion of 
aggregate wage and earnings inequality (Gottschalk and Moffitt 2009; Shin and Solon 
2008). In short, the gap between different kinds of workers is growing, and the gap 
between similar workers is also growing; about half of this growth is due not to 
persistent gaps between workers but greater wage uncertainty over an individual’s 
lifetime.  
While inequality in the distribution of incomes and wages stretched at almost 
every possible point, inequality in the distribution of wealth has been a different 
story. Wolff (2012) reports that the wealth share of the wealthiest 1% increased 
marginally from 34.4% to 34.6% between 1969 and 2007, but also noted a more 
substantial increase in overall wealth inequality as the Gini coefficient rose from .811 
to .870 during that period. Kopczuk and Saez (2004) reported lower top wealth shares 
in 2000 than in 1969. The stability in wealth inequality led Armour, Burkhauser and 




prices) as income, as well as benefits and transfers, income inequality did not increase 
between 1979 and 2007. 
The narrative of stable wealth inequality in the United States became much more 
complicated with the collapse of the housing bubble in 2007. Non-high net worth 
(NHNW) Americans are more heavily invested in real estate than their wealthy 
counterparts. For example, principal residence represents 9.4% of total wealth for the 
wealthiest 1% and 66.6% for the bottom 60%; financial assets make up 75.7% and 
12.0%, respectively (Wolff 2012). Therefore, the “creation” of new wealth in the 
housing bubble disproportionately buoyed the total net worth of NHNW Americans. 
But median household wealth fell 47% between 2007 and 2010 and reached levels 
last seen in 1969 (Wolff 2012). The effect of falling house prices on wealth inequality 
was initially offset by losses in equity markets, but since 2009 stock prices have 
recovered while housing prices fell further before stabilizing (Federal Housing 
Financing Agency 2013; Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 2013).  
The Mechanisms 
Beginning in the 1980s, rising income inequality in the United States has inspired 
an academic industry searching for an explanation. Instead of evaluating the relative 
merits of the proposed explanations, I highlight a few key variables, discuss their 
relationships with income inequality and, more important, discuss their relationships 
to one another. It is my argument that these are variables are not competing 
explanations, but principal characters in a larger narrative of global economic change.  
Economic Restructuring/Deunionization/SBTC. Employment in manufacturing in the 




then fell 28% to 1946 as the nation disarmed. Manufacturing employment would 
again approach its war-era peak in 1953 as the US military headed to Korea, but 
would not surpass the 16.6 million employed in 1943 until 1965. It reached a new 
peak in 1969, fluctuated through the 1970s, and then began a fairly consistent descent 
in the 1980s. In 2009, employment in manufacturing would decline to levels last seen 
in the early 1940s before the war machine reached its peak capacity (BLS 2013; see 
Figure 5.2).  
 
There are two, seemingly contradictory explanations for falling employment in 
manufacturing. First, workers in manufacturing today are more productive, so fewer 
are needed to match past production. Over the last three decades, productivity growth 
in manufacturing has outpaced gains in the economy at large, so even as employment 
in manufacturing as a share of total employment has fallen, total production in 

















20th century (BLS 2013, productivity in non-farm business sector; Mishel 1989; 
Morris and Western 1999).  
Demand for manufactured goods has declined relative to services in the United 
States and other rich countries, but has grown globally (Brauer 2004). American 
economic domination at the end of World War II translated into high demand for 
American manufactured exports (Chevan and Stokes 2000), but increased 
productivity since has not equated with a growing demand for US manufacturing 
exports – the share of US manufacturing of the global total has fallen from around a 
third in the early 1980s to a fifth in 2010 (Levinson 2014), and China has now 
surpassed the United States in value added in manufacturing (World Bank 2013). In 
short, global demand for manufactured goods has increased, productivity in 
manufacturing has increased in the United States, but employment in manufacturing 
has declined along with US manufacturing as a share of the global total. 
Meanwhile, wages in manufacturing have stalled. Between the end of 1945 and 
the beginning of 1973, average constant wages (adjusted for inflation) in 
manufacturing almost doubled ($4.67 to $9.11 in 1980 US dollars). If we recognize 
that an average of 30% of workers between 1945 and 1970 were employed in 
manufacturing, wage gains in the sector represented a major source of income growth 
for the middle deciles of the US income distribution. But as of September 2013 
average wages have fallen for four decades in constant terms (BLS 2013, author’s 





The logic correlating manufacturing employment with income inequality traces 
back to Simon Kuznets (1955). As we noted in chapter 4, Kuznets linked inequality 
trends in the United States, Germany and the United Kingdom to industrialization and 
urbanization. In turn, when inequality began to rise, Harrison and Bluestone (1990) 
pointed to deindustrialization and the rise of service employment.  
A relationship between economic structure – the distribution of workers, capital 
and investment by industry – and inequality rests on variations across industries. 
Economic restructuring is important because agricultural and natural resource 
jobs are fundamentally different from manufacturing jobs, which in turn are 
fundamentally different from service jobs. Different industries have different 
wage structures and different work schedules for their employees, require 
different levels and types of education, differ in the types of relationships that 
exist between owners and workers, and vary in the proportion of the 
workforce that is either male or female (Albrecht and Albrecht 2009: 520). 
 
Unlike the Kuznets’ model, which emphasizes sector dualism, the economic 












Figure 5.3 Average Hourly Wage in Manufacturing, 1980 US$




manufacturing. Manufacturing employment was a source of middle-class incomes for 
a mass of high school educated workers, but in a post-industrial economy, these 
workers are forced into low-wage service jobs (Morris and Western 1999).  
Research empirically connecting rising income inequality to economic 
restructuring – which includes the rising employment in the service sector with 
deindustrialization – has returned mixed results (Raffalovich 1990; Tilly et al 1986). 
Consequently, economic restructuring as an explanation for rising inequality has gone 
out of favor in some academic circles. I propose that the empirical link is weak in 
some studies for two reasons. First, to truly measure the impact of economic 
restructuring we must compare real inequality change against a counterfactual history 
sans economic restructuring. But there are no empirical and very little theoretical 
grounds on which we can base this counterfactual scenario. For example, if we allow 
for employment in manufacturing to continue expanding, is that because 
manufacturing firms are investing in labor and not capital, reducing productivity 
gains? Or is the United States able to grab a larger share of the global market for 
manufactured goods? If so, how? The problem with comparing against a historical 
counterfactual is that, because it did not occur, it is inherently illogical. 
We can create meaningful comparison groups if we divide the United States into 
regions. This approach has identified large effects of deindustrialization on inequality 
(Albrecht and Albrecht 2009). Unfortunately, we cannot scale up these results to draw 
conclusions for the United States as a whole. 
Second, and related to the first, economic restructuring is a part of a broader 




Instead of seeking to divvy out responsibility for rising income inequality to sets of 
phenomena – e.g., economic restructuring, skill-biased technical change and the 
skill/unskilled wage gap, financial deregulation and the financialization of the 
economy, tax policy – I will emphasize the interrelationships between these 
phenomena and their net impact on the distribution of incomes across the United 
States. For example, Western and Rosenfeld (2011) empirically link de-unionization 
with rising wage inequality between 1973 and 2007. As I discussed in chapter 4, 
unions can impact wages for member and nonunion workers by influencing policy, 
investment schedules, wage norms and pushing employers to use higher wages to 
bribe workers away from organizing. The decline of organized labor also reduced the 
influence of labor on management (Western and Rosenfeld 2011). With that 
constraint removed, changes in executive regulation and increased instability from 
financial speculation pushed up CEO compensation (Hoskisson, Castleton and 
Withers 2009).  
Though union membership began to decline as a share of total employment 
earlier, researchers often point to 1981, and specifically Reagan’s victory over 
PATCO (Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization), as a major turning point 
(Sherman and Voss 2000; Levy and Temin 2007). The assault on organized labor was 
an intentional policy response to the post-Bretton Woods crisis; employers used 
corporate donations to influence legislators against pro-labor legislation (Hacker and 
Pierson 2010). But it also reflected the associated decline of manufacturing. Union 
coverage in private sector manufacturing is consistently almost twice that in the 




and Japan was a direct assault on the stronghold of organized labor in the United 
States.  
Causality moved in both directions – declining profits in manufacturing weakened 
US labor unions, but the political attack on unions reduced union coverage in 
manufacturing and, ultimately, wages and employment in that sector. By way of 
counter-example, a more militant labor movement in continental Europe in the late 
1960s and 1970s influenced policy that, in turn, led to different patterns of investment 
(Acemoglu 1998). In short, the development and adoption of new technologies is not 
an external development, it is institutionally constrained.  
In other words, the direction of technical change is institutionally constrained. 
New technologies complement some workers, so they become more 
productive/efficient, while making other workers/tasks redundant. In other words, 
technical change can be biased. Economists, in particular, associate rising inequality, 
especially in the 1980s, with skill-biased technical change (SBTC). Over the last half 
of the 20th century, technical change in the United States was skill biased, but over the 
first half, as noted in chapter 4, it was not (Williamson and Lindert 1980; Autor, Katz 
and Kearney 2008). 
The bias of technical change is generally treated as an exogenous condition of 
economic life, but research in directed technical change emphasizes that technical 
change and innovation/diffusion more broadly, like all other economic activities, 
respond to conditions of supply and demand (as discussed in chapter 1). Specifically, 
Acemoglu (1998) argues that the shift to SBTC in the 1970s in the United States 




young/relatively inexperienced) college-educated workers. Specifically, and 
consistent with Goldin and Katz (2010), he argues that technical change became skill-
biased in the decades before, but only in the 1980s, when the growth in the supply of 
college educated workers began to slow did the wage gap between more and less-
skilled workers expand. 
But Acemoglu (1998) also highlights that supply and demand are not just about 
raw numbers. As the case of continental Europe highlights, labor market rigidities, 
unbalanced tax policies and other regulations can influence research, development 
and capital investment, and can thus influence the direction of technical change. 
Though continental Europe generally had access to the same technologies driving 
SBTC in the United States and United Kingdom, inequality stayed low in these 
countries for several more decades (for the most part).  
Economic restructuring can also be tied to changes in family structure and the 
feminization of poverty (Wilson 1987):  
The decline of manufacturing, the loss of jobs to the suburbs, and the rise of 
low-wage service-sector employment dramatically reduce the number of 
inner-city jobs that pay wages sufficient to support a family. This situation 
leads, in turn, to high rates of unemployment and underemployment, and to 
shrinkage in the pool of male household heads financially able to support a 
family. Marriage thus becomes less attractive and less available to poor 
women, unwed childbearing increases, and female-headed families proliferate. 
(Albrecht et al 2000) 
 
Eggers and Massey (1992) and Albrecht et al (2000) found strong support for an 
association between structural transformation and increased levels of poverty, with 
family structure as a mediating variable, for black urban populations and nonurban 




Global competition created a sense of economic crisis, particularly in the power 
centers of organized labor. But as noted by Bluestone and Harrison (1984), the 
critical factor that would lead ultimately to rising inequality was the intentional 
response of firms. For decades, manufacturing had been a source of rising wages for 
millions of American workers, and those benefits spilled over to workers in other 
sectors. But in the post-Bretton Woods world, this arrangement was perceived by 
employers as excessively rigid and costly. They pulled investment out of permanent 
labor – wages in manufacturing, especially, stagnated as a result – and pushed for 
greater flexibility in labor and financial markets. We now turn our attention to those 
financial markets. 
Deregulation and Financialization. Another approach to explaining growing 
inequality in the United States, which has gained momentum since the credit crunch 
in 2007 and 2008, is to point to the financialization of the American economy 
(Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011; Hacker and Pierson 2010; Kenworthy 2010; 
Philippon and Reshef 2009; Rauh and Kaplan 2010; Sum et al 2008; Crotty 2009). 
Financialization of the economy has two components: the growth of the financial 
services sector and, relatedly, the financialization of non-financial firms 
(Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011) 
Arrighi (1994/2010) and others with a more global perspective often highlight a 
financialization of the global economy beginning in the dusk of the 1960s, with the 
move to floating exchange rates, the explosion of Eurocurrency markets and currency 
exchanges, and growing sovereign debt. For the United States alone, while there are 




financialization jumped in the 1980s. Financialization accelerated as firms sought 
external investment opportunities (financial expansion) and the state lost, 
intentionally or unintentionally, the capacity to regulate financial flows and products; 
that is to say, financial markets became effectively deregulated.  
In the United States, financial regulation at its height in the 1960s had three major 
components. The first were state laws that prevented intrastate banking. Only 12 
states allowed unrestricted statewide branching in 1970. The other 38 were 
deregulated by 1994 (Strahan 2002). The second were national regulations that 
prohibited the integration of particular activities within certain firms – e.g., 
commercial and investment banking (Glass-Steagall, 1933), and commercial banking 
and insurance (Bank Holding Act, 1956). The project to remove these restrictions 
began in earnest in 1987 and was complete in 1999 (Financial Services 
Modernization Act; Philippon and Reshef 2009). The third major form of regulation 
was interest rate ceilings, introduced with the Banking Reform Act of 1933 and 
removed between 1980 and 1984 (Philippon and Reshef 2009; Strahan 2002). 
The latter two were introduced in response to the Great Depression and were 
oriented towards greater financial stability by 1) limiting contagion and 2) controlling 
capital flows. State banking restrictions had their own, provincial logic, but also 
contributed in limiting the concentration of financial power. Combined with the 
stabilizing role of the Federal Deposit Insurance Company (FDIC), these regulations 
had an impressive track record. 
In turn, deregulation allowed financial firms to expand and diversify, and for 




rewards, deregulation was not left to institutional drift; Michael Lewis (1990) 
highlights Salomon Brothers trader Lewis Ranieri for his role in lobbying 
Washington to make an emerging sub-prime mortgage market possible and profitable. 
And as with the assault on organized labor, deregulation of finance was as much 
about execution as legislation. The SEC in the 1980s and 1990s “pulled back from 
their regulatory role and became cheerleaders for new financial arrangements” 
(Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011: 543). But the globalization of finance and new 
financial innovations (e.g., over-the-counter swaps and securities) created new fields 
of financial activity that were never regulated.  
Deregulation of financial activities combined with new sources of liquid financial 
capital. Federal Reserve chairman Paul Volcker raised interest rates as the 1970s 
came to a close, which stemmed inflation but also attracted capital flows to US banks. 
Reagan launched a wave of debt spending, somewhat reminiscent of the arms race 
launched a century earlier that ended the Long Depression, funded by high interest 
treasury bonds. And the migration of the center of global financial power from 
Washington to New York was complete. 
The impact of this financialization of the US economy on income (and wealth) 
inequality was twofold, direct and indirect. Directly, financial profits and 
compensation in financial services ballooned in the 1980s with the help of financial 
deregulation and the global financial surge (Philippon and Reshef 2009; Hacker and 
Pierson 2010). For example, the number of US billionaires in finance increased from 
8 to 104 between 1987 and 2012, or 8 to 52 in real terms (1987 US$). The percent of 




2012, author’s calculations). Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey (2013) estimate that 
between $5.8 to $6.6 trillion have been transferred to the financial sector since 1980. 
Profits in FIRE (finance, insurance and real estate) surged in the 1980s and 1990s 
(see Figure 5.4). 
 
Financial expansions have historically been associated with rising inequality in 
the global center of finance (Phillips 1993). One reason is that finance is scalable; 
while a manufacturing firm must employ more workers to expand production, a 
single financial trader can execute a deal of any size. While concentrating capital in 
the United States was a competitive advantage during the material expansion, during 
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Figure 5.4 FIRE Share of Corporate Profits
Source: BLS 2013; Notes: Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (FIRE); corporate profits in FIRE as a percent 




“Financialization appears to have crowded out capital investment in real productive 
assets” (Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011: 546). 
The indirect relationship between financialization and inequality is more complex, 
but fundamentally, financialization increases risk by shortening evaluation periods. 
The financial sector is in the unique position of being able to profit from uncertainty 
and instability, and it therefore has few incentives to pursue stability (Arrighi 
1994/2010; Lewis 1990; this problem has been perversely multiplied by the moral 
hazard of financial firms that are “too-big-to-fail”). Corporate raiders and stock 
market speculation added risk and instability to the economy (Crotty 2009) by 
shortening the time frame within which producers, especially the publicly traded 
variety, operated. Publicly traded companies became less interested in the long-term, 
invested relationships with labor that had prompted the Treaty of Detroit (Acemoglu 
2002). With less than half of corporate free cash going to reinvestment since 1980 
(Davis 2009), investors are not invested (in the non-financial sense of the term) in 
firms. 
This transition is often associated with the shareholder value model. Shareholders 
are the owners of the firm. The goal of the firm is to generate profits to enrich its 
owners – the shareholders. But the relationship between shareholder and firm, 
especially minority shareholders, is fundamentally different for a publicly traded 
company; they tend to respond to shorter time frames.  
In response to different incentives, management employs a different set of  
strategies: “Shareholder value strategies, such as mergers, layoffs, and investments in 




workers, but not to increased profitability” (Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011: 546; 
Fligstein and Shin 2007). In other words, the relationships between financialization, 
economic restructuring, and deunionization are reciprocal, and rising inequality is a 
product of their net effect on the distribution of wages and incomes. On one hand, 
wages for male workers have been stagnant for four decades. On the other, 
compensation in finance and to non-financial management has exploded - most of the 
gains have come in the form of stock and stock options (Frydman and Jentor 2010), a 
choice influenced, in part, by the tax code. 
Tax Policy. One half of the Reagan administration’s neoliberal assault was on 
government regulation – setting markets free. The other half was an assault on 
government fiscal policy. From this perspective, reducing spending was a winner on 
both ends. On one hand, government spending was worse than ineffective: Milton 
Friedman (1975) once said, “I say thank God for government waste. If government is 
doing bad things, it's only the waste that prevents the harm from being greater.” On 
the other, lower spending, and smaller government generally, meant that there was 
less need to collect market distorting taxes.  
Top marginal tax rates topped 90% in the 1940s and 1950s. Between 1963 and 
1965 the top rate fell to 70%. Then in 1981, only seven months after taking office, 
Reagan signed the Economic Recovery Tax Act into law. The law cut individual top 
marginal tax rates from 70% to 50% and reduced estate and corporate taxes. The Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 again reduced top marginal tax rates from 50% to 28%. 
While illuminating, a focus on top marginal tax rates is incomplete. They affect 




of those values changed over time as well. Beginning only in the 1980s were tax 
brackets adjusted for inflation, so the scale would slide over time. And top marginal 
rates do not account for deductions and exclusions. To account for these limitations, 
Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz (2012) report marginal tax rates by income group. For 
example, the tax rate for the richest 1% of Americans hovered around 50% between 
1960 and 1980, but then fell from 54% to 28% between 1980 and 1988. The 
correlations with top income shares is notable. The income share of this group (the 
richest 1%) held steady around 8% for two decades before the 1980s, then jumped 
from 8% to 13% as top tax rates fell (Piketty and Saez 2003). 
In response to tax cuts in the 1980s, a large literature in economics sought to 
estimate the economic impact of these cuts, and taxes in general, on federal revenues 
(a relationship generally described in terms of the Laffer curve from chapter 1) and 
incomes generally. A related literature looked at the relationship between tax rates 
and market incomes (incomes before taxes and transfers). If incomes at the top of the 
distribution are taxed at a very high rate, firms get more return on their investment on 
incomes further down the distribution. During the 1980s, the correlation between top 
marginal tax rates and income concentration is striking, and more sophisticated 
approaches also find a significant relationship between top tax rates, income 
concentration (Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz 2012) and distributional inequality (e.g., 
Gini coefficient; Altig and Carlstrom 1999): “Concretely, the two phenomena are 
perfectly correlated: the countries with the largest decreases in their top tax rates are 




most (especially when it comes to the remuneration of executives of large firms)” 
(Piketty 2014: 521).  
In summary, a host of related changes – deunionization, technological change, 
economic financialization, declining top marginal tax rates, etc. – allowed incomes to 
concentrate at the top of the distribution. This changes, though, did not occur in 
isolation. In the next section of this chapter, I detail the contradictions in the post-war 
spatial configuration that led ultimately to crisis, space for institutional reform, a 
reconfiguration of the world-economy, and rising inequality in the United States.  
Transformation of American Hegemony 
US global hegemony after World War II was built on three interdependent pillars 
– military, economic and financial power. The United States had the world’s most 
destructive military force – especially after the Korean war-inspired re-mobilization 
(OMB 2014: 185), and also had a physical presence around the world: “no state had 
previously based its own troops on the sovereign territory of other states in such 
extensive numbers for so long a peacetime period” (Krasner 1988: 21).  
The gross domestic product of the United States in Geary-Khamis dollars 
(adjusted for purchasing power) peaked over 40% of the global total in 1945 (Bolt 
and van Zanden 2013; author’s calculations; see Figure 5.2). Assuming a higher cost 
of commodities in the United States than the global average, US real GDP probably 
topped 50% of the global total in that year. If we combine the 12 countries of Western 
Europe with consistent coverage in the Maddison data (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the 




the United States would surpass that consortium in total production during World 
War II by about 60% and, after some convergence in the 1950s, would settle at 
around par in the 1960s (Figure 5.5). 
 
Finally, the United States, through World Wars I and II, assumed the role of the 
world’s banker from the United Kingdom. It printed the de facto global currency 
(through the Bretton Woods Agreement), it controlled more than half of the world’s 
gold reserves after World War II, and, in 1950, two-thirds of global monetary 
reserves (Eichengreen 1996: 114).  
The three pillars supported one another and also conferred a degree of moral and 
intellectual authority to the United States. Popular examples of their interdependence 
are the military industrial complex – the Korean and Cold War buildups helped 
resolve a liquidity issue from the demobilization after World War II (Arrighi 
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Figure 5.5 Ratio of GDP of Western Europe to the United States
Source: Bolt and van Zanden 2013; Notes: "Western European" includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 




for bad behavior. I discussed in chapter 4 how the United States exploited its military, 
financial and economic advantage to shape the emerging spatial configuration. 
But less than three decades later, in the 1970s, American hegemony was 
challenged on all three fronts. The French forced Nixon to scrap the Bretton Woods 
Agreement, and financial power shifted from Washington to New York. War in 
Vietnam critically wounded the perception of US military might, both in terms of 
capacity and as a moral force, domestically and internationally. US economic 
hegemony was fundamentally challenged with the reemergence of Western Europe 
and Japan as economic powers par excellence. Through the 1970s inflation, 
unemployment and energy prices spiked while the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell 
in real terms.  
Despite these challenges, by the 1990s the United States was again firmly 
entrenched as the global hegemon, perhaps more so than ever with the fall of the 
Soviet Union. New York was the center of global financial activity. The United States 
still had the world’s largest economy, almost by an order of magnitude (in the mid-
1990s, only Japan had a GDP more than 50% of the US, only Japan’s and Germany’s 
surpassed 25%, and only five other countries had a GDP greater than 10% of that in 
the US [World Bank 2013]), and it seemed to be in very good shape by the most 
popular indicators: unemployment and inflation fell back to healthy levels and the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average surged. And in a military exercise aimed in part at 
keeping a lid on energy prices, the US demonstrated in the Persian Gulf War that, 




In this context, the political scientist Francis Fukuyama famously argued in 1992, 
in stark contrast to my thesis, that we had reached the “end point of mankind’s 
ideological evolution”: 
a remarkable consensus concerning the legitimacy of liberal democracy as a 
system of government had emerged throughout the world over the past few 
years, as it conquered rival ideologies like hereditary monarchy, fascism, and 
most recently communism. . . . That is, while earlier forms of government 
were characterised by grave defects and irrationalities that led to their 
eventual collapse, liberal democracy was arguably free from such fundamental 
internal contradictions (Fukuyama 1992: Introduction). 
 
The perception of arrival is the natural product of a newly emerging configuration, a 
confluence of political, economic and institutional forms that seem free of the 
“irrationalities” that are exposed through time. 
But the structures of the world-economy and of the United States were 
fundamentally transformed between the 1960s and the 1990s, and the new “financial” 
regime that emerged through the 1980s reflected both an adaptation to and an active 
creation of these new realities. In the next section I explore the contradictions in the 
Keynesian Regime that were exposed between the 1960s and 1970s. I focus on the 
structure of US economic and financial hegemony in a world no longer defined by the 
scars of world war and economic crisis in the first half of the 20th century. I then turn 
to the political, economic and institutional adaptations to crisis. Finally, I explore the 
relationship between these adaptations and economic inequality in the United States – 
rising income inequality, a growing wage gap between more and less-educated 





Though perhaps more symbolic than mechanical, the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods Agreement between 1971 and 1973 succinctly captures the structural 
transformations of the global economy and ensuing crisis that would force a shift 
from the Keynesian to the financial inequality regime. Through the Agreement 
established in 1944, foreign currencies were pegged to the US dollar, and dollars 
were redeemable for gold at $35 per ounce. This system was different from the gold 
standard of the past in three critical ways. First, pegged exchange rates were 
adjustable in certain, specific situations. Second, states retained some control of 
international capital flows. Third, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was created 
as a form of international FDIC; it could extend financing to countries at the wrong 
end of a balance-of-payments imbalance (Eichengreen 1996).  
This system depended fundamentally on the United States as a financial anchor – 
the strength of the dollar and the ability of the Treasury to redeem dollars for gold. 
The latter seemed a safe bet given the size of its reserves (Eichengreen 1996). This 
meant that, barring a major and sustained turn in its balance of payments, the United 
States would be able to keep the value of the dollar fixed relative to gold, and a major 
and sustained turn was unlikely in the foreseeable future given the manufacturing 
prowess of the United States. In short, by building on the unique economic and 
financial position of the United States, the Bretton Woods System established a less 





The challenge in the late 1940s was to bring Europe back up to speed so they 
could re-establish currency convertibility without absorbing a stability-threatening 
current account deficit. “Postwar Europe had immense unsatisfied demands for 
foodstuffs, capital goods, and other merchandise produced in the United States and 
only limited capacity to produce goods for export; its consolidated trade deficit with 
the rest of the world rose to $5.8 billion in 1946 and $7.5 billion in 1947” 
(Eichengreen 1996: 98). 
Buying goods from the United States that Europeans could not produce 
domestically required US dollars. Dollars could be obtained by selling local currency 
or gold. If trade was balanced, that local currency and gold would be returned through 
the sale of exports. But in order to maintain a modest standard of living (and social 
harmony), European currencies were overvalued. As a result, imports were attractive 
and exports were uncompetitive. 
Near the end of 1949 twenty-four countries devalued their currencies, and in 1950 
war broke out in Korea. The former made European goods more attractive to 
international buyers, particularly the United States, and the latter increased US 
demand for goods both domestic and international. Over the next year the US current-
account surplus was cut in half (Eichengreen 1996). It took almost another decade, 
but on the last day of 1958, member countries of the European Payment Union 
restored currency convertibility and, finally, the Bretton Woods System swung into 
full effect. In other words, while the United States was still the global economic 




As noted in the last chapter, countries around the world built reserves with both 
gold and US dollars under the fundamental logic that the latter was convertible into 
the former at a fixed rate. And the system was stable as long as there was no question 
that the US gold reserves were sufficient to match foreign monetary liabilities – the 
value in gold of US dollars in foreign currency reserves. The Belgian economist 
Robert Triffin noted that this arrangement had the potential for a liquidity crisis that 
very much resembled a bank run: fear that the US could not meet its liabilities would 
incite a scramble to convert dollars into gold. He theorized that the United States 
would restrict the supply of dollars to inflate its value and encourage central banks to 
hold their dollars, but that other countries would respond in kind, pursuing 
deflationary policies. The result would be a global liquidity crisis. 
Triffin was wrong about the sequence of events that would lead to the collapse of 
the Bretton Woods System, an issue we will return to shortly, but the fundamental 
logic was correct: US foreign liabilities surged while a negatively trending current 
account put downward pressure on the value of the dollar (Arrighi 1994/2010). In 
short, the conditions that justified the the Bretton Woods System – US economic 
hegemony and massive gold and foreign currency reserves – were undermined. The 
US share of total global production fell to around 22% by 1970 (Bolt and van Zanden 
2013, author’s calculations) and US gold reserves fell from $20 billion at the end of 
the 1950s to half that by 1970 (Walter 1991). 
Through the 1960s the United States and other members of the Bretton Woods 
System launched a series of efforts to save gold convertibility. Domestically, these 




exports, even rules preventing US citizens from collecting gold coins. “The array of 
devices to which the Kennedy and Johnson administration resorted became positively 
embarrassing. . . . Dealing with the causes required reforming the international system 
in a way that diminished the dollar’s reserve-currency role, something the United 
States was still unwilling to contemplate” (Eicengreen 1996: 129). 
The United States was not alone in its desires to save the existing system. In 
addition to a number of bilateral arrangements to buy foreign currency to maintain 
workable exchange rates, the London Gold Pool aggregated gold reserves from eight 
central banks in an effort to defend the price of gold relative to the US dollar through 
interventions in the London gold market. Through these and other efforts, the system 
staggered along through the end of the 1960s before finally collapsing in 1971 when 
Nixon halted the conversion of US dollars for gold. (In 1980, the price of gold hit 
$615, 18 times the pegged value under the Bretton Woods Agreement [Green 2007].) 
It is not my argument that the failing of the Bretton Woods System caused income 
inequality in the United States to surge for the next four decades. Instead, it is my 
contention that the failing of the Bretton Woods reflects the end of a post-war 
material expansion that had sustained the previous low inequality regime in the 
United States; the Bretton Woods Agreement was a key component of that regime. 
So, why did the Bretton Woods System fall apart? The short answer is that it 
reflected the logic of a postwar global economy. In this geo-historical context, the 
United States was the economic anchor that could stabilize global finances – it was, 
after all, almost as large as the rest of the global economy combined. But this 




base, technology, and access to financial capital to rebound quickly. The US 
economic advantage, in reality, was organizational: 
As long as trade and production in Western European states and in their 
former colonies were organized by the mixture of familial and state capitalism 
which had emerged out of the disintegration of the nineteenth-century world 
market economy, US corporate capital had a decisive competitive advantage 
in conquering markets for final outputs and sources of primary inputs through 
direct investment and the vertical integration of the intervening sub-processes 
of production and exchange. But as an increasing proportion of European and 
former colonial trade and production was so conquered and reorganized, the 
further expansion of US corporations came to be constrained ever more tightly 
by the imposition of organizational barriers to entry that they created for one 
another (Arrighi 1994/2010: 312-3). 
 
The United States both underestimated the extent of the damage in the immediate 
aftermath of war and underestimated how quickly these economies could transition 
from dependents to competitors.  
This transition is made manifest materially in the current account balance. In less 
than two decades, the United States went from major net exporter to net importer.  
Nevertheless, the phase of material expansion of the 1950s and 1960s 
resembled all others in one key respect: its very unfolding resulted in a major 
intensification of competitive pressures on each and every governmental and 
business organization of the capitalist world-economy and in a consequent 
massive withdrawal of money capital from trade and production (Arrighi 
1994/2010: 307). 
  
Costs of production – rising prices for inputs – increased faster than new sources 
of demand were created, and the impact was felt in the 1970s in almost all core 
countries (Brenner 2006). Multinational firms and finance sought growth 
opportunities outside the United States, so that by 1966 US direct investment totaled 
7% of GNP, which ironically led Europeans to fret about an “American challenge” 




This latter development reflected another critical change in the structure of US 
global hegemony. In the turn of the decade between the 1940s and 1950s, 
Washington deployed finance as a political tool, targeting allies and the well behaved. 
Strict capital controls were imposed in Europe to jimmy rig the Bretton Woods 
System when fixed exchange rates were nonsensical economically.  
Then over the next two decades central banks and politicians in the United States 
and Europe lost control over financial flows. Finance as a share of US GDP grew. 
Debt spending in the United States infused the global financial system with more 
dollars. This combined with petrodollars, institutional investors in the United States 
and Europe (e.g., pension funds), and revenue from core firms that could not be 
profitably reinvested (Davis 2009; Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011). Despite 
explicit efforts in Washington to maintain control, finance was globalized and began 
to operate outside of political borders. This process was only further accelerated with 
the death of Bretton Woods, and now with flexible exchange rates, governments 
outside the United States found themselves free to spend (Arrighi 1994/2010). 
This transition is best represented by the expansion of the Eurodollar market. 
Eurodollars are simply deposits denominated in US dollars but held in banks outside 
the United States. Until the 1950s, US dollars that made their way outside the United 
States were generally repatriated either to buy US exports or invested in US money 
markets. But as the quantity of US dollars internationally grew so did the size of the 
Eurodollar market. US multinationals, particularly, exploited Euromarkets to acquire 




and transaction costs of domestic sources as Washington sought to crack down on 
financial flows.  
Foreign dollar loans that had previously come under the regulatory guidelines 
of examination of US government agencies simply moved out of their 
jurisdictional reach. The result has been the amassing of an immense volume 
of liquid funds and markets – the world of Eurodollar finance – outside the 
regulatory authority of any country or agency (Eugene Birnbaum of Chase 
Manhattan Bank, quoted in Frieden 1987: 85). 
 
The result was a global financial revolution:  
What is most striking about the last few decades is the liberalization of capital 
flows between the major countries and the incredible growth of the Euro-
markets, which has averaged about 30 per cent per year since the 1960s. This 
has so far outstripped the growth of global trade and output that financial 
flows now utterly dominate real flows between countries in quantitative terms 
(Walter 1991: 2000, quoted in Arrighi 1994/2010: 208). 
 
Despite these flesh wounds, the Bretton Woods System survived until member 
states lost faith. The back-breaking straw came from France, who demanded $191 
billion in gold in August 1971 (Frum 2000). This development reflects two 
interrelated structural changes. First, as already noted, the system failed to 
accommodate changing economic realities. Second, the United States no longer had 
the financial, economic or, arguably, military strength to impose its will on the 
economic system. France, and De Gaulle in particular, was never happy with the 
privileged position the system granted to the United States, but were particularly 
perturbed when the United States was able to exploit the system to help fund a war in 
Vietnam when the system had constrained France’s abilities to finance its own 
military efforts in Indochina (Eichengreen 1996). 
Overaccumulation in the core came to a head in the 1970s. On one hand, 




constant dollars, US GDP grew at an annualized rate of 3.2% and GDP in the Euro 
area at 3.5% (World Bank 2013, author’s calculations). Both figures are higher or on 
par with those in any decade since, and much of the slowdown from the 1960s can be 
attributed to the oil embargo in 1973 and 1974.  
On the other hand, there are clear signs that the 1970s marked the end of a 
material expansion. For example, capacity utilization, the ratio of industrial 
production to potential production, began to fall in the 1970s and continues to fall 
(see Figure 5.6). After accounting for business cycles, we can identify a clear (and 
statistically significant) downward trend in the percent of US productive capacity that 
can be profitably deployed. The Dow Jones Industrial Average was lower in 1982 
than it had been in 1966 in nominal terms, and was significantly lower in real terms 
(see Figure 5.7). Inflation spiked, as did unemployment. More fundamentally, there 





















Source: Fed 2013; Trough, peak and total are linear trends. Shaded areas identify periods of 





High inflation with high unemployment was particularly troublesome. In the 
strain of Keynesian economic thought popular in the day, governments could fight 
high unemployment with spending (which would increase the money supply and 
cause inflation), such that there was a negative relationship between the two. The 
portmanteau “stagflation” was coined to describe the scenario in the 1970s in which 
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High unemployment had two fundamental causes in the 1970s. The first was a 
recession brought on by OPEC’s oil embargo. High energy prices increased the cost 
of doing business. The second was that firms responded to narrowing profit margins, 
evidenced in the Dow Jones Industrial Average. Firms sought to reduce costs, but 
wage levels were relatively rigid, so they reduced the cost of labor by employing 
fewer laborers. Manufacturing alone dropped 3.6 million workers between October 
1974 and February 1975 (BLS 2013). 
High inflation reflected a few developments. As economic growth slowed, the 
growth of the money supply outpaced it and costs rose. The money supply was fed by 
government spending domestically and internationally (Vietnam). In the Bretton 
Woods world, excess dollars had to be absorbed in foreign reserves, giving the United 
States more fiscal flexibility. That was no longer the case.  
Finally, the OPEC oil embargo was not a random, external event. In a direct 
challenge to US hegemony, the oil exporting nations called out the US and Europe for 
supporting Israel. Much of the foreign policy of the United States since has been 
oriented towards remedying this uncertain dependence on foreign energy. It also 
highlighted one of the consequences of material expansion and causes of spatial 
reconfiguration – resource depletion: the United States had once been an oil exporter 
itself. 
These conditions created a sense of crisis in the United States that extended 
beyond the economic challenges the country was facing. Domestically, the 
government’s key levers of economic manipulation seemed to break. Internationally, 




and financial control. The result was a new ideological debate, a new set of rules 
governing economic activity, a new organization of production, and a shift in the 
distribution of economic activity in the United States by sector. In short, we changed 
what we make, how we make it, why we make it, and, ultimately, who benefits from 
it all. 
The Response 
“The recent stagnation of American incomes and the rise of inequality have their 
origins in the growth of global competition and specifically in a distinctive array of 
business strategies adopted by American corporate managers to cope” (Bluestone 
and Harrison 1984: xii, emphasis added). Economic competition is not an explanatory 
variable. New competition can prime change, but the exact response is made within 
the context of the existing economic, political and institutional environment: “the 
particular content and form of these changes are affected by the historically specific 
institutional arrangements that define the parameters and options available to social 
actors” (Prechel 2000: 2). 
Broadly, we can understand the response to crisis in the 1970s as a choice 
between domestic demand and comparative advantage. I noted in chapter 4 that 
transition to the Keynesian Regime can be summarized as a new emphasis on 
domestic demand and investment as the means for stable economic growth. Many of 
the institutional changes of the period were oriented towards securing higher wages 
for workers, while also paying for those wages by increasing productivity – physical 




On the other hand, as I noted at the beginning of this chapter, the United States 
emerged from World War II as the global economic hegemon. It exported foodstuffs, 
manufactured durables and capital around the world, particularly to Europe. Through 
the Bretton Woods System it was able to maintain a global economic and military 
presence, at a reduced cost for the latter and at a profit for the former. In other words, 
it was able to play domestic demand at home while exploiting comparative advantage 
internationally.  
But strong domestic demand was not limited to demanding domestically produced 
goods. The United States was the largest commercial market in the world, and in the 
1960s it became a major net importer (Arrighi 1994/2010). Strong domestic demand 
came into conflict with an international competitive advantage. The United States was 
able to spend its way to strong growth through most of the 1960s, but US firms 
increasingly opted to invest internationally, and spending failed to reign in 
unemployment in the 1970s. The US seemed to be faced with a choice: pursue a more 
autarkic, labor-oriented model of growth or reduce costs domestically – both wages 
and government spending – to retain an international economic and financial 
competitive advantage and global military presence.  
And this brings us to Milton Friedman. Upon his death in 2006, his obituary in 
The Economist proposed that “he was the most influential economist of the second 
half of the 20th century (Keynes died in 1946), possibly of all of it” (The Economist 
2006). And the juxtaposition with Keynes is no accident. While Keynes embodied the 




monetarist movement that became the principal ideological alternative post-Bretton 
Woods. 
The fundamental monetarist argument is that the money supply plays a major role 
in determining economic output/investment and consumption. The logic stands firmly 
in contrast to Keynesian-style fiscal policies. While Keynes’ General Theory favored 
government spending in a recession to boost confidence and demand, Friedman and 
his ilk argued that government spending merely increased the money supply and 
disrupted the equilibrium in the supply and demand for money (i.e., price inflation).  
For decades economists had noted an empirical tradeoff between inflation and 
unemployment. Government spending increased the supply of money, driving up 
prices, but was also correlated with falling unemployment rates (known as the 
Phillips curve). Friedman argued that this association was an illusion. Workers were 
fooled in the short term into believing that rising wages meant more purchasing 
power, so they returned to work for lower real wages. Unemployment then rebounded 
when workers adjusted their expectations and demanded higher wages. On top of that, 
inflation (and deflation) adds uncertainty and cost to termed contracts because agents 
must also consider the future value of money as well as the current value of 
goods/capital. 
Extending this concept more broadly, Friedman argued that government 
management of the economy could only produce illusory benefits. He argued in 
Capitalism and Freedom (1962) that the scope of government action should be 
limited to enforcing contracts, promoting competition, minimally managing the 




child”). Government intervention was not only a threat to economic efficiency but 
individual freedom broadly defined. "Concentrated power is not rendered harmless by 
the good intentions of those who create it" (Friedman 1962). 
This logic fundamentally contradicted the postwar social contract adopted 
throughout the West. Government intervention in the postwar era was oriented 
towards promoting domestic demand by securing higher wages for workers and 
benefits to those temporarily unemployed or unable to participate in the labor force. 
But Friedman argued that the government could not succeed. Instead, intervention 
only sustained economic inefficiencies and led to price inflation, both of which had 
real economic costs long term. On these grounds, Friedman won the Noble prize for 
economics in 1976 and Ronald Reagan argued in his first inaugural address in 1981 
that “government is not the solution to our problem; government is the problem”  
The paradigm shift in economic thought in the 1970s and 1980s was tangible 
(Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011). Of his own experience, Friedman noted in 1998 
that he was now part of “the mainstream of thought, not, as we were 50 years ago, a 
derided minority” (Friedman and Friedman 1998). That is not to say that Friedman 
single-handedly redirected American economic thought. Instead, he was the very 
capable messenger of a transition that reflected a change in the material conditions of 
economic life.  
The regime change of the 1970s and 1980s, in this light, was a product of 
institutional changes – e.g., deregulation of finance – that were the manifestation of 
subtle and explicit propaganda/lobbying from economic thinkers, like Friedman, and 




motivated by new forms of competition and guided by the evolving institutional 
environment. Business interests pointed to rising competition and falling profits and 
argued that labor costs and regulation were the cause. Guided by the economic 
philosophies of Friedman and his ilk, they stressed deregulation, tax cuts, declawing 
labor, and smaller government generally, and in the 1970s and 1980s their pleas were 
heeded (Harvey 2005).  
Reviewing the Narrative of 20th Century Inequality 
In the 1930s and 1940s, economic and political crisis destroyed financial and 
physical capital, infrastructure, social networks and organizations, and delegitimized 
institutions, polities and social ideologies. This laid the groundwork for a spatial 
reconfiguration and a new phase of material expansion. But the grounds for material 
expansion were finite. Only in the 1950s did the new configuration really take root, 
and in the 1960s evidence of the inherent contradictions in the system were becoming 
obvious.  
As competition intensified, financial capital was pulled out of productive 
enterprises in search of new investment opportunities. The mobility of capital, 
especially with the dawning of the digital age, meant that financial flows soon 
dwarfed trade and other processes of globalization. Perhaps more important, these 
flows were largely beyond the purview of geographically-defined states. Financial 
agents were able to exploit the inefficiencies and irrationalities of the US-centered 
Bretton Woods system, and the system became untenable.  
In the United States, the failure of the Bretton Woods system and the 




choices. Economic uncertainty in the 1970s was a product of the intersection of 
overaccumulation in the core and attacks on US hegemony more broadly. In this 
environment a new economic logic, represented best by Friedman’s monetarism, took 
root that explicitly contradicted the social contract of the last quarter century and 
offered a solution to the economic malaise. 
The new regime that emerged through the 1980s represented a thorough reversal 
of the Keynesian regime. Taxes on top incomes, labor unions, financial and other 
corporate regulations were scaled back or scrapped altogether. Weaker labor and 
shorter investment windows redirected investment strategies and, in turn, 
technological change; management was incentivized to maximize short-term profits, 
not long-term productivity.  
And the major economic indicators seemed to justify these changes, at least 
temporarily and for some. The Dow Jones Industrial Average surged through the 
1990s, and the United States (or at least those in a position to exploit global economic 
and financial growth) seemed as on top of the world as ever before. But this model 
required a sacrifice of “legitimate” demand (funded by income) in the name of 
lowering costs and controlling prices; domestic consumption was maintained through 
debt spending financed by the liberated financial services industry.  
The 21st Century Narrative 
The economic uncertainty of the 1970s was a distant memory to many as the 
United States reached “the end of history” in the 1990s. In constant terms (adjusted 
for inflation), the Dow Jones Industrial Average [DJIA] trebled between 1982 and 




calculations). GDP per capita in the United States grew at 2.6% per year between 
1991 and 2000 in constant terms. The United States even ran a budget surplus 
between 1998 and 2001; the last budget surplus was 1969, and in only seven other 
years did government revenues surpass outlays since the Great Depression (OMB 
2014: Table 1.1).  
But more important than the economic trends was the sense that we had 
discovered a perfect concoction of economic, political and social institutions in 
Western liberal democracy (Fukuyama 1992). The term “Washington Consensus” 
was coined in 1989 to describe a specific set of economic policies to be exported 
globally, and has been used more broadly in reference to the neoliberal ideal: free 
markets, monetarist, supply-side economics, and a minimalist state. “During [the 
1990s], the world has been under the impression that there was a clear and robust 
consensus about what a poor country should do to become more prosperous” (Naim 
1999). 
Of this period, Arrighi (1994/2010) wrote,  
the bourgeoisie of the West came to enjoy a belle époque  in many ways 
reminiscent of the “wonderful moment” of the European bourgeoisie eighty 
years earlier. The most striking similarity between the two belles époques has 
been the almost complete lack of realization on the part of their beneficiaries 
that the sudden and unprecedented prosperity that they had come to enjoy did 
not rest on a resolution of the crisis of accumulation that had preceded the 
beautiful times. On the contrary, the newly found prosperity rested on a shift 
of the crisis from one set of relations to another set of relations. It was only a 
matter of time before the crisis would re-emerge in more troublesome forms. 
(pg. 334-5) 
 
The euphoria of the 1990s soured in the next decade. The psychological landscape 
was altered by the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. The DJIA lost 33% of its 




decade, the DJIA only briefly topped its 2001 peak for about three cumulative months 
in 2007 in constant terms; in other words, after almost two decades of astronomical 
growth, stock market gains were negligible between 2001 and the end of 2013 (Fed 
2013). GDP per capita grew at 0.7% per year between 2001 and 2009. After eight 
total months of economic contraction between 1983 and 2000, the United States 
experienced 26 months of falling production in the first decade of the 21st century 
(World Bank 2013; NBER 2013).  
An unscientific study of book titles in the current affairs section of a bookstore 
suggests that the United States and the rest of the West, and their associated economic 
models, are in perpetual decline, or require dramatic overhauls to repair (following 
the authors’ diagnoses and prescription, of course). Economic stagnation, uncertainty, 
and debt, combined with rapid economic growth in China and other large but 
relatively poor economies, suggest that the current structure of the world-economy is 
being transformed. In this context we are faced with two pressing questions: 
1) Where does the financial crisis of 2007 fit?  
The financial crisis was deep, global, centered in the core, and threatened 
essential market processes. The crisis and ensuing recession inspired a new round of 
financial regulations, social protest against a system that seemed to enrich a few (e.g., 
the 1%) at the expense of the rest (the 99%), and measurably lowered income 
inequality. But income inequality in the United States quickly rebounded, and wealth 
inequality is probably higher than before. 




The financial crisis highlighted the fragility of a debt-funded financial expansion. 
Neoliberal economic orthodoxy stumbled, and the financial services industry is now 
subject to tighter regulation. There has been a significant shift in the sites of wealth 
generation and accumulation; China, in particular, has emerged as the global 
economic dynamo. As with previous transitions, national and international 
institutional arrangements and relationships are becoming archaic as they struggle to 
govern a global economy that is being materially reconstructed. The when and where 
are yet to be determined, but there are plenty of clues that the next inequality regime 
change is nearing. 
If inequality regime change in the United States is truly synchronized with 
Arrighi’s systemic cycles of accumulation, we should now be looking for a terminal 
crisis to mark the end of the US cycle of accumulation and the financial inequality 
regime. In the next section I take a closer look at the financial crisis of 2007: can we 
interpret a financial crunch with an impact on economic growth and political stability 
globally as the terminal crisis? While the crisis shared many characteristics with the 
Great Depression, it more appropriately understood as foreshadow to a terminal 
crisis. In the final section of this chapter, I note some indicators of a spatial 
configuration in crisis and speculate on future directions. 
The Financial Crisis of 2007-2009. The financial crisis of 2007-2009 was arguably 
the worst of its kind since the 1930s, and even shared many characteristics with the 
cataclysmic collapse that launched the Great Depression. Steven Gjerstad and Nobel 
Laureate Vernon Smith (2009) argued that 
[t]he events of the past 10 years have an eerie similarity to the period leading 




the current crisis had their origins in excessive consumer debt -- especially 
mortgage debt -- that was transmitted into the financial sector during a sharp 
downturn. 
 
For example, housing prices tripled between the end of the 1990s and the peak in 
2006, and the ratio of residential mortgage debt to household wealth almost tripled 
between 1920 and 1929 (.102 to .272; Gjerstad and Smith 2009).  
Other similarities may have been precluded by state intervention, motivated by 
research on the Great Depression. For example, Irving Fischer (1933) argued that the 
root of the Great Depression was over-indebtedness followed by deflation (making it 
more difficult for debtors to meet obligations). Friedman and Schwartz (1963) 
highlighted the constriction of the money supply. Then Federal Reserve Chair Ben 
Bernanke is a noted scholar of the Great Depression, and the eponymous “Bernanke 
Doctrine” is oriented towards combatting deflation. As a result, the Federal Reserve 
devised policy with an eye towards preventing Depression-style deflation.  
Fundamentally, though, the Great Depression and financial crisis of the last 
decade are similar in that both were big and both were global.  
In the United States, the financial crisis was intimately linked to falling house 
prices, which peaked in 2006. Then, between 2007 and 2012 median household 
wealth – about two thirds of which is composed of the value of the principal 
residence – fell 47% (Wolff 2012). The recession spread to other industries as those 
exposed to losses in the mortgage market were unable to meet their other obligations. 
Credit risk, measured as the gap between the interest rate on interbank loans (three 
month LIBOR) and short-term US government debt (three month T-Bill), tripled 




2013). Firms dependent on short term loans (commercial paper) to cover expenses 
were forced to scale back or halt operations. Between mid-2007 and February 2009, 
the value of the Dow Jones Industrial fell more than 50% (by way of comparison, the 
DJIA fell about 75% between the second half of 1929 and the end of 1931; Fed 
2013). 
The impact of the financial crisis and ensuing recession was not isolated to the 
United States. Global market capitalization (the total value of issued shares of 
publicly traded companies) fell more than 50% between October 2007 and February 
2009, losing $39.4 trillion dollars over that period (WFE 2013). GDP growth in high 
income countries, as defined by the World Bank, ground to a halt in 2008 and fell 
3.7% in 2009. On the other hand, GDP growth in middle and low-income countries 
continued, virtually unabated in the case of low-income countries (see Figure 5.9; 
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In the face of credit constraints, global trade fell 20% by volume between April 
2008 and May 2009, and 16% between October 2008 and January 2009 (CPB 2014). 
The value of global trade fell 23% between July 2008 and February 2009. Even more 
dramatic was the collapse in the trade of primary commodities. The real value of fuels 
fell 67% in the second half of 2008, and the real value of other primary commodities 
fell 40% (see Figure 5.10). In short, the crisis impacted finance, production and trade, 
rich and poor, but the impact was greater for the former than the latter. 
 
In an effort to unfreeze financial markets in the United States, Congress 
authorized the expenditure of $700 billion through the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(TARP) in October 2008. That number was later reduced to $475 billion. In the wake 
of the financial meltdown and expensive bailouts, public ire targeted the financial 
services industry and insufficient federal regulation of finance: the crisis originated in 
mortgages under conditions that would have been prohibited in the past; it spread to 
other firms through derivatives that were not regulated and were given top credit 
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in the new regulatory environment, became “too big to fail”. More generally, leverage 
(assets purchased with borrowed funds) had ballooned across firms and households in 
recent decades, multiplying gains in good times and losses in bad. 
The most visible manifestation of discontent was the beginning of the Occupy 
movement in 2011. Particular motives varied from site to site and occupant to 
occupant, but the movement represented a protest against the concentration of 
economic and political power in large corporations and the global financial system, 
with an emphasis on a perceived distinction between an empowered 1% and everyone 
else (the 99%).  
But even before the Occupy movement began in earnest, a sense of class conflict 
was growing publicly. In a survey conducted by the Pew Research Center, 47% of 
respondents in 2009 reported seeing strong or very strong conflicts between rich and 
poor in the United States. That figure jumped to 66% in 2011 (Morin and Motel 
2013). In another survey of marketing and public relations executives in the financial 
services industry, 81% said they were worried about negative public reaction to 
executive compensation in the financial industry, and more than half said that Occupy 
Wall Street had a real impact on the business (Benoit 2012). The International 
Monetary Fund feared “an explosion of social unrest” in the United States and Europe 
in response to the worst jobs crisis since the 1930s (Evans-Pritchard 2010). 
The most substantial policy response to these conditions was the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The Obama Administration sought 
a “sweeping overhaul of the financial regulatory system, a transformation on a scale 




Frank was signed into law in July 2010. On July 16 of that year, the headline in the 
Wall Street Journal read, “Law Remakes U.S. Financial Landscape,” and the authors 
claimed that the law represented a “rewrite of rules touching every corner of finance” 
(Paletta and Lucchetti 2010).  
Some major goals of the law were bringing transparency to derivatives (shifting 
many over-the-counter products to public exchanges), a procedure for winding down 
failing financial firms, and better regulation of credit rating agencies. Perhaps the 
most significant change was the “Volker Rule;” the fundamental logic of this rule, 
formalized only at the end of 2013, is to prohibit deposit-taking firms (commercial 
banks) from engaging in proprietary trading (investment banking). It is, essentially, a 
weakened version of Glass-Steagall.  
The ideological impact of the recession was more fundamental than angry 
protestors at the wrong end of a business cycle. 
For economists 2008 was a nightmare. The people who teach and research the 
discipline mocked by Thomas Carlyle, a 19th-century polemicist, as “the 
dismal science”, not only failed to spot the precipice, many forecast exactly 
the opposite—a tranquil stability they called the “great moderation” [a phrase 
attributed particularly to Ben Bernanke]. While the global economy is slowly 
healing, the subject is still in a state of flux, with students eager to learn what 
went wrong, but frustrated by what they are taught. (The Economist 2013: 
“Keynes New Heirs”) 
 
The Economist (2013) explicitly compared the state of 21st century, post-crisis 
Economics to the 1930s.  
In the early 1930s economics was in a terrible state. The global economy was 
stuck in a rut, and economists could not explain why. Two Britons changed 
things. In 1933, John Maynard Keynes, an economist at Cambridge 
University, supplied the raw ingredients: a new theory that explained how 
deficient demand could lead to persistent recessions and long-term 
unemployment. The ideas were radical but technical. They really took off 




simple model which quickly became the backbone of undergraduate teaching. 
(The Economist 2013: “Keynes New Heirs”) 
 
The ideological evolution at the International Monetary Fund [IMF] has been 
particularly interesting. Historically, the IMF has been the purveyor of the financial 
logic of the Washington Consensus to the world. In its mission to promote financial 
security, the IMF makes assistance to member countries contingent on meeting 
nominal goals in fiscal austerity; in response to the Asian financial crisis, the IMF 
also set targets for structural reforms. But in the onset of the financial crisis, then-
managing director Dominique Strauss-Kahn (2008) laid out the case for a “Targeted 
Fiscal Boost.” He argued that monetary policy is still the first line of defense, “But 
monetary policy may not be enough”. He offered two explanations for this. First, 
monetary policy may fail because banks “have suffered substantial capital losses and 
thus want to consolidate their balance sheets and avoid taking on additional risk”. 
Second, in language that Keynes might have used himself “there is a risk that if a 
slowdown really takes hold, it will be hard to shake off.”  
The pro-fiscal turn received another boost in 2013 when the IMF’s chief 
economist, Olivier Blanchard, released a working paper that suggested that the IMF 
has underestimated the fiscal multiplier (Blanchard and Leigh 2013); in other words, 
government spending can produce gains in the economy that exceed the original 
outlay. The IMF in its World Economic Outlook lowered some growth projections 
based on overzealous austerity and suggested that fiscal adjustment in some cases 
should be delayed (IMF 2012). 
It is in this environment that the Obama administration, in its 2009 spending 




inequality as a policy aim (OMB 2009). In the years since, income inequality has 
remained on the political agenda. 
In short, trillions of dollars of assets were destroyed (at least on paper), and trade 
networks were disrupted by the liquidity crunch. The government response was 
substantial: spending in the hundreds of billions and an overhaul of the financial 
regulatory framework. Public opinion shifted, academic orthodoxy has been critiqued, 
and income inequality became a legitimate target of policy. The financial crisis of 
2007 potentially recreated the conditions for a spatial reconfiguration and inequality 
regime change in the United States. 
And the immediate impact of the recession on the distribution of incomes across 
the United States was non-negligible. According to the Census Bureau, the Gini 
coefficient of household incomes fell .007 between 2006 and 2007, the largest single 
year drop since the 1960s (Census 2012: Table A-3). The income share of the top 1% 
(excluding capital gains) fell from 18.3% to 16.7% between 2007 and 2009, and, 
including capital gains, fell from 21.5% to 17.5% during that period (Piketty and Saez 
2003; updated to 2012). In other words, incomes became less concentrated at the top 
of the distribution and more broadly distributed throughout.  
But the impact of the recession on the distribution of incomes was temporary. 
While the richest 1% absorbed 49% of losses between 2007 and 2009, that same 
group captured 95% of the gains during the recovery between 2009 and 2012. Their 
share of total income, including capital gains, rebounded to 21.5% in 2012 and 
surpassed the 2007 peak in 2012 when you exclude capital gains (Piketty and Saez 




and 2007, recovered that value twice over by 2011, growing from .463 to .477 
(Census 2014: Table A-3). 
Top income shares recovered, and the conditions sustaining relatively low wealth 
inequality faltered. I noted earlier that the wealthiest are invested disproportionately 
in financial assets and the rest in their principal residence (i.e., their homes; Wolff 
2012). Housing and stock prices both began to fall in 2007, but the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average plummeted in 2008 while housing prices continued a slower 
descent (see Figure 5.11). Given the unequal composition of household wealth, this 
turn allowed non-wealthy households to grab a greater share of total wealth. But 
beginning in 2009, equity prices rebounded quickly while housing prices continued to 
fall, stabilizing only in 2011. The result is that median household wealth in the United 
States fell 47%, but the 100 wealthiest Americans were $279 billion wealthier in 2011 
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Figure 5.11 House Prices and Dow Jones Industrial Average, 2000 to 2013




Why was the crisis’ impact on inequality not more longstanding? The first part of 
the answer is that economic crises produce only temporary income compressions, as 
noted in chapter 4 (Atkinson and Morelli 2011). Asset prices can fluctuate more 
wildly than wages. Prices fall quickly during a crisis, but then rebound quickly 
afterwards. On the other hand, high unemployment tends to have a longer shelf life. 
Consequently, inequality tends to fall at the onset of the crisis, but then rise again 
after; this was the case with the Great Depression before the onset of World War II. 
Enduring inequality compression requires a more substantial material and 
institutional transformation. 
We have not yet seen that substantial transformation of the material and 
institutional organization of economic life, but this transformation may still be 
underway. For example, Dodd-Frank, though more than three years old, is largely 
incomplete. The law allows existing regulating bodies to propose specifics in how the 
law is executed, but regulators consistently miss deadlines (Villarreal 2013). A final 
version of the Volker Rule was recently published, and Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew 
allegedly warned bankers that the rule could be more stringent than they were 
expecting (Hopkins and Hamilton 2013). Working from an early draft proposal, 
Standard and Poor’s estimated that the rule “could reduce combined pretax earnings 
for the eight largest U.S. banks by up to $10 billion annually” (Harper 2012).  
Globally, the impact of new regulations is already palpable. Deutsche Bank 
estimates that employment in the ten largest financial firms will be 20% below its 
2010 peak in 2014, and average pay at Goldman Sachs and J.P. Morgan fell 5% in the 




and 25% from 2009 (The Economist 2014, “The Law of Small(er) numbers). J.P. 
Morgan claims that one in seven employees works in compliance (personal 
correspondence). “A failure to cut costs fast enough means that the industry’s 
profitability has been ruined. Average returns on equity for the biggest investment 
banks slumped to about 8% last year, according to McKinsey. Without deep cost cuts 
it reckons this figure will fall to 4% by 2019” (The Economist 2014, “The Law”).  
A second part of the answer as to why the impact of the crisis was short-lived is 
that the financial crisis was quickly followed by a second, related crisis – the 
sovereign debt crisis. In the United States, debt crisis was experienced primarily as 
sympathy pains from Europe (except where self-inflicted by Congressional gridlock) 
as interest rates on government debt have been at record lows. But anger over large 
bailouts to financial firms combined with the specter of a Southern European-style 
sovereign debt crisis inspired a more aggressive version of Friedman’s monetarism. 
Where the Occupy movement was the visual manifestation of anger over 
unrestrained corporate and financial power and the resulting economic inequalities 
and instability, the Tea Party was the manifestation of an ideological movement 
against government spending and regulation of economic life. The Tea Party echoes 
positions that have long been part of the Republican platform, but tend to be 
ideologically extreme. Tea Partyers do not actively support higher levels of income 
inequality in general, but by opposing progressive taxation (e.g., high top marginal 
tax rates) and progressive government spending, they oppose the most powerful 




In summary, the financial crisis temporarily reduced the size distribution of 
incomes, and it may have been a precursor to future changes, but the backlash against 
government intervention also highlights the indeterminate direction in which that 
change will ultimately flow. For example, Madestam, et al (2013) show that Tea 
Party organization affected political outcomes more than can be explained by latent 
attitudes alone. In other words, the direction of future change will be shaped by the 
efforts of social actors. 
Crisis and Synthesis. While the proximate cause of the crisis was unregulated 
mortgage backed securities and collateralized debt obligations, the fundamental origin 
was the mismatch between profit incentives in a new global economy and 20th 
century institutions and logics for organizing and regulating that activity. In the 
United States, wages have been stagnant for male workers for almost four decades 
(DeNavas-Walt, Proctor and Smith 2012). As a result, household income growth 
through the bottom half of the distribution has been anemic. Productive capacity and 
output continued to grow, both in the United States and elsewhere in the global 
economy, but capacity utilization (the ratio of actual to potential production based on 
the existing capital stock) in the United States slid steadily (Fed 2013). US firms and 
the global economy depended on demand from the world’s largest consumer market, 
the United States, but US household incomes were not keeping pace. 
The stopgap solution came in the form of debt spending, sovereign and consumer. 
Economic stability, low interest rates, and financial deregulation encouraged 
leveraged spending in the United States to compensate for stagnant wages. The 




(1982; 2006) spatial fix – excess capital absorbed in real estate. In 1999, Paul 
Krugman (1999/2008) foresaw a return to Depression-era economics as a result of 
“failures on the demand side of the economy” (pg. 182). 
Since the crisis, asset prices have surged in the United States, but full economic 
recovery in the core may be an impossible utopia. US unemployment has gradually 
fallen from a peak of 10% in 2009, but at 6.7% in December 2013 is still higher than 
at any point in the previous two decades (BLS 2013). Asset prices in the United 
States through January 2014 surged beyond what is justified by economic 
fundamentals (The Economist 2013, “More Bricks, Fewer Bubbles”). Of this 
condition, Larry Summers suggests that the rich world may be trapped in “secular 
stagnation,” in which saving outpaces investment (Summers 2013), a defining quality 
of a configuration in the final stages of a financial expansion.  
Economic instability in the core is not the only sign of the next spatial 
reconfiguration. Globally, sites of wealth generation and accumulation have been 
shifting. The obvious case is China. China averaged more than 10% growth between 
1990 and 2007, and in 2007 was producing 5.5 times more in constant terms than in 
1990. The Gross Domestic Product grew by $1.5 trillion between 2000 and 2007 (in 
2005 dollars), equal to about 3% of the global production in that year and 15% of 
global growth between 2000 and 2007 (World Bank 2013, author’s calculations). 
Aggregate measures of economic growth for China underestimate China’s 
economic transformation and, in turn, its transformative impact on the global 
economy. For example, 58 million Chinese live in provinces that would be classified 




(Tianjin, Beijing and Shanghai), and another 158 million will cross that threshold by 
2015 (Jiangsu, Inner Mongolia, Zhejian). The number of dollar billionaires in China 
increased from 8 to 95 between 2006 and 2012; by way of comparison, the number of 
billionaires in the United Kingdom, Germany and France, combined, increased from 
93 to 105 (Forbes 2012). And average (constant) wages across a sample of 14 
occupations in Shanghai almost tripled between 2000 and 2012 (UBS 2012; 
Korzeniewicz and Albrecht 2012; see Figure 5.12). In other words, wealth is quickly 
accumulating, and wage costs rising, in those parts of China that the rich world has 
increasingly become dependent on as a source of cheap labor.  
 
Perhaps more important that surging production in China will be China as an 
increasingly important destination for consumer goods. “In the 1950s and 1960s the 
world-economy was transformed by the emergence of the American consumer. Now 
China seems poised to become the next consumption superpower. In all likelihood, it 




has just overtaken Japan to become the world’s second-biggest consumer economy. 
Its roughly $3.3 trillion in private consumption is about 8% of the world total, and it 
has only just begun” (The Economist 2014, “Chinese Consumers”). Growing supply 
and demand from China will further transform global financial flows and sites of 
wealth accumulation. 
While China is the extreme example, both in terms of population size and the 
pace of growth, the global distribution of incomes more generally has been 
transformed in recent decades. Using GDP per capita and the within-country 
distribution of incomes from national surveys, I estimate the global distribution of 
incomes for 1980 and 2011. During that period, the distribution was reshaped from 
bimodal in 1980, clearly identifying a rich and poor world, to unimodal in 2011, 
reflecting a fundamental transformation in where wealth is produced and how it is 
then distributed (see Figure 5.13). 









The parallels with the world-economy a century earlier are significant. Germany 
and the United States, industrial latecomers, used British capital, the newest 
technologies, and relatively large populations to transform the global economy 
beyond what the arrangements of British liberalism could sustain. The result was 
interstate tension (an arms race and war), financial instability, chaos and inequality 
regime change (in the United States and elsewhere). If these similarities can hold up 
over time, we should expect a reconfiguration of the world-economy and a related 
inequality regime change in the United States. 
And in what direction will that take us? The challenge in prognosticating the 
direction of inequality change is that the period leading to a regime change creates 
space for social action but does not determine the outcome. But if we consider the 
principle dimensions of inequality change in the 20th century, some predictions are 
plausible. 
Rising wages in China have led some to predict a return of manufacturing to the 
United States. The Boston Consulting Group (Sirkin, Zinser and Rose 2013) 
explicitly laid out these expectations: 
Export manufacturing has recently become the unsung hero of the U.S. 
economy. . . . [T]he country’s exports have been growing more than seven 
times faster than GDP since 2005. As a share of the U.S. economy, in fact, 
exports are at their highest point in 50 years. . . . But this is likely to be just 
the beginning. We project that the U.S., as a result of its increasing 
competitiveness in manufacturing, will capture $70 billion to $115 billion in 
annual exports from other nations by the end of the decade. About two-thirds 
of these export gains could come from production shifts to the U.S. from 
leading European nations and Japan. By 2020, higher U.S. exports, combined 
with production work that will likely be “reshored” from China, could create 






Rising prices in China combined with falling energy prices in the United States have 
increased the country’s competitiveness in this sector.  
In addition to creating new jobs, the re-emergence of manufacturing in the US 
economy could empower labor. At first blush, manufacturing returning to the United 
States seems like a harbinger of good things to come for the labor movement. But the 
political environment is hardly nurturing; the victory against public-sector labor 
unions in Wisconsin, for example, highlighted this. And rich world manufacturing is 
about specialization, adaptability, speed and personalization. It is an economic 
activity completely distinct from the Fordist manufacturing of the past.   
New regulations and declining profits in the financial services industry could 
signal a definancialization of the US and global economies. That clearly seemed to be 
the case in 2008 as securitization (the process of pooling assets to sell to investors) 
and IPOs (initial public offerings) were well below high marks reached earlier in the 
decade. Both are important in the process of financialization as they add a degree of 
separation between asset creation (e.g., forming a new company) and ownership. As 
of 2013, IPOs and securitization were still well below their pre-crisis peaks but 





A key covariate of inequality change in the United States in the 20th century was 
the progressivity of federal income taxes. The focus since 2007 on sovereign debt 
would suggest that raising top tax rates would be a focal point on political agendas. 
But any effort to do so elicits cries of class warfare (the alternative to class warfare, 
we must presume, is acknowledging that the wealthy have already won). Top 
marginal tax rates will stay closer to 30% than 90%, barring a major new demand for 
revenues by the federal government. 
And what could drive that new demand? The most significant candidate is the 
same event that was a major impetus for the introduction of a federal income tax a 
century ago – total war. It is well beyond the scope of this paper to predict the 
outbreak of war on a global scale, but it is not unthinkable. The Economist (2013, 
“Look Back with Angst”) led its 2013 year-end issue by arguing that a “century on, 
there are uncomfortable parallels with the era that led to the outbreak of the first 
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accumulation, which predict that growing contradictions in the spatial configuration 
of global production would lead to interstate chaos . .  . again.  
It is this final variable that makes forecasting regime change difficult. No one in 
1913 or even 1929 could have predicted the coming transformation of the US and 
global economies. Income inequality in the United States today could plummet if 
interstate chaos paves the way for more financial regulation, more progressive income 
and estate taxes and a new era of material expansion, with manufacturing returning to 
the United States. On the other hand, change could reflect the emergence of the 
corporate inequality regime a century and a half ago: the remaining barriers to global 
horizontal and vertical integration of production could choke competition and funnel 
profits to those at the top. Does the rise of China and other emerging market 
economies signal the shift of economic power out of the United States, or will rising 
costs and consumption in those countries allow for a new material expansion in the 
United States? Will protests against the power and profits of large corporate and 
financial firms result in meaningful regulation, or will concerns about government 
regulation and capital flight win out? The answers to these questions will shape the 





Epilogue: Assessing the Argument 
I argued in chapter 1 that long-term trends in wealth and income concentration 
reflect changes in the spatial configuration of the world-economy. People, polities, 
institutions, networks, geographies, infrastructure, technologies, capital, etc. are 
located in space. Some components of the configuration are resistant to change (e.g., 
it is difficult to relocate most infrastructure), and the components of the configuration 
are interdependent (e.g., the implementation of a technology requires the co-location 
of people with the right skills, the right capital and infrastructure, the right geography 
in some cases, and the technology must diffuse through networks and over political 
and institutional boundaries). As a result of this resistance to change and 
interdependence of its components, the spatial configuration is durable over time.  
When change does occur it cascades through the entire system: new economic and 
political philosophies, new institutions to implement those philosophies, new 
productive and transportation technologies, and new infrastructure to handle the new 
technologies. Domestic and international hierarchies become unstable. The world-
economy is reconfigured.  
The spatial configuration structures the flow of wealth through the world-
economy; access in and across space to wealth-generating activities is regulated by 
the technologies, infrastructure, geography, institutions, polities, and networks of the 
existing spatial configuration. Wealth and income concentrates in the hands of those 
that are able to exploit wealth-generating activities and tap those markets where 
wealth has accumulated. The result is a relatively stable regime of wealth and income 




disrupted, there can be relatively rapid change in where and to whom wealth 
accumulates.  
How well does this model fit long-term trends in wealth and income concentration 
through US history? I break this discussion into three parts. First, what needs to be 
explained? In other words, what are the historical trends in wealth and income 
concentration in the United States? Second, is there a correlation between the 
dependent and independent variables, or do transitions between American inequality 
regimes correlate with the crises and reconfigurations of Arrighi’s systemic cycles of 
accumulation? Finally, can we establish causality from the independent to the 
dependent variable, or can we identify mechanisms linking spatial configurations to 
American inequality regimes? 
Empirically, the pattern of wealth and income concentration through the 20th 
century is well documented: income concentration fell markedly around World War 
II and began to rise again in the last quarter of the 20th century. The historical record 
on wealth inequality before the Civil War is a matter of debate, but both sides of that 
debate produce estimates that show wealth becoming more concentrated from the 
colonial period through the Civil War and peaking around World War I.  
It is also important to identify the principal beneficiaries in each period. The 
historical record is less clear on this count, but I identify patterns in the characteristics 
of those at the top of wealth and income distributions over time: Southern plantation 
owners through the colonial period; Northern merchants after the barriers of 
colonization and mercantilism began to break down, especially during the Napoleonic 




the financial services industry since 1970. Labor, though not at the top of the income 
distribution, was a principal beneficiary of arrangements in the post-war period.  
Combining the trends in wealth and income concentration with the characteristics 
of those at the top of the distribution, we can identify five distinct periods: low 
inequality across free resident households, but large categorical inequalities that 
benefitted Southern slave owners, through the colonial period; a commercial 
expansion, made possible by war in Europe, that produced America’s first dollar 
millionaires and a concentration of wealth between Independence and the Civil War; 
an explosion of huge corporate conglomerates after the Civil War, and the greater 
concentration of wealth and income in the hands of their owners and managers; a 
levelling of the distributions of wealth and income between the Great Depression and 
the 1970s; rising income inequality since the 1970s as incomes surged in management 
and finance.  
Do these five inequality regimes correlate with Arrighi’s systemic cycles of 
accumulation. The short answer is yes, as demonstrated in Figure 0.3 reproduced 
above. Synchronization in the 20th century is definitive: the Keynesian and financial 
inequality regimes on one hand, and the US-centered material and financial 
expansions on the other. Synchronization between inequality regime change and 
systemic cycles of accumulation is less obvious in the 18th and 19th centuries, but my 
historical account links the beginning of the British systemic cycle of accumulation 
with the transition to the commercial inequality regime in the last quarter of the 18th 
century, and the shift to British-centered financial expansion in the 19th century with 




Can we make the leap from correlation to causation? Though not definitive, the 
narratives of chapters 2 through 5 are suggestive. I mechanically link patterns in 
wealth and income concentration to the spatial configuration by 1) identifying global 
sites of wealth accumulation and 2) identifying the relevant barriers/facilitators to 
accessing those sites across different industries. For example, Europe was the key site 
of wealth accumulation through the colonial period, but technological limitations and 
institutional boundaries limited access to European markets; some plantation owners 
were able to accumulate large estates by skirting mercantilist restrictions and 
exploiting high prices for their exports.  
American merchants were the primary beneficiaries at the end of the 18th century 
when war in Europe gave them unique access to new markets. Early industrial titans 
were able to reap huge profits by riding rapid US economic growth on top of new 
organizational forms designed to limit competition. Global competition in the 1970s 
allowed managers and the financial services industry to rewrite New Deal legislation, 
extract investment out of labor, and move capital around to find new growth 
opportunities globally.  
Having established a plausible causal relationship between the spatial 
configuration and long term trends in wealth and income concentration in the United 
States, the next step is to rule out alternative explanations. But few truly alternative 
explanations exist. My approach does not contradict the existing literature on within-
country inequality; in fact, I draw heavily on those results (e.g., skill-biased technical 
change) to identify key mechanisms of inequality change in the various historical 




able to treat these processes endogenously. Consequently, my challenge is not to rule 
out alternative explanations, but to establish the interdependence of these alternative 
explanations within the spatial configuration of the world-economy. It is left to the 
reader to judge the extent to which I succeeded in doing this.  
Three other efforts do warrant special attention. First is Kuznets’ inverted-U curve 
hypothesis. Technically, Kuznets does not offer an alternative hypothesis to my own; 
the focus on sector dualism highlights wage gaps through the middle of the 
distribution, not income concentration at the top of the distribution. But I would also 
argue that Kuznets’ particular specification of the relationship between economic 
development and inequality is less important than the more general assumption that 
there is a relationship between development and inequality.  
I note in chapter 5 that productive arrangements can have distinctive inequality 
personalities; e.g., large-factory manufacturing can facilitate the organization of labor 
and increase productivity for moderately skilled workers, and thus be associated with 
lower levels of inequality. Linking development to within-country inequality, then, 
requires only that we assume a consistent pattern in the developmental pattern across 
countries – e.g., agriculture to manufacturing to service. Taken to its extreme, this 
logic suggests that global economic processes matter only in so far as they facilitate 
(e.g., diffusion of industrial technologies) or hinder (e.g. colonialism) national 
economic development.  
I forego a full examination of the empirical merits of the modernizationist 
approach to within-country inequality, and go only so far as to say that researchers 




and the correlation between the level of development and within-country inequality 
(Korzeniewicz and Moran 2005). It better serves my purposes to note that the history 
of economic development in the United States does not make sense in a strictly 
modernizationist framework. The industrialization of the American economy in the 
19th century was spurred by British technology and capital, and it was built on the 
labor of European immigrants; war in Europe at the beginning of the 20th century 
allowed the United States to become the global manufacturing and financial leader; 
global competition in the second half of the 20th century pushed the United States to 
develop a service-oriented economy; international trade policy played a role in the 
American Revolution and the Civil War, and belligerent trade policy tore apart the 
world-economy in the decade before World War II. The main characters in US 
economic history are both foreign and domestic; it does not seem prudent to extract 
this experience from its global-historical context and impose it elsewhere. 
The second effort is Goldin and Katz’s (2010) race between education and 
technology. Fundamentally, the argument is that technology and skill tend to be 
complementary, so new technology increases the demand for skill while education 
increases the supply of skilled workers. When technological change outpaces 
education, inequality increases with the skill premium. Again, this approach is not 
directly in contrast with my own as the race between education and technology will 
be made manifest more in the middle of the distribution. Also, innovation (technology 
and new techniques) and diffusion (education) are key components of my model. But 




The third effort only recently made its splash in the within-country inequality 
literature. Piketty (2014) argues that within-country inequality is a product of capital 
accumulation. In short, ownership of capital is more concentrated than incomes, so 
within-country inequality is driven by the ratio of returns to capital to national income 
(or the relative incomes of capitalists and workers), and exacerbated by the ratio of 
capital to national income (because it reflects the value of physical capital relative to 
human capital). The capital to income ratio tends to rise over time, returns to capital 
are fairly constant over time, so within-country inequality will rise over time unless 
capital is destroyed (reducing the capital to income ratio) or national income growth 
is extraordinary (greater than 5%). In Piketty’s account, within-country inequality in 
rich countries increased over the last few centuries with the exception of one 
historical moment (the Great Depression and World War II) that destroyed capital and 
produced extraordinary income growth rates. (I noted in chapter 4 the empirical 
problems with applying Piketty’s model to the Great Compression.) 
Reviewers have noted that constant returns to capital, if capital is allowed to 
accumulate relative to national income, seems to contradict the basic economic 
assumption of price reflecting the intersection of supply and demand—supply 
increases, demand does not, so price should fall (Milanovic 2013). Piketty himself 
posits that it is this assumption (that the accumulation of capital would lead to falling 
profits) that led Marx astray, “a historical prediction that turned out to be quite 
wrong” (Piketty 2014: 59). But Piketty’s position is not heretical economically, nor 
does it contradict the logic of overaccumulation; it only seems that way because he 




The logic of overaccumulation does not presuppose a falling return to capital 
overall, but falling profits in those markets that had received the heaviest investment 
(the dominant regime of accumulation). This results in a “negative judgment on the 
possibility of continuing to profit from the reinvestment of surplus capital in the 
material expansion of the world-economy” as it is currently configured (Arrighi 
1994/2010: 220). Capitalists in the center of the world-economy strategically 
specialize in high finance, and by finding new avenues for investment (and driving 
speculative bubbles) can forestall crisis and even enjoy a “wonderful moment;” 
Fukuyama (1992) is not alone in confusing the peak of a financial expansion for the 
resolution of the human dialectic. If we focus only on rich countries and treat them 
independently, as Piketty does, we can conclude that returns on investment are fairly 
constant and that the process of capital accumulation can continue indefinitely. But if 
we recognize that Britain before World War I managed high returns to capital by 
shifting capital flows to the United States and Germany, and that this ultimately 
destabilized the structure of the world-economy, we can see that the Great Depression 
and World War II were not exceptional historical moments, but products of systemic 
cycles of accumulation in the world-economy.  
In short, as I argued in the introduction, the quality that sets this project apart 
from other efforts of its kind is the more complete use of time and space. The United 
States does not develop economically, adopt new technologies, expand access to 
education, accumulate capital or find returns to that capital in a vacuum.   
Two arguments justify a focus on ‘domestic’ (instead of global) processes in the 




labor market institutions are important and 2) international trade and immigration are 
of insufficient magnitude to drive current trends. But when we extend the unit of 
analysis to include all relevant processes, we see that domestic labor market 
institutions are not independent of global processes and the magnitude of 
international trade and migration are not independent of domestic labor market 
institutions. To quote Wallerstein (1979: 35) one last time, we must recognize the 
importance of the “discontinuity between economic and political institutions.” In 
these overlapping spaces, economic actors deploy a range of strategies, not just price 
competition, to gain an advantage. In other words, competition is economic, political, 
ideological, and its impact is economic, political and ideological. These are not 
independent spheres of analysis, but interrelated components within the system of the 
world-economy.  
From this summation I offer two take-away messages. First, within-country 
inequality is a product of global processes in two key ways: 1) wealth accumulates in 
global space and 2) domestic economic and political ideologies, political and market 
institutions, and patterns of investment in infrastructure and technology are shaped by 
global competition. Second, within-country inequality is a conscious human 
objective. Economic actors intentionally deploy a set of strategies to grab a larger 
share of incomes. The success of any such strategy depends on the strength of the 
opposition and the structural conditions (emphasized in this dissertation) that can 
facilitate or deny exclusive access to wealth-generating activities. Institutional and 
technological change are choices, the products of conflict and negotiation, and 




United States today is rising because enough people wanted it to do so, and they 
deployed the right set of strategies to achieve that goal. The current trend will be 
reversed when enough people decide it is worth disrupting the status quo to 
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